Pendergraph v. Celebrezze

255 F. Supp. 313, 1966 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6600
CourtDistrict Court, M.D. North Carolina
DecidedJune 20, 1966
DocketC-124-D-65
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 255 F. Supp. 313 (Pendergraph v. Celebrezze) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Pendergraph v. Celebrezze, 255 F. Supp. 313, 1966 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6600 (M.D.N.C. 1966).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

EUGENE A. GORDON, District Judge.

On July 17, 1964, the plaintiff filed an application for a period of disability and for disability insurance benefits under the provisions of §§ 216(i) and 223 (a) of the Social Security Act as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 416(i) and 423(a). He alleged that he became unable to work on November 17, 1963, because of “loss of hip joint”. His application was disallowed on October 1, 1964, and on October 14, 1964, he requested that his application be reconsidered. On December 29, 1964, the plaintiff’s request for reconsideration was denied. Thereafter, on March 3, 1965, the plaintiff requested a hearing, which hearing was held on April 21, 1965, before Hearing Examiner, J. C. Goodwin, Esq. On April 30, 1965, the Hearing Examiner rendered his decision holding that the plaintiff had not established that he has an impairment of such severity as to preclude him from engaging in any substantial gainful activity and denied him a period of disability and disability insurance benefits. Thereafter, the Appeals Council, on May 24, 1965, held that the decision of the Hearing Examiner was correct, thereby making such decision the final decision of the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare. 20 C.F.R. § 404.951.

This action, seeking judicial review of the final decision of the Secretary, was commenced on July 22, 1965, following which the parties cross-moved for summary judgment.

As stated by the Hearing Examiner, the issues for decision are whether the plaintiff Is entitled to disability insurance benefits under § 223(a) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 423(a), and whether a period of disability may be established under § 216(i) of that Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 416 (i). The issues are dependent upon specific findings as to whether during the effective period of the application, filed July 17, 1964, and while the special earnings requirement was met, the claimant was under a disability in that he was unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of a medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or to be of long-continued and indefinite duration, and, if so, the beginning date of such disability.

The 1965 Amendments (P.L. 89-97) to § 223 of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S. C.A. § 423 redefined “disability” as:

“Inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.”

The differences in the standards need not concern the Court for as indicated, infra, the only question for decision is whether the plaintiff is able to engage in any substantial gainful activity, and he would otherwise meet the qualifications of either test.

*316 The Hearing Examiner further correctly stated that the evidence must establish that the claimant was under a disability as defined by the Act beginning on or before October 1, 1964, for entitlement to disability insurance benefits and on or before October 17, 1964, for establishment of a period of disability.

The Hearing Examiner decided that the plaintiff was not entitled to the aforesaid period of disability and disability insurance benefits finding that:

“(1) The claimant sustained an injury to his left hip and pelvis on November 7, 1960, including fractures of the left femoral neck, pelvic fractures, and a comminuted fracture of the right proximal fibula and a fracture of the tibial spine in the right knee. All of the fractures have healed except the femoral neck which developed aseptic necrosis and was eventually replaced by a Moore prosthesis.

(2) Due to some resorption of the femoral neck, the prosthesis is now unsatisfactory and claimant has more than a 60% loss of use of his left hip so that he walks with a cane and limps markedly on his left leg.

(3) Due to his impairment the claimant is unable to return to his former work of operating a ‘back hoe’ or other heavy equipment or of working in concrete, setting forms, or doing other heavy manual labor.

(4) There are many forms of sedentary work in the Durham, North Carolina, area in which claimant could be employed and to perform which he has the physical and mental capacity. In addition to these jobs, the claimant could be trained by the Vocational Rehabilitation Division to perform other types of work within his residual capacities and the services of this Division are available to him.

(5) The jobs which claimant is now qualified to perform constitute substantial gainful activity within the meaning of the Social Security Act.

(6) The claimant was not under a ‘disability’ within the meaning of the Act at any time during the effective life of his application of July 17, 1964.”

The sole issue before this Court is whether the decision of the Hearing Examiner (made the decision of the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare by the action of the Appeals Council) was supported by substantial evidence. In Thomas v. Celebrezze, 4 Cir., 331 F.2d 541, 543 (1964) the prescribed standard for judicial review is clearly set out by Judge Sobeloff as follows:

“The prescribed standard for review, found in section 205(g) of the Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 405(g) is as follows : ‘ * * * The findings of the Secretary as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive, * * *.’ Consolidated Edison Co. of New York v. N. L. R. B., 305 U.S. 197, 59 S.Ct. 206, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938). The Secretary, and not the courts, is charged with resolving conflicts in the evidence, and it is immaterial that the evidence before him will permit a conclusion inconsistent with his. Snyder v. Ribicoff, 307 F.2d 518, 520 (4th Cir. 1962). If his findings are supported by substantial evidence, the courts are bound to accept them. Underwood v. Ribicoff, 298 F.2d 850 (4th Cir. 1962). In short, the courts are not to try the case de novo. At the same time, they must not abdicate their traditional functions; they cannot escape their duty to scrutinize the ‘record as a whole’ to determine whether the conclusions reached are rational. Universal Camera Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 340 U.S. 474, 71 S.Ct. 456, 95 L.Ed. 456 (1951); Boyd v. Folsom, 257 F.2d 778 (3d Cir. 1958) * * * j-f * * * reijance hag been placed upon one portion of the record to the disregard of overwhelming evidence to the contrary, the courts are * * * bound to decide against the Secretary. * * * In such a circumstance the courts are empowered *317

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
255 F. Supp. 313, 1966 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6600, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pendergraph-v-celebrezze-ncmd-1966.