Pello v. Centerion

District Court, N.D. Indiana·Decided February 26, 2025·No. 3:24-cv-00206·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA SOUTH BEND DIVISION

JAMES MICHAEL PELLO,

Plaintiff,

v. CAUSE NO. 3:24-CV-206-JD-JEM

PAM COOL,

Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER James Michael Pello, a prisoner without a lawyer, is proceeding in this case “against Nurse Pam Cool in her individual capacity for money damages for deliberate indifference to an excessive risk to his safety in violation of the Eighth Amendment when she failed to assist him in the infirmary shower on or about April 19, 2023, causing him to fall and break his elbow[.]” ECF 6 at 5. Nurse Cool filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing Pello did not exhaust his available administrative remedies before filing this lawsuit. ECF 12. Pello filed a response, and Nurse Cool filed a reply. ECF 20, 22. Nurse Cool’s summary judgment motion is now fully briefed and ripe for ruling. Summary judgment must be granted when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a). A genuine issue of material fact exists when “the evidence is such that a reasonable [factfinder] could [find] for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). To determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the court must construe all facts in the light most favorable

to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. Heft v. Moore, 351 F.3d 278, 282 (7th Cir. 2003). A party opposing a properly supported summary judgment motion may not rely merely on allegations or denials in its own pleading but must “marshal and present the court with the evidence she contends will prove her case.” Goodman v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, Inc., 621 F.3d 651, 654 (7th Cir. 2010). Prisoners are prohibited from bringing an action in federal court with respect to

prison conditions “until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). “[A] suit filed by a prisoner before administrative remedies have been exhausted must be dismissed; the district court lacks discretion to resolve the claim on the merits, even if the prisoner exhausts intra-prison remedies before judgment.” Perez v. Wisconsin Dep’t of Corr., 182 F.3d 532, 535 (7th Cir. 1999). “Failure to

exhaust is an affirmative defense that a defendant has the burden of proving.” King v. McCarty, 781 F.3d 889, 893 (7th Cir. 2015). The Seventh Circuit has taken a “strict compliance approach to exhaustion.” Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804, 809 (7th Cir. 2006). Thus, “unless the prisoner completes the administrative process by following the rules the state has established for that process,

exhaustion has not occurred.” Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1023 (7th Cir. 2002). However, inmates are only required to exhaust administrative remedies that are “available.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 102 (2006). The availability of a remedy is not a matter of what appears “on paper,” but rather whether the process was in actuality available for the prisoner to pursue. Kaba v. Stepp, 458 F.3d 678, 684 (7th Cir. 2006). Thus, when prison staff hinder an inmate’s ability to use the administrative process,

administrative remedies are not considered “available.” Id. In essence, “[p]rison officials may not take unfair advantage of the exhaustion requirement . . . and a remedy becomes ‘unavailable’ if prison employees do not respond to a properly filed grievance or otherwise use affirmative misconduct to prevent a prisoner from exhausting.” Dole, 438 F.3d at 809. Nurse Cool provides an affidavit from the Grievance Specialist at Miami

Correctional Facility (“MCF”) and Pello’s grievance records, which show the following facts: At all relevant times, an Offender Grievance Process was in place at MCF and available to Pello. ECF 15-1 at 2. To fully exhaust a grievance, Pello needed to complete three steps. Id. at 2, 11. First, Pello needed to submit a completed State Form 45471, “Offender Grievance” form, within ten business days from the date of the incident

giving rise to the complaint. Id. at 17. Second, once Pello received a response to his grievance from the Grievance Specialist, he needed to initiate a Level I appeal to the warden by completing a State Form 45473, “Grievance Appeal” form, and submitting the completed form to the Grievance Specialist within five business days from the date of the grievance response. Id. at 20. Third, once Pello received a response to his appeal

from the warden, he needed to initiate a Level II appeal to the Department Grievance Manager by checking the “Disagree” box on the bottom of the Grievance Appeal form and sign and submit the form to the Grievance Specialist within five business days of the warden’s response. Id. at 21. Pello’s grievance records show he submitted a relevant grievance and a Level I appeal to the warden, but did not properly initiate a Level II appeal to the Department Grievance Manager to fully exhaust the grievance. Id. at 5-6.

Specifically, the grievance records show Pello submitted Grievance No. 145624 on April 20, 2023, complaining he fell in the shower and was denied adequate medical care. ECF 15-1 at 5, 24. On June 19, 2023, the grievance office issued a response denying Grievance 145624 on its merits. Id. at 5, 27. On June 23, 2023, Pello submitted a Grievance Appeal form to initiate a Level I appeal to the warden (“June 23 Grievance Appeal form”). Id. at 5, 29. On June 26, 2023, the warden filled out and signed the

“Facility level response” portion of the June 23 Grievance Appeal form, denying the appeal on its merits. Id. at 29. On June 29, 2023, the warden returned the June 23 Grievance Appeal form to Pello. Id. at 5, 29-30. At that point, in order to initiate a Level II appeal to the Department Grievance Manager, Pello needed to check the “Disagree” box on the June 23 Grievance Appeal form beneath the warden’s “Facility level

response,” sign and date the form, and return the completed form to the Grievance Specialist. Id. at 4, 21. But Pello did not follow this procedure. Id. at 6, 29. Instead, Pello submitted a new Grievance Appeal form on June 30, 2023, attempting to appeal the warden’s response to his Level I appeal (“June 30 Grievance Appeal form”). Id. at 6, 35.1 On July 5, 2023, the Grievance Specialist returned Pello’s June 30 Grievance Appeal

form and informed Pello in writing he needed to “follow policy” to appeal the grievance response by checking “Disagree” on the bottom of the June 23 Grievance

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