Peev v. Vega

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Peev v. Vega

28 A.D.3d 446, 811 N.Y.S.2d 585

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedApril 4, 2006

StatusPublished

This text of 28 A.D.3d 446 (Peev v. Vega) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Peev v. Vega, 28 A.D.3d 446, 811 N.Y.S.2d 585 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2006).

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Opinion

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Jackson, J.), dated December 2, 2004, which granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d).

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, the defendants established, prima facie, that he did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345 [2002]; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955 [1992]). The Supreme Court properly determined that the plaintiffs submissions in opposition to the motion failed to raise a triable issue of fact. Florio, J.P., Santucci, Mastro and Rivera, JJ., concur.

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In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Jackson, J.), dated December 2, 2004, which granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d).

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, the defendants established, prima facie, that he did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345 [2002]; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955 [1992]). The Supreme Court properly determined that the plaintiffs submissions in opposition to the motion failed to raise a triable issue of fact. Florio, J.P., Santucci, Mastro and Rivera, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

28 A.D.3d 446, 811 N.Y.S.2d 585, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/peev-v-vega-nyappdiv-2006.

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