Peerless Wire Fence Co. v. Jackson Fence Co.

226 F. 774, 1915 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1181
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Michigan
DecidedJanuary 25, 1915
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 226 F. 774 (Peerless Wire Fence Co. v. Jackson Fence Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Michigan primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Peerless Wire Fence Co. v. Jackson Fence Co., 226 F. 774, 1915 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1181 (E.D. Mich. 1915).

Opinion

TUTTLE, District Judge.

This suit is on Hoxie patent, No.. 879,965, issued February 25, 1908-, for staple forming and discharging mechanism. Plaintiff charges infringement of claims 2, 3, 7, 9, and 12. j

[775]*775[1] Plaintiff lias been engaged in the manufacture of “stiff-stay” woven v’re fence at Adrian, Mich., for the past 18 years, and prior to 1908 was known as the Lamb Wire Pence Company. Defendant has I ecn engaged at Jackson, Mich., in the manufacture of the same type of fence for about 10 years. The fence manufactured by the parties consists of a number of continuous line or strand wires, to which cross wires extending the full width or height of the fence are secured- at regular intervals by means of staples, which are driven around the intersections of the strand and cross wires to securely lock them together, thus giving to this type of fence the name “stiff-stay,” as distinguished from “wrapped-stay” fence, in which the cross wires arc \\ rapped around the strand wires, but not locked thereto by staples.

This controversy has to do with the mechanism for forming, delivering, and driving the staples in manufacturing “stiff-stay” woven wire fence. In the early years of the manufacture of this type of fence by plaintiff, as well as other manufacturers, the staples were formed on large staple-forming machines entirely separate from the looms in which the fence was woven; these staples being delivered from the staple-forming mechanism onto a long slide and transferred therefrom by hand to the series of short slides leading to the various sta.ple-drivmg mechanisms in the looms. This practice was expensive and unsatisfactory, in that each loom required a separate staple-forming machine and a man or boy whose sole duty it was to keep this staple-forming machine operating and supply staples to the staple slides of the loom. In transferring the staples by hand, a great many of them were dropped upon the floor and lost, sometimes falling into the mechanism of the loom and causing breakage and delay.

By 1902 or 1903 Ihis loss of staples amounted to from $4,000 to $6,000 a year in plaintiffs plant, and efforts were made by Hoxie, plaintiff’s superintendent, and other employes of plaintiff, to produce a machine, that would sort these lost staples, so that they might be used; but these efforts proved impractical and were abandoned. Another Adrian manufacturer undertook to connect up one of these independent staple-forming machines with each of the numerous staple-driving mechanisms in the loom; but this attempt also proved a failure.

Hoxie then gave his attention to the development of a device that would both form and drive the staples in the loom itself, and in the early part of 1905 succeeded in producing a device that has been referred to in evidence as the “Hoxie Tip-Over Device,” and is covered by the Hoxie patent, No. 804,403, granted November 14, 1905, which has been offered in evidence by defendant as a part of the prior art. 'Several months prior to the invention of this tip-over1 device by Hoxie, one of, plaintiffs employes invented the device shown in Gibson patent, No. 804,311, granted November 14, 1905, to Lamb Wire Fence Company, as Gibson’s assignee. This Gibson patent was also offered by defendant as a part of the prior art.

The Gibson device was never used, but the Hoxie tip-over device weiil into extensive use in plaintiff’s plant, and was satisfactory in weaving fence of coarse mesh, or with the strand wires spaced well [776]*776apart. The space within which this tip-over device can be operated is limited by the length of the staple wire before the staple is formed. In operation the wire is fed into this tip-over device from below, and substantially parallel to the feeding in of. the strand wires of the fence. A section of the wire suitable to form a staple is then cut off, and tips over into a plane parallel to that occupied by the cross wires, so that the space occupied by each of these tip-over devices in the loom cannot be less than the length of the straightened out staple, and as a matter of fact must be somewhat greater than this length, in order to provide suitable walls for the chamber holding these severed sections of wire.

To meet the demand for fence of finer mesh, Hoxie invented the device of the patent in suit, in which the staple wire is fed in from below in line with the strand wires and the staple formed in that plane. The completed staple is then turned laterally until it occupies a position parallel with the cross wires of the fence, which plane intersects the plane in which the staple was formed at an angle of 90 degrees, and in this latter plane it is driven about the intersecting fence wires.

The Hoxie patent in suit shows' two methods of accomplishing this turning of, the staple from the plane of its formation to- that of its discharge; one of these methods, shown in Figures 2 to 7 of the drawings, being the provision of a curved guide finger which guides the staple in its movement from forming to- -discharging position, and the other method, shown in Figures 8 to 11 of the drawings, being the provision of a closed chamber in which the staple falls from forming to discharging position, being assisted in its movement by a pressure block marked b in the drawings.

It is not contended by the defendant that the patent in suit is invalid; but it is asserted that the invention covered was of such narrow scope that the claims cannot be construed to cover defendant’s device. The controversy in this connection has centered about the means used by defendant for causing the staples to turn through an angle of 90 degrees from forming to discharging positions, defendant contending that the prior art so limits the Hoxie patent that the claims must be confined to the specific means shown by the Hoxie patent for accomplishing this movement of the staple and that defendant’s means is substantially different. It is admitted that the movement of defendant’s staples from forming to discharging positions is caused by the force of gravity, as is the case in the Hoxie patent, and it is further admitted that the staples in defendant’s device are guided by a curved guide or track, so that they must make a 90-degree lateral turn between forming and driving positions; but it is contended that this is not sufficient to bring the defendant’s structure within the claims in issue, and that in order to come within these claims the movement must be a “falling” or “free falling” movement.

[2] While it is true that the terms “drop” and “fall” are used in the Hoxie specifications in describing the movement of the staples, none of the claims in suit call for a dropping or falling of the staple, and to so construe them would be -to read into- them limitations that are [777]*777not required by the prior art, and would also make them of the same scope as other claims not in suit that specifically call for a “dropping” or “falling” movement. Claim 1, for instance, describes the movement as “a free circular falling movement”; claim 4 uses the expression “to permit it to freely fall”; and claims 5 and 8 “to fall by gravity.” It is well settled that:

“Where a patent contains both a broad and a narrow claim, and suit is brought on the broad claim, we cannot construe into it a limitation not therein expressed, but which is expressed in the narrower claim, and by which alone one is distinguished from the other. To do so would be making over tiie contract between the public and the patentee. Bresnahan v. Tripp Co. (C. C. A. 1 ) 102 Fed.

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Bluebook (online)
226 F. 774, 1915 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1181, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/peerless-wire-fence-co-v-jackson-fence-co-mied-1915.