USCA11 Case: 20-14544 Date Filed: 01/11/2022 Page: 1 of 9
[DO NOT PUBLISH] In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 20-14544 ____________________
In Re: Deepwater Horizon Belo Cases ___________________________________________________ PEGGY A. GRIFFIN, et al, Plaintiffs-Appellants, versus BP EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION INC, BP AMERICA PRODUCTION COMPANY,
Defendants-Appellees. USCA11 Case: 20-14544 Date Filed: 01/11/2022 Page: 2 of 9
2 Opinion of the Court 20-14544
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 3:19-cv-00963-MCR-GRJ ____________________
Before ROSENBAUM and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges, and STEELE, Dis- trict Judge. * PER CURIAM: Appellants Peggy A. Griffin, Calvin Nettles, Chason K. Nor- ris, Jackie Robertson, Linda M. Singleton, Gregory L. Warren, James A. Cooper, Bryant Hand, Jr., Dorothy Lynn Hill, Derrick Lee, Michael J. Turner, and Dewayne Veasey appeal the district court’s November 4, 2020, order excluding Appellants’ proffered toxicology expert under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), and granting summary judgment in favor of Appellees BP Exploration & Production Inc. and BP America Production Company (“BP”). After careful review of the record and the parties’ briefs, and with the benefit of oral argument, we affirm. I.
*The Honorable John E. Steele, United States District Judge for the Middle District of Florida, sitting by designation. USCA11 Case: 20-14544 Date Filed: 01/11/2022 Page: 3 of 9
20-14544 Opinion of the Court 3
This matter arises out of a disastrous BP oil spill. On April 20, 2010, the oil-drilling rig Deepwater Horizon, operated by BP in the Gulf of Mexico, exploded and sank, resulting in the largest oil spill in the history of marine oil-drilling operations. A massive ef- fort responded to the spill, with as many as 90,000 workers engaged in near-shore and offshore response activities. But the damage was done. Millions of barrels of oil flowed from the damaged Macondo Prospect well over an 87-day period, before the well was finally capped on July 15, 2010. The oil spill spawned thousands of claims. The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation assigned Judge Carl Joseph Barbier of the Eastern District of Louisiana to oversee the Deepwater Hori- zon MDL. See In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mex., on April 20, 2010, 731 F. Supp. 2d 1352 (J.P.M.L. 2010). Under Judge Barbier’s supervision, BP and class counsel en- tered into a massive class settlement agreement for personal-injury claims. That agreement pertains to class members who allege that exposure to substances released in the spill or used in connection with response activities caused them to suffer physical injuries first diagnosed after April 16, 2012. Under it, these class members can sue BP in federal court in what is called the “Back-End Litigation Option” (“BELO”). The settlement requires BELO plaintiffs to prove that their injuries were legally caused by exposure to pur- portedly toxicological substances. Hundreds of those BELO cases USCA11 Case: 20-14544 Date Filed: 01/11/2022 Page: 4 of 9
4 Opinion of the Court 20-14544
are currently pending before Judge M. Casey Rodgers of the North- ern District of Florida. To manage those cases, Judge Rodgers selected Appel- lants—a dozen BELO plaintiffs who were assigned to clean up the spill on the beaches of Northwest Florida—for a bellwether pro- cess. She ordered the parties to first address general causation be- fore reaching the question of specific causation.
Appellants proffered a single expert, Dr. Patricia Williams, to establish general causation. Following discovery, BP moved for summary judgment on the basis that Dr. Williams’s opinions failed to satisfy the standards of Rule 702 and Daubert. After briefing and a hearing, the district court concluded that Dr. Williams’s opinions fell short of the Rule 702 and Daubert requirements and granted summary judgment to BP. Appellants now appeal that ruling.
II.
We have jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 as the appeal of a final decision of a district court—here, the order granting summary judgment to BP. III. A. We begin with Appellants’ contention that the district court erred in failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing on their sum- mary-judgment motion because they wished to elicit live USCA11 Case: 20-14544 Date Filed: 01/11/2022 Page: 5 of 9
20-14544 Opinion of the Court 5
testimony from Dr. Williams. We review the district court’s denial of an evidentiary hearing for abuse of discretion. Loyd v. Alabama Dep’t of Corr., 176 F.3d 1336, 1339 (11th Cir. 1999). Here, Dr. Williams previously gave testimony at two depo- sitions over several hours, submitted an expert report, and pro- duced a supplemental report. Because Dr. Williams had sufficient opportunity to discuss her methodology on these four occasions, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that it was not necessary to give her yet another opportunity for addi- tional explanation. B. We review the district court’s determination to exclude the Appellants’ proffered expert testimony for abuse of discretion. Chapman v. Procter & Gamble Distrib., LLC, 766 F.3d 1296, 1305 (11th Cir. 2014). Because “[a] district court is more familiar with the procedural and factual details and is in a better position to de- cide Daubert issues,” a district judge is afforded “considerable lee- way” in determining whether to exclude expert testimony. Id. at 1305 & n.8. We are thus “require[d] … to defer to the judge’s de- cision on expert testimony, unless it is manifestly erroneous.” Id. at 1305; see also id. at 1305 n.8 (we “must affirm” unless the district court “made a clear error of judgment”). This “deferential abuse- of-discretion standard is applied stringently, even if a decision on expert testimony is outcome determinative.” Id. at 1305. USCA11 Case: 20-14544 Date Filed: 01/11/2022 Page: 6 of 9
6 Opinion of the Court 20-14544
In a toxic-tort case like this one, a plaintiff must establish both general and specific causation through admissible, reliable ex- pert testimony. McClain v. Metabolife Int’l, Inc., 401 F.3d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 2005). Rule 702 provides that expert testimony re- garding scientific, technical, or specialized knowledge is admissible if it is (1) helpful to the jury, (2) based on sufficient facts or data, (3) the product of reliable principles and methods, and (4) demon- strates that “the expert has reliably applied the principles and meth- ods to the facts of the case.” Fed. R. Evid. 702.
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USCA11 Case: 20-14544 Date Filed: 01/11/2022 Page: 1 of 9
[DO NOT PUBLISH] In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 20-14544 ____________________
In Re: Deepwater Horizon Belo Cases ___________________________________________________ PEGGY A. GRIFFIN, et al, Plaintiffs-Appellants, versus BP EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION INC, BP AMERICA PRODUCTION COMPANY,
Defendants-Appellees. USCA11 Case: 20-14544 Date Filed: 01/11/2022 Page: 2 of 9
2 Opinion of the Court 20-14544
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 3:19-cv-00963-MCR-GRJ ____________________
Before ROSENBAUM and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges, and STEELE, Dis- trict Judge. * PER CURIAM: Appellants Peggy A. Griffin, Calvin Nettles, Chason K. Nor- ris, Jackie Robertson, Linda M. Singleton, Gregory L. Warren, James A. Cooper, Bryant Hand, Jr., Dorothy Lynn Hill, Derrick Lee, Michael J. Turner, and Dewayne Veasey appeal the district court’s November 4, 2020, order excluding Appellants’ proffered toxicology expert under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), and granting summary judgment in favor of Appellees BP Exploration & Production Inc. and BP America Production Company (“BP”). After careful review of the record and the parties’ briefs, and with the benefit of oral argument, we affirm. I.
*The Honorable John E. Steele, United States District Judge for the Middle District of Florida, sitting by designation. USCA11 Case: 20-14544 Date Filed: 01/11/2022 Page: 3 of 9
20-14544 Opinion of the Court 3
This matter arises out of a disastrous BP oil spill. On April 20, 2010, the oil-drilling rig Deepwater Horizon, operated by BP in the Gulf of Mexico, exploded and sank, resulting in the largest oil spill in the history of marine oil-drilling operations. A massive ef- fort responded to the spill, with as many as 90,000 workers engaged in near-shore and offshore response activities. But the damage was done. Millions of barrels of oil flowed from the damaged Macondo Prospect well over an 87-day period, before the well was finally capped on July 15, 2010. The oil spill spawned thousands of claims. The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation assigned Judge Carl Joseph Barbier of the Eastern District of Louisiana to oversee the Deepwater Hori- zon MDL. See In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mex., on April 20, 2010, 731 F. Supp. 2d 1352 (J.P.M.L. 2010). Under Judge Barbier’s supervision, BP and class counsel en- tered into a massive class settlement agreement for personal-injury claims. That agreement pertains to class members who allege that exposure to substances released in the spill or used in connection with response activities caused them to suffer physical injuries first diagnosed after April 16, 2012. Under it, these class members can sue BP in federal court in what is called the “Back-End Litigation Option” (“BELO”). The settlement requires BELO plaintiffs to prove that their injuries were legally caused by exposure to pur- portedly toxicological substances. Hundreds of those BELO cases USCA11 Case: 20-14544 Date Filed: 01/11/2022 Page: 4 of 9
4 Opinion of the Court 20-14544
are currently pending before Judge M. Casey Rodgers of the North- ern District of Florida. To manage those cases, Judge Rodgers selected Appel- lants—a dozen BELO plaintiffs who were assigned to clean up the spill on the beaches of Northwest Florida—for a bellwether pro- cess. She ordered the parties to first address general causation be- fore reaching the question of specific causation.
Appellants proffered a single expert, Dr. Patricia Williams, to establish general causation. Following discovery, BP moved for summary judgment on the basis that Dr. Williams’s opinions failed to satisfy the standards of Rule 702 and Daubert. After briefing and a hearing, the district court concluded that Dr. Williams’s opinions fell short of the Rule 702 and Daubert requirements and granted summary judgment to BP. Appellants now appeal that ruling.
II.
We have jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 as the appeal of a final decision of a district court—here, the order granting summary judgment to BP. III. A. We begin with Appellants’ contention that the district court erred in failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing on their sum- mary-judgment motion because they wished to elicit live USCA11 Case: 20-14544 Date Filed: 01/11/2022 Page: 5 of 9
20-14544 Opinion of the Court 5
testimony from Dr. Williams. We review the district court’s denial of an evidentiary hearing for abuse of discretion. Loyd v. Alabama Dep’t of Corr., 176 F.3d 1336, 1339 (11th Cir. 1999). Here, Dr. Williams previously gave testimony at two depo- sitions over several hours, submitted an expert report, and pro- duced a supplemental report. Because Dr. Williams had sufficient opportunity to discuss her methodology on these four occasions, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that it was not necessary to give her yet another opportunity for addi- tional explanation. B. We review the district court’s determination to exclude the Appellants’ proffered expert testimony for abuse of discretion. Chapman v. Procter & Gamble Distrib., LLC, 766 F.3d 1296, 1305 (11th Cir. 2014). Because “[a] district court is more familiar with the procedural and factual details and is in a better position to de- cide Daubert issues,” a district judge is afforded “considerable lee- way” in determining whether to exclude expert testimony. Id. at 1305 & n.8. We are thus “require[d] … to defer to the judge’s de- cision on expert testimony, unless it is manifestly erroneous.” Id. at 1305; see also id. at 1305 n.8 (we “must affirm” unless the district court “made a clear error of judgment”). This “deferential abuse- of-discretion standard is applied stringently, even if a decision on expert testimony is outcome determinative.” Id. at 1305. USCA11 Case: 20-14544 Date Filed: 01/11/2022 Page: 6 of 9
6 Opinion of the Court 20-14544
In a toxic-tort case like this one, a plaintiff must establish both general and specific causation through admissible, reliable ex- pert testimony. McClain v. Metabolife Int’l, Inc., 401 F.3d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 2005). Rule 702 provides that expert testimony re- garding scientific, technical, or specialized knowledge is admissible if it is (1) helpful to the jury, (2) based on sufficient facts or data, (3) the product of reliable principles and methods, and (4) demon- strates that “the expert has reliably applied the principles and meth- ods to the facts of the case.” Fed. R. Evid. 702. We have distilled the Rule 702 requirements into three in- quiries: (1) whether the expert is qualified; (2) whether “the meth- odology by which the expert reaches [a] conclusion is sufficiently reliable” under the principles of Daubert; and (3) whether the tes- timony will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue through the application of scientific, tech- nical, or other specialized knowledge. Rink v. Cheminova, Inc., 400 F.3d 1286, 1291-92 (11th Cir. 2005). In its order, the district court found that Dr. Williams’s opin- ions fell “woefully short” of these requirements. Some examples of these shortcomings, the district court determined, include the following: • “[T]he exposure scenarios in the studies Dr. Wil- liams cited occurred close to shore and involved fresh crude oil, whereas the Deepwater Horizon spill oc- curred approximately 125 miles offshore of Florida, USCA11 Case: 20-14544 Date Filed: 01/11/2022 Page: 7 of 9
20-14544 Opinion of the Court 7
and exposed cleanup workers on Florida beaches to weathered oil.” • “[T]here is . . . no evidence that . . . the conditions present in these cases were somehow comparable to the conditions present in the[] studies [cited by Dr. Williams].” • “[A]lthough Dr. Williams specifically identified PM [particulate matter] and arsenic as the causative agents in Plaintiffs’ cases, neither is referenced in Dr. Williams’s oil spill studies.” • “[T]he other oil spill studies documented ‘symp- toms’ . . . and ‘primarily acute health effects experi- enced over a period of less than a year after exposure,’ not chronic conditions, as are alleged here.” • “Dr. Williams’s complete[ly] fail[ed] to engage in any critical analysis of the studies she cited is a fatal flaw in her methodology.” • “Dr. Williams’s arsenic opinion . . . reli[es] on sev- eral studies showing an association between arsenic in drinking water and skin lesions, neither of which is at issue here.” • “A general causation opinion that PM or arsenic can be harmful at some level that the Plaintiffs were not potentially exposed to, or the fact that PM or arsenic exceeded human health benchmarks in an area where USCA11 Case: 20-14544 Date Filed: 01/11/2022 Page: 8 of 9
8 Opinion of the Court 20-14544
the Plaintiffs did not work, is simply not helpful to the trier of fact, and to the extent Plaintiffs needed an- other expert to bridge this gap, it was their burden to produce one.” Noting that she did not reach her determination “lightly,” the dis- trict judge concluded that Dr. Williams’s opinions must be ex- cluded as both unreliable and unhelpful. Absent a qualified expert to testify regarding general causation, the district court had to con- clude Appellants could not survive summary judgment. After careful consideration, we conclude that Appellants have shown no reversible error in the district court’s findings or rulings. Indeed, the district court’s analysis is well-reasoned. Appellants argue that the district court did not adequately consider the distinction between general and specific causation with respect to Dr. Williams’s opinions. We disagree. But even if that were the case, any error that might have occurred was harm- less because the court also found that her expert testimony was un- helpful. And we can’t say that was an abuse of discretion on this record. In short, the district court did not abuse its discretion or make any “clear error of judgment” in excluding Dr. Williams’ opinions under Rule 702 and Daubert. C. We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. See, e.g., Edward Lewis Tobinick, MD v. Novella, 848 F.3d 935, 943 (11th USCA11 Case: 20-14544 Date Filed: 01/11/2022 Page: 9 of 9
20-14544 Opinion of the Court 9
Cir. 2017). Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Here, the district court granted summary judgment because after it excluded Appellants’ proffered expert testimony under Daubert, Appellants were unable to establish general causation, a necessary element of their claims. Because Appellants did not es- tablish a material issue of fact concerning general causation, we must likewise conclude that the district court did not err in grant- ing summary judgment in favor of BP. IV. For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s order. AFFIRMED.