Peggy S. Thompson v. Public Employees' Retirement System of Mississippi;

• Court: Court of Appeals of Mississippi
• Decided: November 19, 2019
• Docket: NO. 2018-SA-00975-COA
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 2018-SA-00975-COA

PEGGY S. THOMPSON APPELLANT

v.

PUBLIC EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT SYSTEM APPELLEE OF MISSISSIPPI

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 06/14/2018 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. JOSEPH ANTHONY SCLAFANI COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: HINDS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: GEORGE S. LUTER ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: SAMUEL MARTIN MILLETTE III JANE L. MAPP NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - STATE BOARDS AND AGENCIES DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 11/19/2019 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED:

BEFORE J. WILSON, P.J., WESTBROOKS AND LAWRENCE, JJ.

WESTBROOKS, J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. Peggy Thompson filed an application for Public Employees’ Retirement System

(PERS) duty-related disability benefits on February 9, 2015.1 The PERS Medical Board

reviewed and denied Thompson’s application. The Medical Board determined that

Thompson failed to provide sufficient evidence that she was disabled under Mississippi Code

Annotated sections 25-11-113 or 25-11-114 (Supp. 2011). Thompson appealed the Medical

1 Thompson later amended her request to include a determination as to non-duty- related disability benefits. Board’s decision to the PERS Disability Appeals Committee. A hearing was held on

September 14, 2015. Following the hearing, the Committee recommended the denial of

Thompson’s application to the PERS Board of Trustees (the Board). The Board adopted the

Committee’s proposed statement of facts and conclusions of law to deny Thompson’s claim

for both duty-related and non-duty-related disability benefits on December 15, 2015.

Thompson appealed the Board’s decision to the Circuit Court of Hinds County. On or about

June 12, 2018, the circuit court affirmed the Board’s decision to deny Thompson’s

application for benefits. Aggrieved, Thompson appeals. After review of the record, we

affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2. Thompson worked as a court reporter/court administrator for the Honorable Beverly

Franklin in Lowndes County, Mississippi from 2002 until March 2014. Thompson was

terminated because she was unable to perform her duties at work. Thompson claims the

failure to perform her duties and resulting termination were due to debilitating pain in her

hands. Thompson has a long history of hand-related issues. She testified she was first

diagnosed with carpal tunnel syndrome in the early 1990s and had surgery during that time

to relieve the symptoms. She testified that she has experienced pain and discomfort from

recurrent carpal tunnel syndrome continuously since the 1990s. Thompson testified she had

open-heart surgery in 1999. Thompson testified she has been diagnosed and treated for

carpal tunnel syndrome, trigger finger, and De Quervain syndrome2 through the years. On

2 De Quervain syndrome is the inflammation of tendons, resulting in pain on the outside of the wrist. It is uncommon but is effectively treated with rest, physical therapy, and

2 July 21, 2012, Thompson was treated by Dr. Chris Galjour for complaints of bilateral wrist

pain. Dr. Galjour performed a trigger-finger digit release on her left hand on August 2, 2013.

On October 3, 2013, Dr. Karl Crossen inserted an implantable loop recorder (heart monitor)

to record Thompson’s heart-electrical activity.

¶3. On July 8, 2014, Dr. Galjour treated Thompson for her recurring carpal tunnel

syndrome with an injection. On July 17, 2014, Thompson was given the specific restriction

of “no use of her hands” pending an EMG study.3 Dr. Galjour, in addition to making the

restriction contingent upon the EMG study, also noted Thompson had an “excellent

prognosis for recovery.” Thompson never had the EMG study performed and testified that

she sought no further treatment in the year between her termination and the appeals hearing

before the Committee.

¶4. At the request of PERS, Thompson underwent an independent medical evaluation on

April 17, 2015, by Dr. Laura Gray, who noted that Thompson may have had pain in her

hands; however, there were no deformities, swelling, or visible abnormalities that would

make typing impossible. Further, Dr. Gray found that Thompson would be able to return to

her previous occupation and that she did not meet the criteria for a duty-related disability.

The Medical Board denied her application, finding that Thompson failed to provide sufficient

evidence that she was disabled under Mississippi Code Annotated sections 25-11-113 or 25-

injections. Surgery is the last resort proven to be effective. 3 EMG stands for electromyogram.

3 11-114.4

¶5. Thompson appealed to the Committee in September 2015 and was granted a de novo

hearing. At the hearing, Thompson stated that she knew that she had issues with her hands

prior to working for Lowndes County; however, the pain had gotten worse over the last

several years. Thompson specifically testified she could not attribute her pain to a single

traumatic event or accident; she explained that her pain was the result of repetitive use.

Thompson also stated that she had undergone open-heart surgery in 1999, had issues with

atrial fibrillation, and wears a heart monitor.

¶6. The Committee recommended the denial of both duty-related and non-duty-related

disability benefits, and the Board adopted the Committee’s recommendation. Thompson

appealed the Board’s decision to the Circuit Court of Hinds County, and the circuit court

affirmed the Board’s decision. Aggrieved, Thompson appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶7. “This Court’s standard of review of an administrative agency’s findings and decisions

is well established.” Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Stamps, 898 So. 2d 664, 673 (¶27) (Miss. 2005)

(quoting Byrd v. Pub. Emps’ Ret. Sys., 774 So. 2d 434, 437 (¶11) (Miss. 2000)). “An

agency’s conclusions must remain undisturbed unless the agency’s order 1) is not supported

by substantial evidence, 2) is arbitrary or capricious, 3) is beyond the scope or power granted

to the agency, or 4) violates one’s constitutional rights.” Id.

¶8. “However, whether a party received due process is a question of law, which an

4 At the hearing, Thompson amended her application to include non-duty-related disability benefits.

4 appellate court reviews de novo.” Holt v. Miss. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 131 So. 3d

1271, 1276 (¶7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2014) (citing Akins v. Miss. Dep’t of Rev., 70 So. 3d 204,

208 (¶9) (Miss. 2011)).

DISCUSSION

I. Whether the decision of PERS’s Board of Trustees to deny Thompson both duty-related and non-duty-related disability benefits was supported by substantial evidence.

¶9. PERS members can apply to receive disability benefits in two scenarios, and either

of which, if successful, can result in an award of disability benefits to the member. First,

members can claim disability benefits for non-duty-related disability pursuant to Mississippi

Code Annotated section 25-11-113. This section applies to any vested member who becomes

disabled for any reason. Id. Second, members injured at work while performing their duties

can receive duty-related disability benefits pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated section

25-11-114, regardless of the number of years served in employment. Disability is defined

as the “inability to perform the usual duties of employment.” Miss. Code Ann. § 25-11-

113(1)(a).

¶10. This Court has applied the above statutes concerning disability claims as follows:

Any member that claims they are in need of disability benefits has the burden to prove the following elements through sufficient evidence: 1) the claimant is mentally or physically incapacitated for the further performance of their duty; 2) the incapacity is likely permanent; and 3) the claimant should retire.

Ulrich v. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., No. 2018-SA-00306-COA, 2019 WL 1448512, at *3 (¶13)

(Miss. Ct. App. Apr. 2, 2019). Regarding duty-related disability benefits, in addition to the

5 above, this Court further stated, “[A]n individual who applies specifically for duty related

disability benefits must prove that they were disabled as a ‘direct result of an accident or

traumatic event resulting in a physical injury occurring in the line of performance of a duty.’”

Id. (quoting Miss. Code Ann. § 25-11-114 (Supp. 2015)).

¶11. Thompson applied for both types of disability benefits. In denying Thompson’s

application for benefits, the Board found “that Peggy Thompson is not disabled as that term

is defined and held applicable herein in order to qualify for duty-related or non duty-related

disability benefits.” The Hinds County Circuit Court affirmed the Board’s decision,

specifically stating the Board’s decision was “supported by substantial evidence, including

the findings of the physician that conducted an independent medical evaluation and

Thompson’s own physician who opined that her prognosis is good; thus the decision of the

Board is not arbitrary and capricious.”

¶12. While it is undisputed that Thompson suffers from pain-causing conditions, there was

no evidence presented that any physician found her to be disabled. In fact, her treating

physician, Dr. Galjour, stated she was likely to recover. Further, according to the EME that

Dr. Gray performed, there were no records or opinions offered to suggest Thompson has a

permanent and likely total-occupational disability. Thompson further testified at the hearing

that she never had the EMG study performed and has not sought any further treatment or

therapy since her last visit to Dr. Galjour in 2014. The Mississippi Supreme Court has said

PERS is required to “determine which evidence to believe and which evidence should be

given greater weight.” Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Howard, 905 So. 2d 1279, 1290 (¶30) (Miss.

6 2005). “This Court is obligated to give substantial deference to an administrative agency

when reviewing its decision on appeal, and this Court would exceed its authority if it were

to re-evaluate the evidence and make its own determination of the trustworthiness of some

particular testimony.” Knight v. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 108 So. 3d 912, 916 (¶14) (Miss.

2012) (internal quotation mark omitted). In the instant case, there was no evidence presented

that Thompson was disabled.

¶13. Regarding duty-related disability benefits, Thompson failed to prove a disability

existed; thus, there is no reason to determine if any disability were duty-related because even

considering Thompson’s argument on appeal, there was no testimony or evidence in the

record wherein Thompson claimed that a work-related incident occurred or caused her

numerous conditions. “A claimant seeking duty-related disability benefits must show that

his or her disability was the direct result of some work-related accident or traumatic event.”

Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Walker, 126 So. 3d 892, 898 (¶13) (Miss. 2013); see also Miss. Code

Ann. § 25-11-114(6). Mississippi Code Annotated section 25-11-114(6) provides disability

benefits for “any active member who becomes disabled as a direct result of an accident or

traumatic event resulting in a physical injury occurring in the line of performance of duty,”

regardless of the number of years of service. Further, “[p]ermanent and total disability

resulting from a cardiovascular, pulmonary or musculo-skeletal condition that was not a

direct result of a traumatic event occurring in the performance of duty shall be deemed an

ordinary disability.” Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Card, 994 So. 2d 239, 245-46 (¶32) (Miss. Ct.

App. 2008); see also Miss. Code Ann. § 25-11-114(6).

7 ¶14. In Card, the claimant had carpel tunnel and failed to show that her condition was the

result of an accident or traumatic event. Card, 994 So. 2d at 241-42 (¶¶5-13). Aggravation

of pre-existing conditions and/or repetitive use injuries, while possibly qualifying the

claimant for regular disability, does not meet the statutory standard for duty-related disability

benefits. Here, the State maintains that the evidence reflects that the issues with Thompson’s

hands pre-date her PERS-covered employment.

¶15. Thompson suffered from carpel tunnel syndrome prior to taking the job in Lowndes

County. There was no evidence presented demonstrating Thompson’s condition was the

result of an accident or traumatic event occurring at work. Further, the record is clear that

Thompson’s symptoms and treatment was just as much for trigger finger and DeQuervain

syndrome. Thompson’s treating physician ordered further testing and treatment, specifically

an EMG study, which Thompson elected to not have performed. There was no evidence

presented that Thompson was permanently disabled as a result of anything, let alone carpel

tunnel syndrome. In fact, all the evidence presented by Thompson demonstrated that she

could have recovered if she had elected to follow the advice of her physician.

¶16. Like Card, Thompson failed to show her condition was the result of a work-related

accident or traumatic event.5 As such, the Board’s decision to deny Thompson duty-related

disability benefits was supported by substantial evidence. She specifically testified she

5 Thompson maintains that PERS’s decision to deny her application for duty-related disability benefits was not supported by substantial evidence because her boss’s deposition was not considered. But, the deposition of the Honorable Beverly Franklin was admitted into evidence, and the deposition reveals no evidence to support Thompson’s contention that she is entitled to relief on appeal.

8 believed her conditions were the result of repetition. While there is evidence in the record

that Thompson suffered from carpal tunnel syndrome, trigger finger, DeQuervain’s disease,

and atrial fibrillation, there is no evidence that any of these conditions were permanently

disabling. As a result we find the issues concerning disability are without merit.

II. Whether PERS’s actions violated Thompson’s due process rights.

¶17. In her brief, Thompson maintains that the Committee never advised her of the right

to be represented by counsel, nor did the committee inquire whether she attempted to obtain

counsel. Thus, Thompson contends that her due process rights were violated. “Administrative

hearings are not trials and are thereby not governed by the same rules which are applicable

to courts of law.” Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Stamps, 898 So. 2d 664, 676 (¶45) (Miss. 2005).

¶18. The circuit court found that the record clearly established Thompson was informed

of her right to be represented by counsel and that she was aware of that right prior to the

hearing. We agree. In her brief Thompson states in a footnote that she attempted to hire an

attorney but could not find one to take her case. Furthermore, Thompson wrote that she had

not retained counsel but planned to hire counsel on the “Notice of Appeal” form in the

section marked “appealing party’s attorney or authorized representative, if any.” We find this

issue is without merit.

III. Whether it was Thompson’s responsibility to submit all of her pertinent medical information prior to the hearing.

¶19. Thompson asserts that the Committee violated her due process rights in not deferring

her case for the purpose of obtaining additional medical records from her cardiologist.

Thompson claims that PERS violated her right to a fair hearing when the committee

9 announced it would close the record without her heart-related medical records. At the close

of the hearing, when asked by the Committee if she had anything further to say, Thompson

asked if she could supply records from her cardiologist at a later date. The Committee said

it would be closing the record but would send her a letter if the Committee required any

further information. Thompson never claimed her disability was the result of a heart

condition, and she brought no information concerning her heart surgery from 1999 with her

to the hearing. She also did not bring any documentation regarding the heart monitor that she

received while working for the State. In addition to Stamps quoted above, our supreme court

has said that “board rules must afford minimum procedural due process which is (1) notice

and (2) an opportunity to be heard.” State Oil & Gas Bd. v. McGowan, 542 So. 2d 244, 248

(Miss. 1989). Due process requires

simply the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. The formalities of practice, procedure, and evidence are relaxed in all administrative proceedings, including those concerning licenses. Further, due process requires notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and to afford them an opportunity to present their objections.

Holt v. Miss. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 131 So. 3d 1271, 1279-80 (¶27) (Miss. Ct. App.

2014) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Miss. Bd. of Veterinary Med.

v. Geotes, 770 So. 2d 940, 943 (¶14) (Miss. 2000).

¶20. In this particular case (i.e., before an administrative committee), due process does not

require anything more than the notice and opportunity to be heard, which was afforded to

Thompson. Further, Thompson was allowed to introduce additional documents into evidence

that were not produced prior to the hearing. She was fully aware of her responsibility to

10 provide documentation as evidenced by the records and transcripts she produced. The record

indicates no medical documentation of a qualifying disability. Thompson never claimed her

heart condition caused her to suffer a disability. In her brief, Thompson relies upon Stevison

v. Public Employees Retirement System, 966 So. 2d 874 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007). In Stevison,

there was medical evidence of a disability presented to the Committee that had been

documented by Stevison’s treating physicians and corroborated by a functional capacity

exam. Id. at 875-78 (¶¶2-13). Missing records in Stevison were an issue because “PERS also

based its decision on its assumption that, because Stevison had not submitted medical records

from all her physicians, those physicians had opined she was not disabled.” Id. at 882 (¶26).

Unlike in Stevison, the Board here did not base its ultimate conclusion on records not in

evidence that were obtainable. The decision was based on ample evidence that was heavily

documented in the record before us. As explained considerably above, the opinions within

the record in this case revealed no evidence or allegation of any qualifying disability.

Thompson’s argument that her due process rights were violated by the Committee’s refusal

to pause the hearing pending her obtaining more medical documentation is without merit.

¶21. Our review of the record indicates there was sufficient evidence to support a denial

of Thompson’s application for disability benefits. Further, the record indicates no due

process rights were violated regarding Thompson’s ability to obtain counsel or regarding her

ability to provide documentation at her hearing before the Committee. The decision of the

circuit court is affirmed.

¶22. AFFIRMED.

11 BARNES, C.J., CARLTON AND J. WILSON, P.JJ., GREENLEE, TINDELL, McDONALD, LAWRENCE, McCARTY AND C. WILSON, JJ., CONCUR.