Pellegrino v. Fallahee

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. New York
DecidedJune 28, 2021
Docket1:19-cv-01412
StatusUnknown

This text of Pellegrino v. Fallahee (Pellegrino v. Fallahee) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Pellegrino v. Fallahee, (W.D.N.Y. 2021).

Opinion

EP Set Fes RT UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT va WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK Cans 8 2021 7 MARK PELLEGRINO, ——

Plaintiff, v. 19-CV-1412 (JLS) GEORGE FALLAHKEE, et al.,

Defendants.

DECISION AND ORDER Pro se Plaintiff Mark Pellegrino commenced this action on October 21, 2019, alleging violations of his rights to due process and equal protection under “the United States Constitution or by Federal law[.]” Dkt. 1. Recognizing Pellegrino’s failure to establish personal jurisdiction, this Court directed Pellegrino to file an Amended Complaint by May 28, 2021 or face dismissal of his claims. Dkt. 5, at 9. On May 28, 2021, Pellegrino filed an Amended Complaint. Dkt. 6. Pellegrino’s amended pleading, like his original Complaint, fails for lack of personal jurisdiction.

DISCUSSION Pellegrino has already been granted permission to proceed in forma pauperis. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1915; see also Dkt. 5, at 9. Therefore, the Court elects to screen this Complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also Martin v. Martin, 250 F. App’x 438, 439 (2d Cir. 2007) (summary order) (“District courts are not required to screen complaints filed in forma pauperis except in cases where a prisoner seeks

civil redress from a governmental entity.” (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A)); Key v. Does, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1006, 1007-08 (E.D. Ark. 2016) (setting forth the “history and structure” of Section 1915 and collecting cases holding that nonprisoner complaints can be screened and dismissed pursuant to Section 1915(e)(2)(B)). I. LEGAL STANDARDS Section 1915 “provide[s] an efficient means by which a court can screen for and dismiss legally insufficient claims.” Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.8d 686, 639 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing Shakur v. Selsky, 391 F.3d 106, 112 (2d Cir. 2004)). The court shall dismiss a pro se complaint that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)()-(ili). Generally, the court will afford a pro se plaintiff an opportunity to amend or to be heard prior to dismissal “unless the court can rule out any possibility, however unlikely it might be, that an amended complaint would succeed in stating a claim.” Abbas, 480 F.3d at 639 (quoting Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 796 (2d Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted)). But leave to amend pleadings may be denied when any amendment would be futile. See Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000). In evaluating the Complaint, the Court must accept all factual allegations as true and must draw all inferences in the plaintiffs favor. See Larkin v. Savage, 318 F.3d 138, 1389 (2d Cir. 20038) (per curiam); King v. Simpson, 189 F.3d 284, 287 (2d Cir. 1999). “Specific facts are not necessary,” and a plaintiff “need only ‘give the

defendant fair notice of what the... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 98, (2007) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) Gnternal quotation marks and citation omitted)); see also Boykin v. Keycorp, 521 F.3d 202, 216 (2d Cir. 2008) (discussing pleading standard in pro se cases after Twombly: “even after Twombly, dismissal of a pro se claim as insufficiently pleaded is appropriate only in the most unsustainable of cases.”). Although “a court is obliged to construe [pro se] pleadings liberally, particularly when they allege civil rights violations,” McEHachin v. McGuinnis, 357 F.3d 197, 200 (2d Cir. 2004), even pleadings submitted pro se must meet the notice requirements of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Wynder v. McMahon, 360 F.3d 73, 77-78 (2d Cir. 2004). PELLEGRINO’S AMENDED CLAIMS Pellegrino’s Amended Complaint is virtually identical to his original pleading. In the Amended Complaint, Pellegrino identifies the same slate of Defendants named in the original Complaint, including Officers George Fallahee, Emily Smith, Brock Jensen, Ricky Carter, Michael Karayianes, and Michael Saia (all in their individual and official capacities). Compare Dkt. 1, at 1 with Dkt. 6, at 1. Pellegrino also sues the St. Petersburg Police Department, Judge Joshua Riba, and the “Clerk of Courts Pinellas County,” all of whom were named in the original Complaint. Id. The claims alleged in the Amended Complaint are indistinguishable from those set forth in the original Complaint and arise out of the same set of operative

facts. Compare Dkt. 1, at 5-6 with Dkt. 6, at 2-3. The traffic stop, arrest, and legal proceedings alleged in detail in Pellegrino’s original Complaint appear in truncated format in the Amended Complaint, excluding several references to Pinellas County, Florida and the St. Petersburg Police Department. Compare Dkt. 1, at 2-4 with Dkt. 6, at 1-3. The monetary relief sought in Pellegrino’s Amended Complaint is unchanged. Compare Dkt. 1, at 5-6 with Dkt. 6, at 8.

III. ANALYSIS A. Personal Jurisdiction As set forth in this Court’s April 28, 2021 Decision and Order, Dkt. 5, personal jurisdiction concerns “the relationship of a given defendant to the particular geographic area in which a case is brought.” United States ex rel. Thistlethwaite v. Dowty Woodville Polymer, Lid., 110 F.3d 861, 864 (2d Cir. 1997). Personal jurisdiction “protects the individual interest that is implicated when a nonresident defendant is haled into a distant and possibly inconvenient forum.” United States v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822, 828 (1984). In a diversity action, personal jurisdiction “is determined by reference to the relevant [New York] jurisdictional statutes....” Beacon Enters., Inc. v. Menzies, 715 F.2d 757, 762 (2d Cir. 1988). New York’s long-arm statute provides that a court has personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary defendant who: 1. transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state; or 2.

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Related

Boykin v. KeyCorp
521 F.3d 202 (Second Circuit, 2008)
United States v. Morton
467 U.S. 822 (Supreme Court, 1984)
Erickson v. Pardus
551 U.S. 89 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Beacon Enterprises, Inc. v. Mary Rose Menzies
715 F.2d 757 (Second Circuit, 1983)
Cuoco v. Moritsugu
222 F.3d 99 (Second Circuit, 2000)
Key v. Does
217 F. Supp. 3d 1006 (E.D. Arkansas, 2016)
Shakur v. Selsky
391 F.3d 106 (Second Circuit, 2004)
Martin v. Martin
250 F. App'x 438 (Second Circuit, 2007)

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