Pelletier v. Colonial Lloyds

Louisiana Court of Appeal

Pelletier v. Colonial Lloyds

649 So. 2d 31, 94 La.App. 1 Cir. 0363, 1994 La. App. LEXIS 3636, 1994 WL 739194

CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal

DecidedDecember 22, 1994

DocketNo. 94 CA 0363

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 649 So. 2d 31 (Pelletier v. Colonial Lloyds) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Pelletier v. Colonial Lloyds, 649 So. 2d 31, 94 La.App. 1 Cir. 0363, 1994 La. App. LEXIS 3636, 1994 WL 739194 (La. Ct. App. 1994).

Pincite

Opinion

I2PARRO, Judge.

Appellant, Charles E. Pelletier, Jr., devolu-tively appealed from a judgment rendered by the trial court dismissing the claims of him and his wife, Laura Pelletier, against State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (“State Farm”). Based on stipulated facts and documents only, the trial judge concluded, as a matter of law, that pursuant to the provisions of LSA-R.S. 22:1406(D)(l)(e), the Pelletiers were not entitled to uninsured motorist (“UM”) coverage.¹

Briefly, the stipulated facts indicate that on July 31, 1990, Mr. Pelletier was injured while driving a car which was registered and titled in his wife’s name subsequent to their marriage. Mrs. Pelletier maintained liability insurance on this car, but she elected to exclude uninsured motorist coverage in this policy. The insurance with State Farm on Mr. Pelletier’s vehicle, however, did provide uninsured motorist coverage, and he sought to recover damages under that policy, even though the car titled in his wife’s name only was not listed as a covered auto. Mr. Pelleti[32]*32er contends that the vehicle in which he was injured was not “owned” by him; rather his wife was the “owner,” as that term is defined by LSA-R.S. 32:851(8).² The trial court rejected this argument, determining that Mr. Pelletier was, indeed, an “owner” of his wife’s car by virtue of Louisiana’s community property laws, and therefore, LSA-R.S. 22:1406(D)(l)(e) operated to prohibit him from recovering under the UM provision of the policy covering his vehicle.

The facts are not disputed in this case, and accordingly, the doctrine of manifest error is not applicable in appellate review of the trial court’s decision. Maryland Casualty Company v. Dixie Insurance Company, 622 So.2d 698, 701 (La.App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 629 So.2d 1138-39 (La.1993). Grounded in the stipulated facts and documentation presented at trial, the only issue before us concerns the trial court’s | .^determination that Mr. Pelletier “owned” the vehicle in which he was injured, which operated to exclude him from the UM coverage of the State Farm policy on the other vehicle. Appellate review of questions of law is simply review of whether the trial court was legally correct or legally incorrect. O’Niell v. Louisiana Power & Light Company, 558 So.2d 1235, 1238 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1990).

The precise issue raised in this appeal was recently addressed in the case of Iles v. American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Company, 93-1149 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 5/4/94), 640 So.2d 451, writ denied, 94-1449 (La. 9/23/94), 642 So.2d 1292. In that case, the court concluded that a husband who was not named as the registered (titled) owner of a community automobile was nevertheless an “owner” within the meaning of LSA-R.S. 22:1406(D)(l)(e) despite the definition of “owner” set forth in LSA-R.S. 32:1(45).³ Therefore, his claim for UM coverage was subject to an “ownership exclusion” provision contained in a policy covering him as an insured since his policy did not list the community automobile as a “covered auto.” Id. at 452-53. We agree with that conclusion and the reasoning of the court.

Therefore, after a thorough review and evaluation of the entire record, we conclude that the trial court was legally correct in its decision. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Costs are assessed to Mr. Pelletier.

AFFIRMED.

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I2PARRO, Judge.

Appellant, Charles E. Pelletier, Jr., devolu-tively appealed from a judgment rendered by the trial court dismissing the claims of him and his wife, Laura Pelletier, against State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (“State Farm”). Based on stipulated facts and documents only, the trial judge concluded, as a matter of law, that pursuant to the provisions of LSA-R.S. 22:1406(D)(l)(e), the Pelletiers were not entitled to uninsured motorist (“UM”) coverage.¹

Briefly, the stipulated facts indicate that on July 31, 1990, Mr. Pelletier was injured while driving a car which was registered and titled in his wife’s name subsequent to their marriage. Mrs. Pelletier maintained liability insurance on this car, but she elected to exclude uninsured motorist coverage in this policy. The insurance with State Farm on Mr. Pelletier’s vehicle, however, did provide uninsured motorist coverage, and he sought to recover damages under that policy, even though the car titled in his wife’s name only was not listed as a covered auto. Mr. Pelleti[32]*32er contends that the vehicle in which he was injured was not “owned” by him; rather his wife was the “owner,” as that term is defined by LSA-R.S. 32:851(8).² The trial court rejected this argument, determining that Mr. Pelletier was, indeed, an “owner” of his wife’s car by virtue of Louisiana’s community property laws, and therefore, LSA-R.S. 22:1406(D)(l)(e) operated to prohibit him from recovering under the UM provision of the policy covering his vehicle.

The facts are not disputed in this case, and accordingly, the doctrine of manifest error is not applicable in appellate review of the trial court’s decision. Maryland Casualty Company v. Dixie Insurance Company, 622 So.2d 698, 701 (La.App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 629 So.2d 1138-39 (La.1993). Grounded in the stipulated facts and documentation presented at trial, the only issue before us concerns the trial court’s | .^determination that Mr. Pelletier “owned” the vehicle in which he was injured, which operated to exclude him from the UM coverage of the State Farm policy on the other vehicle. Appellate review of questions of law is simply review of whether the trial court was legally correct or legally incorrect. O’Niell v. Louisiana Power & Light Company, 558 So.2d 1235, 1238 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1990).

The precise issue raised in this appeal was recently addressed in the case of Iles v. American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Company, 93-1149 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 5/4/94), 640 So.2d 451, writ denied, 94-1449 (La. 9/23/94), 642 So.2d 1292. In that case, the court concluded that a husband who was not named as the registered (titled) owner of a community automobile was nevertheless an “owner” within the meaning of LSA-R.S. 22:1406(D)(l)(e) despite the definition of “owner” set forth in LSA-R.S. 32:1(45).³ Therefore, his claim for UM coverage was subject to an “ownership exclusion” provision contained in a policy covering him as an insured since his policy did not list the community automobile as a “covered auto.” Id. at 452-53. We agree with that conclusion and the reasoning of the court.

Therefore, after a thorough review and evaluation of the entire record, we conclude that the trial court was legally correct in its decision. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Costs are assessed to Mr. Pelletier.

AFFIRMED.

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649 So. 2d 31, 94 La.App. 1 Cir. 0363, 1994 La. App. LEXIS 3636, 1994 WL 739194, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pelletier-v-colonial-lloyds-lactapp-1994.

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