Peek v. Clear Sky Financial, LLC

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: April 1, 2025
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2024-3125
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

CHRISTOPHER EARL PEEK, : : Plaintiff, : Civil Action No.: 24-3125 (RC) : v. : Re Document No.: 5 : CLEAR SKY FINANCIAL, LLC, : : Defendant. :

ORDER

GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS

Plaintiff Christopher Earl Peek sued Defendant Clear Sky Financial, LLC ahead of a

pending non-judicial foreclosure sale of a property owned by Peek, LLC. Plaintiff, 1 proceeding

pro se, alleges various violations of federal and local consumer protection laws, as well as the

District of Columbia Tenants Opportunity to Purchase Act. See generally Compl., ECF No. 1.

A factual background can be found in the Court’s prior memorandum opinion, which the Court

adopts here. See Mem. Op., ECF No. 13; Peek v. Clear Sky Fin., LLC, No. 24-cv-3125, 2024

WL 4932059, at *1–2 (D.D.C. Dec. 2, 2024). In that prior opinion, the Court denied Plaintiff’s

motion for a temporary restraining order, finding that he had no likelihood of success in

establishing that he has standing to bring his claims or that the consumer protection laws apply to

the commercial loan at issue. The Court delayed resolution of Clear Sky’s motion to dismiss to

provide Plaintiff time to respond to that motion. See Mem. Op. at 1 n.2. The Court initially

provided Plaintiff 30 days to respond to the motion to dismiss, later extending the deadline a

further two weeks. See Fox/Neal Order, ECF No. 7; Min. Order dated Dec. 17, 2024. Plaintiff

1 The Court refers to Mr. Peek as “Plaintiff” to avoid confusion with the LLC. never filed a formal opposition to the motion to dismiss, such that the motion could be

considered conceded. See D.D.C. Civ. R. 7(b). The Court nonetheless construes one of

Plaintiff’s filings as an opposition here. See Mot. for Leave to Reply to Def.’s Mot. Dismiss and

Amend Pl.’s Compl. (“Pl.’s Opp’n”), ECF No. 11. That filing, however, contains no argument

as to why Plaintiff has standing to bring his claims on behalf of the LLC. See id. at 2–6.

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), a party may move to dismiss an action

or claim when the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). A motion for

dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) “presents a threshold challenge to the court’s jurisdiction.” Haase

v. Sessions, 835 F.2d 902, 906 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,

and it is “presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian

Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Thus, on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the plaintiff “bears the

burden of establishing jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.” Bagherian v. Pompeo,

442 F. Supp. 3d 87, 91 (D.D.C. 2020); see also Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561

(1992). “It is well-settled that [a court] may consider materials outside the pleadings to

determine [its] jurisdiction.” Kareem v. Haspel, 986 F.3d 859, 866 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 2021).

“The D.C. Circuit has instructed that a motion to dismiss for lack of standing constitutes

a motion under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because ‘the defect of

standing is a defect in subject matter jurisdiction.’” Sweigert v. Perez, 334 F. Supp. 3d 36, 40

(D.D.C 2018) (quoting Haase, 835 F.2d at 906). “To establish standing, a plaintiff must show

(1) it has suffered a ‘concrete and particularized’ injury (2) that is ‘fairly traceable to the

challenged action of the defendant’ and (3) that is ‘likely’ to be ‘redressed by a favorable

decision,’ i.e., a decision granting the plaintiff the relief it seeks.” Elec. Priv. Info. Ctr. v.

Presidential Advisory Comm’n on Election Integrity, 878 F.3d 371, 376–77 (D.C. Cir. 2017)

2 (quoting West v. Lynch, 845 F.3d 1228, 1230 (D.C. Cir. 2017)). The asserted injury must be

specific to the plaintiff, such that the plaintiff has “a personal stake in the outcome of the

controversy.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975); see also Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 n.1

(1992) (noting that a defendant’s alleged conduct must affect the plaintiff in a “personal and

individual way”).

For the reasons explained in its prior memorandum opinion, the Court concludes that

Plaintiff lacks standing to bring a claim on behalf of Peek, LLC, which is a legal entity separate

from himself. See Mem. Op. at 7–11. The evidence submitted by Clear Sky demonstrates that

Peek, LLC owns the relevant property; that Peek, LLC executed the commercial deed of trust

with Clear Sky; and that Plaintiff signed the documents for Peek, LLC in his capacity as Chief

Executive Member of the company. 2 Id. at 2. The evidence does not indicate that Plaintiff was

coerced or otherwise misled in transferring the property to Peek, LLC or signing the commercial

loan. See id. at 9–11. Peek, LLC is therefore the legal entity that could claim an injury arising

out of the commercial deed of trust and associated loan. See id. at 8–9. Plaintiff lacks standing

to bring these claims on his own behalf, and he does not allege injury to himself separate from

that affecting Peek, LLC. See id.

Peek, LLC is not before the Court, given that it is not represented by counsel. The LLC

is a creation of Delaware law with a legal identity separate from Plaintiff’s. See id. at 7. “Courts

in this Circuit have repeatedly held that LLCs are not properly before the court unless

represented by counsel.” Id. (collecting cases). Thus, no plaintiff in this case has standing to

allege that Clear Sky violated consumer protection laws in its dealings with Peek, LLC. The

2 Plaintiff asserts that he never “sold his home to his Peek, LLC.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 5. This claim is plainly contradicted by the special warranty deed he recorded in December 2018. See Ex. B to Def.’s Opp’n to Mot. for TRO and Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 5-4.

3 Court therefore lacks jurisdiction over this case and cannot reach the merits of Plaintiff’s

claims. 3

For these reasons, Clear Sky’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 5) is GRANTED.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 1, 2025 RUDOLPH CONTRERAS United States District Judge

3 Plaintiff argues that if the Court were to dismiss his complaint as a “shotgun pleading,” he should be permitted to amend. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 3–4. The Court does not dismiss his complaint on that basis, but nonetheless denies any request to amend as futile because the record plainly demonstrates Plaintiff’s lack of standing to bring these claims. See Atchinson v. District of Columbia, 73 F.3d 418, 425 (D.C. Cir. 1996).