Pedro Fundora, etc. v. Roberto Dangond
This text of Pedro Fundora, etc. v. Roberto Dangond (Pedro Fundora, etc. v. Roberto Dangond) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida
Opinion filed May 1, 2024. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
________________
No. 3D22-1749 Lower Tribunal No. 20-24948 ________________
Pedro Fundora, etc., Appellant,
vs.
Roberto Dangond, et al., Appellees.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Beatrice Butchko, Judge.
Warrior Law, P.A., and Liah C. Catanese, for appellant.
Boyd Richards Parker & Colonnelli, P.L., and Elaine D. Walter, and Yvette R. Lavelle, for appellees.
Before EMAS, SCALES, and LINDSEY, JJ.
PER CURIAM. Pedro Fundora filed suit against Robert Dangond and Maria Guevara
after sustaining injuries when Dangond struck Fundora with a vehicle owned
by Guevara. On appeal, Fundora argues that the trial court erred by granting
Robert Dangond and Maria Guevara’s Motion to Enforce Settlement
Agreement.
During litigation, Fundora sent Dangond and Guevara’s insurer,
Progressive Insurance Company, a demand letter pursuant to section
627.4137(1), Florida Statutes (2011), which provides that an “insurer which
does or may provide liability insurance coverage to pay all or a portion of a
claim which might be made shall provide . . . a statement . . . setting forth
[the information specified in this statute] with regard to each known policy
of insurance . . . .” (Emphasis supplied). In response, Progressive sent
Fundora a letter disclosing only one policy, held by Dangond. Included in
the disclosure was a statement “certify[ing] . . . that the contents of this
disclosure made pursuant to Florida Statute 627.4137 are true and correct.”
Progressive did not disclose any other policies.
When Fundora later offered to settle with Dangond and Guevara,
Fundora sent Progressive a demand letter, again requesting disclosure of
information on additional known policies, and making the settlement offer
contingent on verification that Progressive knew of no other policies:
2 Please be advised that this settlement proposal is contingent upon the following:
1. Written confirmation that there is no umbrella coverage, excess coverage or any other liability insurance coverage available with regard to this accident and that the negligent insured was not in the course and scope of any employment, agency or joint venture at the time of this accident . . . .
Two weeks later, Progressive sent Fundora’s counsel a letter
accepting the settlement offer. Progressive responded to the disclosure
demand by attaching affidavits from Dangond and Guevara stating that there
was no additional coverage.
On the same day that Progressive sent the letter accepting Fundora’s
settlement offer, it sent a separate letter to Fundora disclosing an additional
insurance policy held by Dangond and Guevara’s codefendant, Dangond
Construction, that may provide coverage for the accident. Because
Progressive disclosed this policy after accepting the settlement offer,
Fundora did not have the benefit of reviewing the additional policy prior to
offering to settle. See Underwriters at Lloyd’s London v. Osting-Schwinn,
No. 805-CV-1460T-17TGW, 2008 WL 746829, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 18,
2008) (“The legislature could not have included the word ‘known’ to impose
only an obligation to disclose that insurer’s own coverage information.”).
Fundora’s request to Progressive for information on any known policies
pursuant to section 627.4137(1) was an essential term of Fundora’s offer to
3 settle with which Progressive failed to comply. See Cheverie v. Geisser, 783
So. 2d 1115, 1119 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (holding that the settlement offer was
unenforceable because, despite “repeated demands” pursuant to section
627.4137 and clearly establishing that compliance “was a necessary and
essential element of any settlement acceptance[,]” the defendant “did not
provide [the information] until two months after suit was filed”); Schlosser v.
Perez, 832 So. 2d 179, 183 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (holding that the insurer’s
“fail[ure] to provide the disclosure” in accordance with section 627.4137
rendered the settlement unenforceable because the plaintiff “made it clear
that the insurance disclosure was an essential term” and because “the
insurance disclosure is an essential term under Cheverie”)
Because we agree with Fundora that the settlement is unenforceable,
we reverse.
Reversed.
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