Pedro Garcia Cruz v. Todd Blanche

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: May 14, 2026
• Docket: 20-72682
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 14 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

PEDRO GARCIA CRUZ; ANA PATRICIA No. 20-72682 VASQUEZ VALDOVINOS; YARELI EMERITH GARCIA VASQUEZ; EBER Agency Nos. A201-441-046 JANCARLO GARCIA VASQUEZ; A201-441-047 OLIVER JASSIEL GARCIA VASQUEZ, A201-441-048 A201-441-049 Petitioners, A201-441-050

v. MEMORANDUM* TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted May 12, 2026** San Francisco, California

Before: H.A. THOMAS and MENDOZA, Circuit Judges, and BOLTON,*** District Judge.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Susan R. Bolton, United States District Judge for the District of Arizona, sitting by designation. Petitioners Pedro Garcia Cruz, his wife Ana Patricia Vasquez Valdovinos, and

their three minor children are natives and citizens of Mexico. They petition for

review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing their

appeal of an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of their motion to reopen and rescind

their in absentia removal orders. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We

review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen and rescind an in absentia removal

order for abuse of discretion. See Hernandez-Galand v. Garland, 996 F.3d 1030,

1034 (9th Cir. 2021), overruled on other grounds by, Montejo-Gonzalez v. Bondi,

No. 21-304, 2026 WL 305327 (9th Cir. Feb. 5, 2026). We deny the petition.

An in absentia removal order may be rescinded if a petitioner files a motion

to reopen within 180 days and demonstrates that the “failure to appear was because

of exceptional circumstances,” or files a motion to reopen at any time demonstrating

that they “did not receive notice in accordance with paragraph (1) or (2) of section

1229(a).” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C). “The term ‘exceptional circumstances’ refers

to exceptional circumstances (such as battery or extreme cruelty to the [noncitizen]

or any child or parent of the [noncitizen], serious illness of the [noncitizen], or

serious illness or death of the spouse, child, or parent of the [noncitizen], but not

including less compelling circumstances) beyond the control of the [noncitizen].”

Id. § 1229a(e)(1). “‘Exceptional circumstances’ are ‘by definition unique,’ and the

statute’s listed examples of compelling circumstances are ‘explicitly not

2 exhaustive.’” Montejo-Gonzalez, 2026 WL 305327 at *3 (quoting V. Singh v.

Garland, 117 F.4th 1145, 1150 (9th Cir. 2024)). To determine whether exceptional

circumstances exist, we look to the “particularized facts” and consider the “totality

of the circumstances” of each case. Id. (citation omitted). Although “[e]vidence

relevant to the statutory factors may include whether the petitioners were diligent,

whether they encountered external or unforeseen circumstances, and whether they

lacked a motive to evade the hearing,” id., “[o]ther factors may be relevant

depending on the circumstances.” Id. “[T]he possibility of unconscionable results,”

however, is not a “standalone element” that the “agency must consider.” Id.

1. The record does not compel the conclusion that exceptional circumstances

beyond Petitioners’ control caused them to miss their hearing. As the IJ found,

Petitioners were aware of Karla’s mental-health condition, yet did not implement

safeguards to ensure that they would receive mail addressed to them. See Hernandez-

Galand, 996 F.3d at 1034 (explaining that the first consideration in determining if a

failure to appear was justified is “whether ‘petitioners did all they reasonably could

to have their cases heard promptly’” (quoting Lo v. Ashcroft, 341 F.3d 934, 938 (9th

Cir. 2003))); Celis-Castellano v. Ashcroft, 298 F.3d 888, 892 (9th Cir. 2002)

(emphasizing the petitioner’s burden to show that the record compels reversing the

3 agency’s finding that exceptional circumstances were absent).1

2. To the extent Petitioners argue that the IJ lacked jurisdiction over the

proceedings because the notice to appear was incomplete, that argument is

foreclosed by our decision in Karingithi v. Whitaker, 913 F.3d 1158 (9th Cir. 2019).

PETITION DENIED.2

1 Petitioners seem to suggest in their reply brief that the petition must be granted because Karla, rather than Petitioners, actually received the mailed notice. But as they did not raise this argument before the IJ, the BIA, or in their opening brief, they forfeited this argument. See Lui v. DeJoy, 129 F.4th 770, 780 (9th Cir. 2025). 2 The temporary stay of removal remains in place until the mandate issues.