Pellini v. Pellini, No. Fa97 0157708 (Oct. 22, 1999)

1999 Conn. Super. Ct. 13973
CourtConnecticut Superior Court
DecidedOctober 22, 1999
DocketNo. FA97 0157708
StatusUnpublished

This text of 1999 Conn. Super. Ct. 13973 (Pellini v. Pellini, No. Fa97 0157708 (Oct. 22, 1999)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Connecticut Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Pellini v. Pellini, No. Fa97 0157708 (Oct. 22, 1999), 1999 Conn. Super. Ct. 13973 (Colo. Ct. App. 1999).

Opinion

[EDITOR'S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicated by the issuing court.]

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
This is an action for the dissolution of marriage and related relief. The plaintiff, whose maiden name was Caterina Scaturchio, and the defendant were married on January 19, 1991, in Stamford, Connecticut. At least one of the parties to this marriage, for at least twelve months next preceding the date of the filing of the complaint, has been a resident of the State of Connecticut; therefore, this court does have jurisdiction. There are two minor CT Page 13974 children issue of this marriage, Jade Pellini, born on July 11, 1991 and Dylan Pellini, born July 30, 1993. Neither the State of Connecticut nor any town thereof is contributing or has contributed to the support or maintenance of either party. The marriage of the parties has broken down irretrievably and a decree of dissolution shall enter on that ground.

The plaintiff wife is 36 years old. This is her second marriage. She graduated from high school in or about 1980, and has one year post-secondary education at SUNY. At the time of the marriage, she worked as a waitress. At some time thereafter, she went to beautician school, and obtained a licensed as a hairdresser and cosmetologist. The plaintiff started work in that field in approximately 1997. She now works on a part-time basis, one and sometimes two days per week. Her earnings are as reflected on her amended financial affidavit, $120 gross and $120 net per week. The court assumes by this that plaintiff does not withhold for taxes. During the marriage the plaintiff has also been the homemaker and primary caretaker of the children.

The defendant husband is 39 years old. His health is good. He, too, is a high school graduate having graduated in or about 1978. The defendant has been continuously employed as a carpenter at Pitney-Bowes since 1979 or 1980. He also has over-time and odd job work as reflected on his financial affidavit. His total weekly gross earnings are approximately $1,103 and his weekly net earnings, after deducting for taxes and health insurance are approximately $881.

There are several other matters which require further mention. The first concerns the marital home at 19 Wells Avenue in Stamford. The home was purchased in 1993, and title was taken solely in the name of the defendant. It has been, and remains the residence of the plaintiff and the children. Both parties have asserted competing, different claims to the home. This court does not believe that either's claim is satisfactory. Therefore, the court has fashioned its own orders concerning the home in the context of its other financial orders.

Second, the court has determined that periodic alimony to the plaintiff of a rehabilitative nature for a period of time is appropriate. The court cannot find that the plaintiff has a present earning capacity in excess of her current earnings. However, both children are of full-time school age, the plaintiff does work only one or two days per week, and her reasons for not CT Page 13975 attempting to secure fuller employment are not completely persuasive. The court believes that given an appropriate period of time, and based upon her work skills and history, she should be able to become more self-sufficient.

Third, the parties entered into a pendente lite stipulation on or about May 12, 1997. Pursuant to that stipulation, the defendant has certain financial obligations to or for the benefit of the children. The court finds that there is an arrearage due the plaintiff from the defendant in the amount of $2,345 for Playschool expenses and $468 for uncovered or unreimbursed medical or dental expenses, for a total of $2,813. This arrearage shall survive the decree. Again, the court will enter an order concerning disposition of this arrearage.

Fourth, the defendant claimed at trial that the plaintiff had "keyed" or damaged his car and motorcycle. The court does find that the plaintiff did damage the same. The loss to the defendant was in the sum of $1,917. Though the court does not enter a separate and distinct order concerning the same, the court has considered this and dealt with it in the totality of all of its financial orders.

Fifth, and finally, the court finds that during the pendency of this action, the defendant sold or liquidated approximately $10,000 of Pitney-Bowes stock apparently for his own use or benefit. This was in contravention of the automatic orders, P.B. § 25-5, as well as the parties' own aforementioned stipulation. Again, the court has considered this and resolved it within the context of its financial orders.

The court last addresses, briefly, the cause of the breakdown of this marriage. There was friction of an unspecified nature for several years. The defendant moved out of the marital home in or about mid-1997; the plaintiff has been dating and has the same steady boyfriend since that same time. On the basis of the record before it, this court cannot and does not attribute fault for the breakdown of the marriage more to one party than the other.

This court has considered all of the evidence and the statutes made and provided for dissolution of marriage actions in Chapter 815j of the General Statutes, including but not limited to C.G.S. §§ 46b-62, 81, and 82, and hereby enters the following orders: CT Page 13976

(1) The marriage of the parties is dissolved on the grounds of an irretrievable breakdown.

(2) The plaintiff and the defendant shall have joint legal custody of the minor children issue of the marriage; the plaintiff shall have primary physical custody, and the defendant shall have visitation rights in accordance with the parties' pendente lite stipulation of June 9, 1999, which is adopted and incorporated by reference herein.

(3) The defendant shall pay to the plaintiff, as and for periodic alimony and child support, the following:

(a) Until such time as the sale of the marital home occurs as set forth hereinafter, the defendant shall pay to the plaintiff as and for unallocated alimony and child support, the mortgage, taxes, insurance and reasonable and customary utilities on and for the marital home, plus $1,000 per month in equal semi-monthly installments on the first and fifteenth of each month, in advance, effective November 1, 1999;

(b) At such time and following the sale of the marital home as set forth hereinafter, the defendant shall pay to the plaintiff as and for periodic alimony the sum of $1,000 per month, and as and for child support the sum of $1,200 per month, with each payable in equal semi-monthly installments on the first and fifteenth of each month, in advance.

(c) Said alimony as set forth in subparagraphs (a) and (b), above, shall terminate upon the happening of any of the following events, whichever first occurs: the plaintiffs death, the defendant's death, the plaintiffs remarriage, the plaintiffs cohabitation with an unrelated male pursuant to C.G.S. § 46b-86 (b), or upon five (5) years from the date hereof. In the event of termination prior to the sale of the marital home, either party may move the court to set a child support order.

(d) A contingent wage withholding order shall issue against the defendant to satisfy his obligations hereunder.

(4) The defendant shall pay to the plaintiff the pendente lite arrearage of $2,813 as follows:

(a)

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

§ 46b-62
Connecticut § 46b-62
§ 46b-86
Connecticut § 46b-86(b)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
1999 Conn. Super. Ct. 13973, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pellini-v-pellini-no-fa97-0157708-oct-22-1999-connsuperct-1999.