Peerless Insurance v. Nationwide Insurance

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Peerless Insurance v. Nationwide Insurance

12 A.D.2d 602, 208 N.Y.S.2d 469, 1960 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6536

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedDecember 13, 1960

StatusPublished

Cited by7 cases

This text of 12 A.D.2d 602 (Peerless Insurance v. Nationwide Insurance) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Peerless Insurance v. Nationwide Insurance, 12 A.D.2d 602, 208 N.Y.S.2d 469, 1960 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6536 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1960).

Pincite

Opinion

Resettled order entered April 14, 1960, denying, among other things, the cross motion of the defendant Nationwide Insurance Company for summary judgment, unanimously modified to the extent of granting said defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment, with $10 costs, and as so modified, the resettled order is affirmed, with $20 costs and disbursements to appellant Nationwide Insurance Company. Nationwide had issued an automobile liability policy to defendants Jayson — who operated a Summer camp — covering a pick-up truck. A camper was injured on July 7, 1957, apparently as she was climbing aboard the truck. Nationwide was not notified until April 19, 1958, when the Jaysons received a claim letter from the girl camper’s attorneys, although the policy required the insured to give written notice of an accident or occurrence “ as soon as practicable ”. Even assuming that the insureds were justified in supposing that the occurrence on July 7, 1957, was a trivial mishap, they were certainly alerted to the possibility of a claim being made when the camper’s father telephoned Jayson in November or December, 1957 and informed Jayson that radioactive treatments were being administered to the injured person’s leg. Any unreasonable delay in notifying the insurer from that point became inexcusable. The passage of four to five months from the receipt of such information to the time of notifying Nationwide constitutes late notice as a matter of law. Hence, there is no triable issue as to the reasonableness of the notice under the circumstances. The appeal from the order entered January 18, 1960, is dismissed, without costs, since that order was subsequently resettled by the order entered April 14, 1960. (Matter of French v. Knapp, 170 App. Div. 959; Young v. White, 158 App. Div. 763.) Settle order on notice. Concur—Valente, J. P., McNally, Stevens, Eager and Noonan, JJ.

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Resettled order entered April 14, 1960, denying, among other things, the cross motion of the defendant Nationwide Insurance Company for summary judgment, unanimously modified to the extent of granting said defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment, with $10 costs, and as so modified, the resettled order is affirmed, with $20 costs and disbursements to appellant Nationwide Insurance Company. Nationwide had issued an automobile liability policy to defendants Jayson — who operated a Summer camp — covering a pick-up truck. A camper was injured on July 7, 1957, apparently as she was climbing aboard the truck. Nationwide was not notified until April 19, 1958, when the Jaysons received a claim letter from the girl camper’s attorneys, although the policy required the insured to give written notice of an accident or occurrence “ as soon as practicable ”. Even assuming that the insureds were justified in supposing that the occurrence on July 7, 1957, was a trivial mishap, they were certainly alerted to the possibility of a claim being made when the camper’s father telephoned Jayson in November or December, 1957 and informed Jayson that radioactive treatments were being administered to the injured person’s leg. Any unreasonable delay in notifying the insurer from that point became inexcusable. The passage of four to five months from the receipt of such information to the time of notifying Nationwide constitutes late notice as a matter of law. Hence, there is no triable issue as to the reasonableness of the notice under the circumstances. The appeal from the order entered January 18, 1960, is dismissed, without costs, since that order was subsequently resettled by the order entered April 14, 1960. (Matter of French v. Knapp, 170 App. Div. 959; Young v. White, 158 App. Div. 763.) Settle order on notice. Concur—Valente, J. P., McNally, Stevens, Eager and Noonan, JJ.

State of New York v. Walter T. Blank and Abalene Pest Control Service, Inc., and Orkin Exterminating Company, Inc., Walter T. Blank and Abalene Pest Control Service, Inc., Third-Party v. New York State Department of Environmental Conservation, New England Marine Contractors, Inc., Third-Party National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, Capital Mutual Insurance Co., Third-Party Capital Mutual Insurance Co., Fourth-Party Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross-Appellant v. New York Mutual Underwriters, Commercial Mutual Insurance Company, Formerly Known as Cooperative Fire Insurance Company of Catskill, New York, Security Mutual Fire Insurance Company, and Sterling Insurance Company, Fourth-Party Defendants-Appellants-Cross-Appellees

27 F.3d 783 (Second Circuit, 1994)

New York v. Blank

27 F.3d 783 (Second Circuit, 1994)

American Insurance v. Fairchild Industries, Inc.

852 F. Supp. 1173 (E.D. New York, 1994)

Winstead v. Uniondale Union Free School District

201 A.D.2d 721 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1994)

Olin Corp. v. Insurance Co. of North America

743 F. Supp. 1044 (S.D. New York, 1990)

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Bluebook (online)

12 A.D.2d 602, 208 N.Y.S.2d 469, 1960 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6536, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/peerless-insurance-v-nationwide-insurance-nyappdiv-1960.

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