Pecora v. James
This text of 150 So. 2d 90 (Pecora v. James) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Nofio J. PECORA d/b/a Tropical Tourist Court
v.
D. L. JAMES.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
*91 Leo L. Dubourg, New Orleans, for plaintiff-appellant.
Philip Gensler, New Orleans (curator ad hoc), for defendant-appellee.
George Haylon, New Orleans, for Civil Sheriff for the Parish of Orleans.
Clarence F. Favret, Jr., New Orleans, for intervenor-appellee.
Before McBRIDE, CHASEZ and HALL, JJ.
HALL, Judge.
In this case a certain 1959 Palace Trailer was seized by the Civil Sheriff for the Parish of Orleans under a writ of sequestration sued out by Nofio J. Pecora, d/b/a Tropical Tourist Court who claimed a lessor's lien and privilege on the trailer for rental due by one D. L. James for trailer parking space. Thereupon Wolverine Insurance Company filed an intervention and third opposition alleging that it had a lien on the trailer superior to that of plaintiff by virtue of a conditional sales contract executed and recorded in the State of Mississippi prior to the commencement of plaintiff's lease to James.
The trial of the third opposition resulted in a judgment in favor of the third-opponent, Wolverine Insurance Company, against the defendant, James, for $3,438.82 (balance due under the conditional sales contract) which judgment decreed that Wolverine Insurance Company "be paid by priority and preference over the plaintiff herein, Nofio J. Pecora, and all other creditors of the said defendant out of the proceeds of the sale of the property herein *92 seized * * *". Nofio J. Pecora, plaintiff in suit prosecutes this appeal from that judgment.
The sole question presented by this appeal is the question of priority of liens between that of plaintiff, as lessor, and that of the third opponent, Wolverine Insurance Company, as holder of a conditional sales contract covering the seized trailer.
The facts are not in dispute, and, in so far as they need be stated are as follows: the defendant, James, purchased the trailer in the State of Mississippi on credit and signed a conditional sales contract under which he acknowledged an indebtedness on which the balance due at this time is $3,438.82. The conditional sales contract was executed in the State of Mississippi on July 8, 1959 and was duly recorded in Harrison County, Mississippi on July 29, 1959. The third opponent, Wolverine Insurance Company, acquired the sales contract and the Mississippi Certificate of Title covering the trailer by assignment from the finance company which financed the sale. Wolverine was the insurer of the finance company under a policy covering conversion, secretion and embezzlement of the trailer, and the consideration given for the assignment was the payment by Wolverine to the finance company of the balance of the purchase price then due on the trailer.
On April 3, 1961 the defendant, James, brought the trailer to Louisiana and parked it in a space in plaintiff's trailer court for which he agreed to pay a rental of $30.90 per month plus the cost of utilities. Defendant subsequently abandoned the trailer and disappeared. At the time he left the defendant owed plaintiff $338.58 for rent and $60.48 for utilities which plaintiff advanced in his behalf.
Conditional sales contracts are valid in Mississippi and are security devices which have effects similar to our chattel mortgages although under a conditional sales contract the legal title to the chattel remains in the vendor. See Fanning v. C. I. T. Corporation, 187 Miss. 45, 192 So. 41.
"Such a contract is good against even a bona fide purchaser for value, and for like reason is superior to any asserted lien on the part of a third party. The reason for this rule is that the conditional purchaser has no title to convey or incumber." American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Lynn, 167 Miss. 93, 148 So. 351.
It is well settled that conditional sales contracts executed in another state and valid where executed will be recognized and enforced by the Courts of this state. In Universal C. I. T. Credit Corporation v. Victory Motor Company, La. App., 33 So.2d 703 the rule is stated as follows:
"The jurisprudence of this State applicable to conditional sale contracts is now well settled and can be stated thusly: In spite of the fact that conditional sales are invalid when contracted in Louisiana, the Louisiana courts, through comity, have recognized sales executed in other states, even as against a bona fide purchaser or pledgee of the vendee, where the object has been removed to Louisiana without the knowledge or consent of the vendor (citing cases). Where, however, if the removal to Louisiana is with the knowledge or consent of the vendor (or when the intent of the parties in contracting outside of Louisiana is to circumvent the law of the state), the conditional sale is not recognized. * * *"
We note that the Victory Motor Company case involved a conditional sales contract executed in Mississippi. Its language was quoted with approval by our Supreme Court in Fisher v. Bullington, 223 La. 368, 65 So.2d 880, 882.
It is also well settled that chattel mortgages executed in a foreign state will be recognized and enforced in this state.
*93 The rule is succinctly stated in the landmark case of General Motors Acceptance Corporation v. Nuss, 195 La. 209, 196 So. 323, as follows:
"`The great weight of authority is to the effect that a chattel mortgage, properly executed and recorded according to the law of the place where the mortgage is executed and the property is located, will, if valid there, be held valid even as against creditors and purchasers in good faith in another state to which the property is removed by the mortgagor, unless there is some statute in that state to the contrary, or unless the transaction contravenes the settled law or policy of the forum.' * * *"
While not questioning the foregoing propositions appellant contends:
1) That the Mississippi law was not proved as a fact during the trial of the case, citing Taylor v. Terzia, 171 La. 1040, 132 So. 781.
2) That there is no proof in the record that the trailer was removed to this state without the knowledge and consent of the vendor or the holder of the conditional sales contract.
3) That the conditional sales contract was not effective against him (a) since it was not duly recorded in Louisiana as a chattel mortgage, and (b) since it was not noted on the Certificate of Title as required by LSA-R.S. 32:710.
4) That he is entitled to have recognized his lien for the preservation of the trailer under LSA-C.C. Arts. 3224-3226.
We shall consider appellant's contentions in the order stated.
(1) Since the adoption of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure it is no longer necessary to prove foreign law as a fact. LSA-C.C.P. Art. 1391 reads in part as follows:
"Every court of this state shall take judicial notice of the common law and statutes of every state, territory and other jurisdiction of the United States.
"The court may inform itself of such laws in any manner as it may deem proper, and the court may call upon counsel to aid it in obtaining such information. * * *"
(2) The record contains ample proof that the trailer was brought to this State without the knowledge or consent of the owner of the conditional sales contract.
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150 So. 2d 90, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pecora-v-james-lactapp-1963.