Pellegrino Food Products Co. v. City of Warren

Third Circuit

Pellegrino Food Products Co. v. City of Warren

116 F. App'x 346

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Third Circuit

DecidedNovember 19, 2004

Docket03-1090

StatusUnpublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 116 F. App'x 346 (Pellegrino Food Products Co. v. City of Warren) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Pellegrino Food Products Co. v. City of Warren, 116 F. App'x 346 (3d Cir. 2004).

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Opinion

OPINION OF THE COURT

FISHER, Circuit Judge.

Appellants John R. Nemcovsky, A. Kenneth DuPont, William F. Morgan, Esq., Donald A. Worley and George W. Crozier (“City of Warren Officials”) appeal from those portions of two orders of the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania which denied their motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. While Appellees Pellegrino Food Products Company, Inc., Anthony Pellegrino, Sr., Angela M. Pellegrino, and Thomas Pellegrino, contend at the outset that this Court lacks appellate jurisdiction, we conclude that jurisdiction does exist. See Ziccardi v. City of Philadelphia, 288 F.3d 57, 61 (3d Cir. 2002) (“we possess jurisdiction to review whether the set of facts identified by the district court is sufficient to establish a violation of a clearly established constitutional right.”), see also Rivas v. City of Passaic, 365 F.3d 181 (3d Cir.2004). We affirm because our plenary review of the record and application of the summary judgment standard convinces us that summary judgment on qualified immunity could not have been granted at this stage of the proceedings. Appellees have indeed asserted recognized constitutional rights, see DeBlasio v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 53 F.3d 592, 601 (3d Cir.1995) (“in situations where the governmental decision in question impinges upon a landowner’s use and enjoyment of property, a landowning plaintiff states a substantive due process claim where he or she alleges that the decision limiting the intended land use was arbitrarily or irrationally reached”), abrogated on other grounds, United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc. v. Township of Warrington, 316 F.3d 392 (3d Cir.2003); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985) (similarly-situated entities should be *348 treated similarly), but, as the district court correctly determined, there exist disputed issues of material fact, resolution of which will determine whether those rights were actually deprived. It is not now the court’s role to find and interpret these facts. See Rivas, 365 F.3d at 204 (Ambro, J., concurring in part).

The judgment of the district court will be affirmed.

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OPINION OF THE COURT

FISHER, Circuit Judge.

Appellants John R. Nemcovsky, A. Kenneth DuPont, William F. Morgan, Esq., Donald A. Worley and George W. Crozier (“City of Warren Officials”) appeal from those portions of two orders of the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania which denied their motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. While Appellees Pellegrino Food Products Company, Inc., Anthony Pellegrino, Sr., Angela M. Pellegrino, and Thomas Pellegrino, contend at the outset that this Court lacks appellate jurisdiction, we conclude that jurisdiction does exist. See Ziccardi v. City of Philadelphia, 288 F.3d 57, 61 (3d Cir. 2002) (“we possess jurisdiction to review whether the set of facts identified by the district court is sufficient to establish a violation of a clearly established constitutional right.”), see also Rivas v. City of Passaic, 365 F.3d 181 (3d Cir.2004). We affirm because our plenary review of the record and application of the summary judgment standard convinces us that summary judgment on qualified immunity could not have been granted at this stage of the proceedings. Appellees have indeed asserted recognized constitutional rights, see DeBlasio v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 53 F.3d 592, 601 (3d Cir.1995) (“in situations where the governmental decision in question impinges upon a landowner’s use and enjoyment of property, a landowning plaintiff states a substantive due process claim where he or she alleges that the decision limiting the intended land use was arbitrarily or irrationally reached”), abrogated on other grounds, United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc. v. Township of Warrington, 316 F.3d 392 (3d Cir.2003); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985) (similarly-situated entities should be *348 treated similarly), but, as the district court correctly determined, there exist disputed issues of material fact, resolution of which will determine whether those rights were actually deprived. It is not now the court’s role to find and interpret these facts. See Rivas, 365 F.3d at 204 (Ambro, J., concurring in part).

The judgment of the district court will be affirmed.

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