Peirce-Phelps, Inc. ex rel. Heller v. Julason

428 A.2d 216, 286 Pa. Super. 18, 1981 Pa. Super. LEXIS 2420
CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedApril 3, 1981
DocketNos. 2630 and 1106
StatusPublished

This text of 428 A.2d 216 (Peirce-Phelps, Inc. ex rel. Heller v. Julason) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Peirce-Phelps, Inc. ex rel. Heller v. Julason, 428 A.2d 216, 286 Pa. Super. 18, 1981 Pa. Super. LEXIS 2420 (Pa. Ct. App. 1981).

Opinions

LIPEZ, Judge:

These cross-appeals arise out of the refusal of the court below to direct the satisfaction of a judgment without prejudice to the defendant petitioner’s right to contest the precise amount due the use plaintiff in a further proceeding. Defendant appeals because the court did not direct the satisfaction of the judgment, and use plaintiff cross appeals because the court dismissed the amended petition without prejudice. Since no appellate review lies under the circumstances, the appeals must be dismissed.

The facts are somewhat complicated. Suffice it to say, for the purpose of this appeal, that the use plaintiff is the assignee of a certain judgment which the defendant petitioner claims was paid (indeed claimed it was twice paid). She therefore petitioned (subsequently amending her petition), alleging the circumstances of the payment and requesting an order directing satisfaction of the judgment. A rule to show cause was issued by the court, and an answer was filed by the use plaintiff denying the payments. After hearing testimony, it was apparent to the court below that there was a substantial dispute as to whether payment had in fact been made, and the court therefore dismissed the amended petition and discharged the rule. The court below was clearly right.

[20]*20The petition was brought under the act of March 1876, P.L. 7, 12 P.S. § 978.1

As long ago as 1893, the Supreme Court said of the Act of 1876, “It is confined to cases of actual payment in full, by the defendant, or possibly to cases of such undisputed facts as produce a conclusive result of strict law that satisfaction equivalent to actual payment has been obtained. If there is any doubt or question as to the facts, or the inference to be drawn from them, the statute cannot apply.” Atkinson v. Harrison, 153 Pa. 472, 475, 26 A. 294, 295 (1893). We find nothing in the later cases which changes that basic rule.

Smith v. Witmer et al., 221 Pa.Super. 376, 378, 379, 293 A.2d 89, (1972.) Where there is such a dispute

“.. . an issue should be awarded for a jury to determine whether the judgment has actually been paid and upon the determination of payment by the jury, the order for the entry of the satisfaction may be made.”

7. Standard Pennsylvania Practices 818.

No appellate review lies from the dismissal of a rule issued on a petition under the Act of 1876 supra. Prager v. Warren, 402 Pa. 128, 166 A.2d 500, (1961.)

Appeals dismissed.

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Related

Prager v. Warren
166 A.2d 500 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1961)
Atkinson v. Harrison
26 A. 294 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1893)
Smith v. Witmer
293 A.2d 89 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1972)

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Bluebook (online)
428 A.2d 216, 286 Pa. Super. 18, 1981 Pa. Super. LEXIS 2420, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/peirce-phelps-inc-ex-rel-heller-v-julason-pasuperct-1981.