Peel v. Jordan

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Peel v. Jordan

202 A.D.2d 485, 609 N.Y.S.2d 74, 1994 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 2467

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedMarch 14, 1994

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 202 A.D.2d 485 (Peel v. Jordan) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Peel v. Jordan, 202 A.D.2d 485, 609 N.Y.S.2d 74, 1994 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 2467 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1994).

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Opinion

—In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Baisley, J.), dated December 16, 1991, which denied her motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, the defendant’s motion is granted, and the complaint is dismissed.

The plaintiff’s subjective complaints of ringing in the ear, and her minor bruises, are insufficient to make out a prima facie case of "serious injury” within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d). Accordingly, the court should have granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the [486]*486complaint (see, Insurance Law § 5104 [a]; Scheer v Koubek, 70 NY2d 678; Licari v Elliott, 57 NY2d 230). Sullivan, J. P., Pizzuto, Joy and Goldstein, JJ., concur.

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—In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Baisley, J.), dated December 16, 1991, which denied her motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, the defendant’s motion is granted, and the complaint is dismissed.

The plaintiff’s subjective complaints of ringing in the ear, and her minor bruises, are insufficient to make out a prima facie case of "serious injury” within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d). Accordingly, the court should have granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the [486]*486complaint (see, Insurance Law § 5104 [a]; Scheer v Koubek, 70 NY2d 678; Licari v Elliott, 57 NY2d 230). Sullivan, J. P., Pizzuto, Joy and Goldstein, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

202 A.D.2d 485, 609 N.Y.S.2d 74, 1994 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 2467, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/peel-v-jordan-nyappdiv-1994.

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