Peltz v. Bryson

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: April 24, 2026
• Docket: 23-3972
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 24 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

VERNON PELTZ; MARK BROWN; No. 23-3972 PATRICK GONZALEZ; ROY D.C. No. 4:23-cv-00094-RCC TRIPOLONI,

Plaintiffs - Appellants, MEMORANDUM*

v.

KYLE BRYSON, Honorable, Presiding Judge of the Superior Court of the State of Arizona, in and for County of Pima; VINCE ROBERTS, Honorable, Presiding Judge of the Consolidated Justice Court in and for the County of Pima; ANTONIO RIOJAS, Honorable, Presiding Magistrate of the Tucson City Court, County of Pima, State of Arizona; Unknown WAKEFIELD, named as TPD Wakefield, both individually and in his official capacity; Unknown SACHS, named as TPD Sachs, both individually and in his official capacity; WILLIAM CORRALES, named as TPD Sargent, both individually and in his official capacity; JEFFREY BERGIN,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. Raner C. Collins, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted April 22, 2026**

Before: LEE, DESAI, and JOHNSTONE, Circuit Judges.

Vernon Peltz, Mark Brown, Patrick Gonzalez, and Roy Tripoloni appeal pro

se from the district court’s judgment dismissing their 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action

alleging that the prohibition of videorecording in three Arizona courthouses

without judicial permission violated their First Amendment rights. We have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656

F.3d 1034, 1040 (9th Cir. 2011). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed plaintiffs’ action because plaintiffs

failed to allege facts sufficient to show that the recording prohibitions were

unreasonable or not viewpoint neutral. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009) (explaining that to avoid dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient

factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face” and that the court need not accept as true legal conclusions contained in the

complaint (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Sammartano v. First

Jud. Dist. Ct., in and for County of Carson City, 303 F.3d 959, 965-66 (9th Cir.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

2 23-3972 2002) (explaining that judicial complexes are nonpublic forums where the

government may impose reasonable and viewpoint-neutral restrictions), abrogated

on other grounds by Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying plaintiffs leave to

amend because amendment would have been futile. See Cervantes, 656 F.3d at

1041 (setting forth standard of review and explaining that dismissal without leave

to amend is proper when amendment would be futile).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying plaintiffs’ motion

for reimbursement of service expenses because defendant Bryson demonstrated

good cause. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(2) (requiring a court to impose on a defendant

the expenses of service if that defendant fails, without good cause, to sign and

return a waiver requested by a plaintiff); Est. of Darulis v. Garate, 401 F.3d 1060,

1063 (9th Cir. 2005) (setting forth standard of review).

We reject as meritless plaintiffs’ contention that the district court was

required to convert defendants’ motions to dismiss into motions for summary

judgment.

AFFIRMED.

3 23-3972