NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 25a0399n.06
Case No. 22-3365
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT Aug 13, 2025 KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk ) PEDRO AGUILAR-MEJIA, ) Petitioner, ) ON PETITION FOR REVIEW OF ) THE DECISION OF THE BOARD v. ) OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS ) PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General, ) OPINION Respondent. ) )
Before: SUTTON; Chief Judge; SILER and WHITE, Circuit Judges.
SILER, Circuit Judge. Pedro Aguilar-Mejia, a native and citizen of Guatemala,
challenges the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) decision to affirm the denial of his requests
for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture
(“CAT”). He also contests the BIA’s refusal to remand for consideration of new evidence.
Because substantial evidence supports the agency’s disposition and the BIA acted within its broad
discretion in denying remand, we deny the petition for review.
I.
The facts are straightforward and, for the most part, uncontested. In 2013, when Aguilar-
Mejia was 15 years old, three Mara 18 gang members approached him as he was leaving a
neighborhood store in Guatemala. They slapped and pushed him, took the drink and small amount
of money he was carrying, and ordered him to join their gang. He refused. He suffered no lasting
injury, did not seek medical care, and on his parents’ advice made no police report. No. 22-3365, Aguilar-Mejia v. Bondi
Three days later, his family moved to another town, and Aguilar-Mejia testified that he
experienced no further threats or harm during the next 10 months before he left Guatemala. In
October 2014, Aguilar-Mejia entered the United States without admission or parole.
Removal proceedings followed. At a hearing in February 2015, he admitted the notice-to-
appear allegations, conceded removability, and indicated that he would seek asylum, withholding
of removal, and CAT protection. He filed a Form I-589 application a few months later.
At the December 2018 merits hearing, Aguilar-Mejia’s counsel claimed persecution as a
member of a proposed particular social group (“PSG”): “child victims” “of gang recruitment and
gang violence in Guatemala,” or, as stated in closing argument, “young . . . male Guatemalans.”
In April 2019, the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) found Aguilar-Mejia credible yet denied all relief,
holding that the single 2013 incident did not rise to persecution, lacked nexus to a protected ground,
and involved a PSG that was impermissibly circular and insufficiently particular.
Aguilar-Mejia appealed and, citing his girlfriend’s pregnancy, moved to remand so he
could present additional family-based PSG formulations. In March 2022, the BIA dismissed his
appeal and denied remand, echoing the IJ’s analysis and finding the new evidence immaterial.
Aguilar-Mejia timely petitioned this court for review.
II.
We review legal questions de novo and factual findings for substantial evidence, accepting
the agency’s view unless the record compels the opposite result. Tista-Ruiz de Ajualip v. Garland,
114 F.4th 487, 495 (6th Cir. 2024). Denial of a motion to remand receives abuse-of-discretion
review. Marqus v. Barr, 968 F.3d 583, 592 (6th Cir. 2020).
2 No. 22-3365, Aguilar-Mejia v. Bondi
III.
A. Asylum
An asylum applicant must show past persecution or a well-founded fear of future
persecution “on account of” one of five protected grounds, here, membership in a cognizable PSG.
8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42)(A); 1158(b)(1)(B)(i). Three questions capture the dispute: motivation,
magnitude, and group definition.
Motivation (nexus). Why did the gang target Aguilar-Mejia? The IJ concluded that Mara
18 confronted Aguilar-Mejia for ordinary criminal reasons—to take the few quetzales in his pocket
and to recruit him—not because of any protected characteristic. The record supports that view:
Aguilar-Mejia testified that the assailants robbed him of about 10 quetzales and told him that they
could “give [him] money” if he joined the gang. On cross-examination he agreed with counsel’s
statement that Mara 18 “rob[s] people of all ages” when it needs money. Such general economic
or criminal motives do not supply the “on account of” nexus that the INA demands. See
Khozhaynova v. Holder, 641 F.3d 187, 195 (6th Cir. 2011). Aguilar-Mejia’s opening brief devotes
only a single, conclusory sentence to contest the IJ’s nexus finding, which forfeits the argument.
See McPherson v. Kelsey, 125 F.3d 989, 995–96 (6th Cir. 1997).
Magnitude (persecution). Persecution “requires more than a few isolated incidents of
verbal harassment or intimidation.” Pilica v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 941, 950 (6th Cir. 2004) (citation
omitted). Aguilar-Mejia experienced just one brief encounter: the gang members slapped and
pushed him, stole roughly 10 quetzales, and attempted to recruit him. He sustained no lasting
injury, sought no medical care, and safely relocated within Guatemala where he lived for the next
10 months without further incident. A single, short-lived assault followed by successful relocation
falls well below the persecution threshold. See Mikhailevitch v. INS, 146 F.3d 384, 390 (6th Cir.
3 No. 22-3365, Aguilar-Mejia v. Bondi
1998); Rios-Zamora v. Sessions, 751 F. App’x 784, 787 (6th Cir. 2018) (a robbery that “is merely
an instance of ‘widespread crime and violence[]’ . . . does not constitute persecution” (quoting
Menijar v. Lynch, 812 F.3d 491, 501 (6th Cir. 2015))). The record does not compel a different
conclusion.
Group definition (PSG). A PSG must (i) share an immutable trait, (ii) be defined with
particularity, and (iii) be socially distinct in Guatemala. Cruz-Guzman v. Barr, 920 F.3d 1033,
1036 (6th Cir. 2019). “Child victims of gang recruitment and gang violence” fails two of the three
tests. It defines the group by the harm feared (circularity) and sweeps in an indeterminate slice of
Guatemalan youth (lack of particularity). Rreshpja v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d 551, 555–56 (6th Cir.
2005). Nor does “young male Guatemalans” fare better; broad demographic labels rarely do.
Lopez Garcia v. Garland, 2023 WL 4145320, at *5 (6th Cir. June 23, 2023).
Failure to prove even a single statutory prerequisite is fatal to an asylum application. See
Cruz-Guzman, 920 F.3d at 1038. Aguilar-Mejia misses all three.
B. Withholding of Removal
Withholding of removal is available only to an applicant who shows a “clear probability”
that his “life or freedom would be threatened” on account of a protected ground—meaning it is
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NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 25a0399n.06
Case No. 22-3365
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT Aug 13, 2025 KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk ) PEDRO AGUILAR-MEJIA, ) Petitioner, ) ON PETITION FOR REVIEW OF ) THE DECISION OF THE BOARD v. ) OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS ) PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General, ) OPINION Respondent. ) )
Before: SUTTON; Chief Judge; SILER and WHITE, Circuit Judges.
SILER, Circuit Judge. Pedro Aguilar-Mejia, a native and citizen of Guatemala,
challenges the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) decision to affirm the denial of his requests
for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture
(“CAT”). He also contests the BIA’s refusal to remand for consideration of new evidence.
Because substantial evidence supports the agency’s disposition and the BIA acted within its broad
discretion in denying remand, we deny the petition for review.
I.
The facts are straightforward and, for the most part, uncontested. In 2013, when Aguilar-
Mejia was 15 years old, three Mara 18 gang members approached him as he was leaving a
neighborhood store in Guatemala. They slapped and pushed him, took the drink and small amount
of money he was carrying, and ordered him to join their gang. He refused. He suffered no lasting
injury, did not seek medical care, and on his parents’ advice made no police report. No. 22-3365, Aguilar-Mejia v. Bondi
Three days later, his family moved to another town, and Aguilar-Mejia testified that he
experienced no further threats or harm during the next 10 months before he left Guatemala. In
October 2014, Aguilar-Mejia entered the United States without admission or parole.
Removal proceedings followed. At a hearing in February 2015, he admitted the notice-to-
appear allegations, conceded removability, and indicated that he would seek asylum, withholding
of removal, and CAT protection. He filed a Form I-589 application a few months later.
At the December 2018 merits hearing, Aguilar-Mejia’s counsel claimed persecution as a
member of a proposed particular social group (“PSG”): “child victims” “of gang recruitment and
gang violence in Guatemala,” or, as stated in closing argument, “young . . . male Guatemalans.”
In April 2019, the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) found Aguilar-Mejia credible yet denied all relief,
holding that the single 2013 incident did not rise to persecution, lacked nexus to a protected ground,
and involved a PSG that was impermissibly circular and insufficiently particular.
Aguilar-Mejia appealed and, citing his girlfriend’s pregnancy, moved to remand so he
could present additional family-based PSG formulations. In March 2022, the BIA dismissed his
appeal and denied remand, echoing the IJ’s analysis and finding the new evidence immaterial.
Aguilar-Mejia timely petitioned this court for review.
II.
We review legal questions de novo and factual findings for substantial evidence, accepting
the agency’s view unless the record compels the opposite result. Tista-Ruiz de Ajualip v. Garland,
114 F.4th 487, 495 (6th Cir. 2024). Denial of a motion to remand receives abuse-of-discretion
review. Marqus v. Barr, 968 F.3d 583, 592 (6th Cir. 2020).
2 No. 22-3365, Aguilar-Mejia v. Bondi
III.
A. Asylum
An asylum applicant must show past persecution or a well-founded fear of future
persecution “on account of” one of five protected grounds, here, membership in a cognizable PSG.
8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42)(A); 1158(b)(1)(B)(i). Three questions capture the dispute: motivation,
magnitude, and group definition.
Motivation (nexus). Why did the gang target Aguilar-Mejia? The IJ concluded that Mara
18 confronted Aguilar-Mejia for ordinary criminal reasons—to take the few quetzales in his pocket
and to recruit him—not because of any protected characteristic. The record supports that view:
Aguilar-Mejia testified that the assailants robbed him of about 10 quetzales and told him that they
could “give [him] money” if he joined the gang. On cross-examination he agreed with counsel’s
statement that Mara 18 “rob[s] people of all ages” when it needs money. Such general economic
or criminal motives do not supply the “on account of” nexus that the INA demands. See
Khozhaynova v. Holder, 641 F.3d 187, 195 (6th Cir. 2011). Aguilar-Mejia’s opening brief devotes
only a single, conclusory sentence to contest the IJ’s nexus finding, which forfeits the argument.
See McPherson v. Kelsey, 125 F.3d 989, 995–96 (6th Cir. 1997).
Magnitude (persecution). Persecution “requires more than a few isolated incidents of
verbal harassment or intimidation.” Pilica v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 941, 950 (6th Cir. 2004) (citation
omitted). Aguilar-Mejia experienced just one brief encounter: the gang members slapped and
pushed him, stole roughly 10 quetzales, and attempted to recruit him. He sustained no lasting
injury, sought no medical care, and safely relocated within Guatemala where he lived for the next
10 months without further incident. A single, short-lived assault followed by successful relocation
falls well below the persecution threshold. See Mikhailevitch v. INS, 146 F.3d 384, 390 (6th Cir.
3 No. 22-3365, Aguilar-Mejia v. Bondi
1998); Rios-Zamora v. Sessions, 751 F. App’x 784, 787 (6th Cir. 2018) (a robbery that “is merely
an instance of ‘widespread crime and violence[]’ . . . does not constitute persecution” (quoting
Menijar v. Lynch, 812 F.3d 491, 501 (6th Cir. 2015))). The record does not compel a different
conclusion.
Group definition (PSG). A PSG must (i) share an immutable trait, (ii) be defined with
particularity, and (iii) be socially distinct in Guatemala. Cruz-Guzman v. Barr, 920 F.3d 1033,
1036 (6th Cir. 2019). “Child victims of gang recruitment and gang violence” fails two of the three
tests. It defines the group by the harm feared (circularity) and sweeps in an indeterminate slice of
Guatemalan youth (lack of particularity). Rreshpja v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d 551, 555–56 (6th Cir.
2005). Nor does “young male Guatemalans” fare better; broad demographic labels rarely do.
Lopez Garcia v. Garland, 2023 WL 4145320, at *5 (6th Cir. June 23, 2023).
Failure to prove even a single statutory prerequisite is fatal to an asylum application. See
Cruz-Guzman, 920 F.3d at 1038. Aguilar-Mejia misses all three.
B. Withholding of Removal
Withholding of removal is available only to an applicant who shows a “clear probability”
that his “life or freedom would be threatened” on account of a protected ground—meaning it is
more likely than not that the feared persecution will occur. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A); INS v. Stevic,
467 U.S. 407, 424–25 (1984). That burden is more stringent than the well-founded-fear standard
that governs asylum. Yousif v. Lynch, 796 F.3d 622, 629 (6th Cir. 2015). Because Aguilar-Mejia
has not met the lesser standard required for asylum, he necessarily cannot satisfy the higher
threshold for withholding of removal. See id.
4 No. 22-3365, Aguilar-Mejia v. Bondi
C. Convention Against Torture
Aguilar-Mejia’s CAT claim never made it past the starting gate. He did not meaningfully
pursue it before the BIA and offers only a passing reference here. That forfeits the argument.
Ramani v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 554, 560 (6th Cir. 2004).
D. Motion to Remand
Finally, Aguilar-Mejia faults the BIA for refusing to reopen the record after he disclosed
that his girlfriend was pregnant and proposed new PSGs. A motion to remand based on new
evidence must show that the evidence was previously unavailable and likely to change the result.
Yousif v. Garland, No. 19-4084, 2024 WL 641044, at *6 (6th Cir. Feb. 15, 2024).
Aguilar-Mejia initially argued that his girlfriend’s pregnancy provided a basis for
humanitarian asylum under 18 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(iii)(B), but the BIA found that he later
withdrew this claim before the BIA decided it. Aguilar-Mejia also argues that his girlfriend’s
pregnancy supports a new PSG described only as “family.” The BIA did not abuse its discretion,
however, by finding that Aguilar-Mejia’s invocation of generalized gang activity and violence
failed to establish a well-founded fear of persecution on that basis. And given that Aguilar-Mejia
lived in Guatemala without incident for 10 months after his encounter with Mara 18, the BIA did
not abuse its discretion by rejecting the assertion that Mara 18 would attack Aguilar-Mejia and his
family simply because the gang “know[s] him.” In sum, his girlfriend’s pregnancy in the United
States bears no relevance to the nexus, persecution, or PSG analysis that turns on conditions in
Guatemala.
Likewise, re-casting his PSG as “former youths threatened with violence and suffering
robbery by gangs” or “young males who refused recruitment, left the country, and who are poor
with a family to support” does not cure the underlying defects of circularity and over-breadth;
5 No. 22-3365, Aguilar-Mejia v. Bondi
changing the label leaves the same problem intact. See Reyes Galeana v. Garland, 94 F.4th 555,
559 (6th Cir. 2024). Because the new evidence and repackaged PSGs would not alter the asylum
analysis, the BIA acted within its broad discretion in denying the motion. See Marqus, 968 F.3d
at 592.
For these reasons, we deny the petition for review.