1 2 3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 7 PEGGY ADAMS, Case No.: 3:25-cv-01205-JAH-DEB
8 Plaintiff, ORDER ENTERING JUDGMENT 9 v. AGAINST DEFENDANT AND GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING 10 MIDLAND CREDIT MANAGEMENT, IN PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION INC., 11 FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS Defendant. 12 [ECF Nos. 12, 16] 13 14 INTRODUCTION 15 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Peggy Adams’ (“Plaintiff”) Motion for 16 Attorney Fees and Costs pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”). 17 ECF No. 16 (“Motion” or “Mot.”). Defendant Midland Credit Management, Inc. 18 (“Defendant” or “Midland”) opposed the motion. ECF No. 18 (“Opposition” or “Opp’n”). 19 Plaintiff filed a reply. ECF No. 19 (“Reply”). After a thorough review of the record, and 20 for the reasons described below, Plaintiff’s Motion is GRANTED IN PART AND 21 DENIED IN PART. 22 BACKGROUND 23 On May 12, 2025, Plaintiff, a debtor, filed a lawsuit seeking to recover damages 24 against Defendant, a debt collector, for alleged violations of the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1692, 25 et seq. ECF No. 1. On August 5, 2025, Plaintiff accepted Defendant’s offer of judgment 26 pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68(a). ECF No. 12. The parties were unable 27 to resolve Plaintiff’s award of attorney costs and fees pursuant to § 1692k(a)(3). Mot. at 28 7. On August 26, 2025, Plaintiff filed this Motion. ECF No. 16. Plaintiff asks the Court 1 to award $17,476.32 ($16,650 in attorney fees and $826.32 in costs). Reply at 11. 2 Defendant asks the Court to reduce Plaintiff’s award to $6,435.00. Opp’n at 8, 17. 3 LEGAL STANDARD 4 Generally, litigants must pay for their own attorneys’ fees. Camacho v. Bridgeport 5 Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 978 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). An exception to the rule, 6 known as a “fee shifting statute,” allows prevailing parties to recover their attorneys’ fees 7 from the opposing side. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The FDCPA 8 is a fee-shifting statute that makes violating debt collectors liable to prevailing debtors for 9 “the costs of the action, together with a reasonable attorney’s fee as determined by the 10 court.” Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3)). “The FDCPA’s statutory language makes an 11 award of fees mandatory. Id. (citation omitted). 12 To calculate awards for attorneys’ fees, courts must use the “lodestar” method, and 13 “the amount of that fee must be determined on the facts of each case.” Id. (citations 14 omitted). “The ‘lodestar’ is calculated by multiplying the number of hours the prevailing 15 party reasonably expended on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate.” Id. (quoting 16 Ferland v. Conrad Credit Corp., 244 F.3d 1145, 1149 n.4 (9th Cir. 2001)). Generally, “the 17 lodestar figure is presumptively a reasonable fee award,” but courts may “adjust the 18 lodestar to account for other factors which are not subsumed within it.” Id. In rare cases, 19 courts may make upward or downward adjustments to the lodestar based on the Kerr 20 factors2. Id. at 982. In such cases, courts must calculate the lodestar first, then adequately 21 explain the reasons for departing from it. Id. (citations omitted). 22 For part one of the lodestar calculation, the attorney’s hourly rate, courts have “a 23 great deal of discretion in determining the reasonableness of the fee.” Id. (quoting Gates 24 25 1 In her Motion, Plaintiff requests $13,410 in attorney fees and $480 in costs. Mot. at 7. In her Reply, 26 Plaintiff requests an additional $3,240 in attorney fees and $346.32 in costs. Reply at 11.
27 2 Relevant factors include, in part: preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to accepting the case; time limitations imposed by the client or circumstances; and the undesirability of the case. Kerr v. 28 1 v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1398 (9th Cir. 1992)). To determine the reasonable fee, 2 courts must identify the relevant community and consider “the prevailing hourly rate in 3 that community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience 4 and reputation . . . .” Id. at 979. “[T]he relevant community is the forum in which the 5 district court sits.” Id. (citing Barjon v. Dalton, 132 F.3d 496, 500 (9th Cir. 1997)). Rates 6 from outside the relevant community are only used if local attorneys are unable or 7 unwilling to properly handle the case. Id. Further, courts should not “rel[y] on cases 8 decided years before the attorneys actually rendered their services.” Id. at 981. (citing Bell 9 v. Clackamas Cnty., 341 F.3d 858, 869 (9th Cir. 2003)) (holding that it was an abuse of 10 discretion to apply market rates in effect more than two years before the work was 11 performed). Also, courts may consider awarded fees in cases of similar difficulty or 12 complexity and need not “rely[] solely on FDCPA cases in determining the prevailing 13 market rate.” Id. (citations omitted). 14 The prevailing party carries the burden to produce satisfactory evidence that the 15 requested rates are in line with those of reasonably comparable attorneys in the relevant 16 community. Id. at 980 (citing Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 n.11 (1984)). Affidavits 17 from the prevailing party’s attorneys and other attorneys in the community, as well as rate 18 determinations in other cases, “are satisfactory evidence of the prevailing market rate.” Id. 19 (citation omitted). “However, declarations filed by the fee applicant do not conclusively 20 establish the prevailing market rate.” Id. The opposing party carries the burden of rebuttal 21 to submit evidence challenging the accuracy and reasonableness of the facts asserted by 22 the prevailing party. Id. (citing Gates, 987 F.2d at 1397-98). 23 For part two of the lodestar calculation, “[d]etermining the number of hours 24 reasonably expended requires considering whether, in light of the circumstances, the time 25 could reasonably have been billed to a private client.” Vargas v. Howell, 949 F.3d 1188, 26 1194 (9th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In statutory fee cases, 27 courts “have uniformly held that time spent in establishing the entitlement to and amount 28 of the fee is compensable.” Camacho, 523 F.3d at 981. (internal quotation marks and 1 citation omitted). “[I]t would be inconsistent to dilute a fees award by refusing to 2 compensate attorneys for the time they reasonably spent in establishing their rightful claim 3 to the fee.” Id. (citations omitted). To that end, a prevailing party “may also seek the 4 additional fees and costs [] incurred in litigating [] fees and costs.” Afewerki v. Anaya Law 5 Group, 779 F. App’x 449, 452 (9th Cir. 2019). 6 DISCUSSION 7 I. Reasonable Fee 8 To calculate the lodestar, Plaintiff proposes a rate of $450/hr. Declaration of Ely 9 Grinvald (“Grinvald Decl.”), ECF No. 16-2, Ex. 2 at ¶ 6; Reply at 4. Defendant opposes 10 that proposed rate and asks the Court to reduce the rate to $325/hr. Opp’n at 17. 11 For her proposed fee, Plaintiff incorrectly applies market rates typical for attorneys 12 in Los Angeles to her case. Mot.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
1 2 3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 7 PEGGY ADAMS, Case No.: 3:25-cv-01205-JAH-DEB
8 Plaintiff, ORDER ENTERING JUDGMENT 9 v. AGAINST DEFENDANT AND GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING 10 MIDLAND CREDIT MANAGEMENT, IN PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION INC., 11 FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS Defendant. 12 [ECF Nos. 12, 16] 13 14 INTRODUCTION 15 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Peggy Adams’ (“Plaintiff”) Motion for 16 Attorney Fees and Costs pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”). 17 ECF No. 16 (“Motion” or “Mot.”). Defendant Midland Credit Management, Inc. 18 (“Defendant” or “Midland”) opposed the motion. ECF No. 18 (“Opposition” or “Opp’n”). 19 Plaintiff filed a reply. ECF No. 19 (“Reply”). After a thorough review of the record, and 20 for the reasons described below, Plaintiff’s Motion is GRANTED IN PART AND 21 DENIED IN PART. 22 BACKGROUND 23 On May 12, 2025, Plaintiff, a debtor, filed a lawsuit seeking to recover damages 24 against Defendant, a debt collector, for alleged violations of the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1692, 25 et seq. ECF No. 1. On August 5, 2025, Plaintiff accepted Defendant’s offer of judgment 26 pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68(a). ECF No. 12. The parties were unable 27 to resolve Plaintiff’s award of attorney costs and fees pursuant to § 1692k(a)(3). Mot. at 28 7. On August 26, 2025, Plaintiff filed this Motion. ECF No. 16. Plaintiff asks the Court 1 to award $17,476.32 ($16,650 in attorney fees and $826.32 in costs). Reply at 11. 2 Defendant asks the Court to reduce Plaintiff’s award to $6,435.00. Opp’n at 8, 17. 3 LEGAL STANDARD 4 Generally, litigants must pay for their own attorneys’ fees. Camacho v. Bridgeport 5 Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 978 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). An exception to the rule, 6 known as a “fee shifting statute,” allows prevailing parties to recover their attorneys’ fees 7 from the opposing side. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The FDCPA 8 is a fee-shifting statute that makes violating debt collectors liable to prevailing debtors for 9 “the costs of the action, together with a reasonable attorney’s fee as determined by the 10 court.” Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3)). “The FDCPA’s statutory language makes an 11 award of fees mandatory. Id. (citation omitted). 12 To calculate awards for attorneys’ fees, courts must use the “lodestar” method, and 13 “the amount of that fee must be determined on the facts of each case.” Id. (citations 14 omitted). “The ‘lodestar’ is calculated by multiplying the number of hours the prevailing 15 party reasonably expended on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate.” Id. (quoting 16 Ferland v. Conrad Credit Corp., 244 F.3d 1145, 1149 n.4 (9th Cir. 2001)). Generally, “the 17 lodestar figure is presumptively a reasonable fee award,” but courts may “adjust the 18 lodestar to account for other factors which are not subsumed within it.” Id. In rare cases, 19 courts may make upward or downward adjustments to the lodestar based on the Kerr 20 factors2. Id. at 982. In such cases, courts must calculate the lodestar first, then adequately 21 explain the reasons for departing from it. Id. (citations omitted). 22 For part one of the lodestar calculation, the attorney’s hourly rate, courts have “a 23 great deal of discretion in determining the reasonableness of the fee.” Id. (quoting Gates 24 25 1 In her Motion, Plaintiff requests $13,410 in attorney fees and $480 in costs. Mot. at 7. In her Reply, 26 Plaintiff requests an additional $3,240 in attorney fees and $346.32 in costs. Reply at 11.
27 2 Relevant factors include, in part: preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to accepting the case; time limitations imposed by the client or circumstances; and the undesirability of the case. Kerr v. 28 1 v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1398 (9th Cir. 1992)). To determine the reasonable fee, 2 courts must identify the relevant community and consider “the prevailing hourly rate in 3 that community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience 4 and reputation . . . .” Id. at 979. “[T]he relevant community is the forum in which the 5 district court sits.” Id. (citing Barjon v. Dalton, 132 F.3d 496, 500 (9th Cir. 1997)). Rates 6 from outside the relevant community are only used if local attorneys are unable or 7 unwilling to properly handle the case. Id. Further, courts should not “rel[y] on cases 8 decided years before the attorneys actually rendered their services.” Id. at 981. (citing Bell 9 v. Clackamas Cnty., 341 F.3d 858, 869 (9th Cir. 2003)) (holding that it was an abuse of 10 discretion to apply market rates in effect more than two years before the work was 11 performed). Also, courts may consider awarded fees in cases of similar difficulty or 12 complexity and need not “rely[] solely on FDCPA cases in determining the prevailing 13 market rate.” Id. (citations omitted). 14 The prevailing party carries the burden to produce satisfactory evidence that the 15 requested rates are in line with those of reasonably comparable attorneys in the relevant 16 community. Id. at 980 (citing Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 n.11 (1984)). Affidavits 17 from the prevailing party’s attorneys and other attorneys in the community, as well as rate 18 determinations in other cases, “are satisfactory evidence of the prevailing market rate.” Id. 19 (citation omitted). “However, declarations filed by the fee applicant do not conclusively 20 establish the prevailing market rate.” Id. The opposing party carries the burden of rebuttal 21 to submit evidence challenging the accuracy and reasonableness of the facts asserted by 22 the prevailing party. Id. (citing Gates, 987 F.2d at 1397-98). 23 For part two of the lodestar calculation, “[d]etermining the number of hours 24 reasonably expended requires considering whether, in light of the circumstances, the time 25 could reasonably have been billed to a private client.” Vargas v. Howell, 949 F.3d 1188, 26 1194 (9th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In statutory fee cases, 27 courts “have uniformly held that time spent in establishing the entitlement to and amount 28 of the fee is compensable.” Camacho, 523 F.3d at 981. (internal quotation marks and 1 citation omitted). “[I]t would be inconsistent to dilute a fees award by refusing to 2 compensate attorneys for the time they reasonably spent in establishing their rightful claim 3 to the fee.” Id. (citations omitted). To that end, a prevailing party “may also seek the 4 additional fees and costs [] incurred in litigating [] fees and costs.” Afewerki v. Anaya Law 5 Group, 779 F. App’x 449, 452 (9th Cir. 2019). 6 DISCUSSION 7 I. Reasonable Fee 8 To calculate the lodestar, Plaintiff proposes a rate of $450/hr. Declaration of Ely 9 Grinvald (“Grinvald Decl.”), ECF No. 16-2, Ex. 2 at ¶ 6; Reply at 4. Defendant opposes 10 that proposed rate and asks the Court to reduce the rate to $325/hr. Opp’n at 17. 11 For her proposed fee, Plaintiff incorrectly applies market rates typical for attorneys 12 in Los Angeles to her case. Mot. at 17 (“As a major metropolitan area with elevated cost 13 of living, the Los Angeles, California market rate necessarily skews to the higher end of 14 that range.”). Los Angeles is in the Central District of California, whereas Plaintiff’s case 15 was filed in the Southern District of California. In her Motion, Plaintiff does not offer any 16 evidence related to the Southern District, nor evidence explaining why local attorneys were 17 unavailable to handle her case, thus no exception applies. See Camacho, 523 F.3d at 979 18 (citation omitted). Therefore, the Southern District is the relevant community, and the 19 reasonable fee must be calculated using prevailing rates in the relevant community. Id. 20 As evidence to rebut Plaintiff’s proposed fee, Defendant attaches to its Opposition 21 the “2024 Real Rate Report” published by Wolters Kluwer. Declaration of Kathryn J. 22 Richards (“Richards Decl.”), ECF No. 18-1 at ¶ 8, Ex. E (“Rate Report”). The Rate Report 23 is a national publication that touts itself as “[t]he industry’s leading analysis of law firm 24 rates, trends, and practices.” Rate Report at 1. “This report has been cited with approval 25 by courts inside and outside this district.” Erhart v. BofI Federal Bank, Case No. 15-cv- 26 02287-BAS-NLS, 2023 WL 6382460, at *14 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2023) (internal quotation 27 28 1 marks and citations omitted). As such, the Court finds the Rate Report to be a reliable and 2 instructive source to assist with calculating a reasonable fee in this case3. 3 San Diego is the city where this district court sits, and Plaintiff’s case was filed here 4 on May 12, 2025. Plaintiff’s counsel Mr. Grinvald began practicing in California in 2012 5 and began representing consumers as a solo practitioner in December 2023. Grinvald 6 Decl., Ex. 2 at ¶¶ 1, 12. According to the Rate Report, the median rate for litigation partners 7 in San Diego is $400/hr. Rate Report at 22. The median rate for litigation associates in 8 San Diego is $250/hr. Id. Based on his years of experience and status as a solo practitioner, 9 the Court finds that a reasonable rate is $325/hr, the average of the two median rates for 10 litigation attorneys in San Diego. 11 II. Reasonable Number of Hours Spent on Litigation 12 “[T]he determination of fees should not result in a second major litigation.” Fox v. 13 Vice, 563 U.S. 826, 838 (2011). “[T]rial courts need not, and indeed should not, become 14 green-eyeshade accountants.” Id. “The essential goal in shifting fees . . . is to do rough 15 justice, not to achieve auditing perfection.” Id. “So trial courts may take into account their 16 overall sense of a suit, and may use estimates in calculating and allocating an attorney’s 17 time.” Id. 18 To calculate the lodestar, Plaintiff’s counsel claims to have spent 30.8 hours working 19 on this case. Mot. at 16; ECF No. 16-2 at 7-11. Defendant argues that these hours are 20 unreasonable on five grounds and asks the Court to reduce the hours worked to 19.8. Opp’n 21 at 14-17. 22 First, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s counsel’s claim to have spent 3.9 hours 23 drafting the complaint is excessive in this case. Opp’n at 14. Second, Plaintiff’s counsel 24 “billed numerous 0.1-hour increments for simple tasks such as receiving and reviewing 25 26 27 3 In her Motion, Plaintiff references the “United States Consumer Law Attorney Fee Survey Report 2017- 2018.” See Mot. at 16-18. Given that report was published more than five years before this case was 28 1 routine documents.” Id. Third, it was unreasonable for Plaintiff’s counsel to have spent 2 “over [two] hours in connection with drafting a routine motion to strike Midland’s 3 affirmative defenses.” Id. at 16. Fourth, Defendant’s settlement offer was rejected. Id. 4 Fifth and finally, Defendant argues that it was unreasonable for Plaintiff’s counsel to have 5 spent over 10.5 hours related to this Motion. Id. at 17. In sum, Defendant asks the Court 6 to subtract two hours for preparing the complaint, two hours for improper 0.1 billing 7 increments, two hours for preparing the motion to strike, and five hours for preparing this 8 Motion. Id. 9 The Court finds Defendant’s arguments unavailing. To argue excessive hours spent 10 on Plaintiff’s complaint, Defendant cites a case involving a default judgment in a civil 11 rights case where injunctive relief was requested. Id. at 14-15; see Whitaker v. Bellaire 12 Reseda Props., LLC, Case No. CV 19-9529-DMG, 2021 WL 3619876 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 13 2021). To distinguish, this case involves statutory damages that were ultimately resolved 14 through a Rule 68(a) offer of judgment. Regarding excessive 0.1 billing, the Court finds 15 that Plaintiff’s counsel tracked, but did not bill, several 0.1 entries that could be considered 16 “routine.” See ECF No. 16-2 at 7-11 (e.g. “Review email from clerk re notice of OOJ 17 acceptance;” “Review Order from court;” “File notice to enter judgment against Midland”). 18 Regarding the motion to strike draft, Defendant appears to argue that because Plaintiff 19 never filed the motion, Plaintiff’s counsel unreasonably spent time drafting said motion. 20 Opp’n at 16. Defendant does not cite, and the Court is unaware, of a law that reduces 21 attorney compensation for a draft of a motion that ultimately does not get filed. Related, 22 Defendant does not cite, and the Court is unaware, of a law that reduces attorney 23 compensation for working on a case following a failed settlement. Finally, the case 24 Defendant cites to argue against the amount of time Plaintiff’s counsel spent on this Motion 25 is easily distinguishable. Opp’n at 17; see Kalani v. Starbucks Corp., Case No. 13-CV- 26 00734-LHK, 2016 WL 379623 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2016) (where plaintiff’s requested fees 27 for preparing the fee motion were 34.3 hours and included “substantial time spent by an 28 experienced paralegal”). 1 After reviewing Plaintiff's counsel’s time entries, ECF No. 16-2 at 7-11, and for the 2 ||reasons stated above, the Court finds that 30.8 hours spent on the case and this Motion is 3 ||reasonable. Further, the Court finds that 7.2 hours spent “for the review and analysis of 4 || [Defendant’s] Opposition, and preparation of [the] Reply brief” is also reasonable. Reply 5 11; ECF No. 19-1 at 94. This totals 38 hours spent on this litigation. 6 Lodestar Calculation and Costs 7 As stated supra, the Court finds the lodestar calculation to be a rate of $325/hr 8 multiplied by 38 hours, for a total of $12,350 in attorney fees. Plaintiff requests $480 in 9 costs for the Motion and Defendant does not oppose. Opp’n at 6. Therefore, the Court 10 awards Plaintiff a total of $12,830 in fees and costs. 1] Finally, Plaintiff also requests $346.32 in costs for courtesy copies provided to the 12 ||Court for the Motion and Reply. Reply at 11. According to Local Rule 54.1(b)(6)(b), 13 || “[t]he cost of reproducing copies of motions, pleadings, notices and other routine case 14 || papers is not allowable.” Therefore, Plaintiffs request for an additional $346.32 is denied. 15 CONCLUSION 16 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 17 1) Plaintiffs Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs is GRANTED IN PART and 18 DENIED IN PART; 19 2) Judgment is entered against Defendant in the total sum of $2,100, plus $12,830 in 20 reasonable attorney fees and costs; and, 21 3) The Clerk of Court is instructed to close the case. 22 23 ISSO ORDERED. 24 25 || Dated: March 30, 2026
27 United States District Judge 28