Pease v. Vendenakker

30 Mass. L. Rptr. 59
CourtMassachusetts Superior Court
DecidedJune 22, 2012
DocketNo. WOCV201001234B
StatusPublished

This text of 30 Mass. L. Rptr. 59 (Pease v. Vendenakker) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Pease v. Vendenakker, 30 Mass. L. Rptr. 59 (Mass. Ct. App. 2012).

Opinion

Ricciardone, David, J.

Mr. Howard Pease, who is not a member of the bar, has evidently decided to discharge the plaintiffs counsel and filed his own “Notice of Appearance” (P.#21) together with a “Withdrawal of Appearance”1 by the attorney, Stephen J. Kenney, Esq. The pro se trustee now wishes to argue a Motion to Vacate this court’s preliminary injunction. (P.#22.)

Previously, Attorney Kenney was served a Motion to Dismiss and in response served an opposition thereto, and this motion is awaiting hearing. (P.#16.)

Mr. Pease’s actions purporting to represent not only himself, but the Trust, and apparently, the interests of his neighbors (see affidavits attached as Exhibit H to Motion to Vacate), constitute an unauthorized practice of law which the court must not abide regardless of the defendants’ position, or lack thereof, with regard to this issue. See, LAS Collection Management v. Pagan, 447 Mass. 847 (2006).

“Permission to practice law is within the exclusive cognizance of the judicial department.” Opinion of the Justices, 289 Mass. 607, 613 (1935). Statutes may provide penalties for the unlicensed practice of law, but may not extend the privilege. Lowell Bar Ass’n v. Loeb, 315 Mass. 176, 179, (1943), and cases cited. “Plainly the commencement and prosecution for another of legal proceedings in court, and the advocacy for another of a cause before a court . . . are reserved exclusively for members of the bar.” Id. at 183. See Opinion of the Justices, supra at 612 (“practice of law [includes] the preparation of pleadings, process, and other papers incident [to a cause of action], and the management and trial of the action or proceeding on behalf of clients before judicial tribunals”). The purpose of the limitation is to protect the public. Matter of the Shoe Mfrs. Protective Ass’n, 295 Mass. 369, 372 (1936).

Id. at 849-50. Specifically with regard to the issue of whether a non-attorney trustee may represent a trust, I adopt the reasoning espoused by this court (Kenton-Walker, J.) in Hutchings v. Gardner, 2010 WL 653968 (Mass. Super. 2010) [26 Mass. L. Rptr. 404], expressly prohibiting same (citing Kitras v. Zoning Adm’r of Aquinnah, 453 Mass. 245, 250, n.14 (2009)). Accordingly, the court issues the following.

ORDER

Mr. Pease’s “Notice of Appearance” is stricken.

Stephen J. Kenney, Esq.’s “Withdrawal of Appearance” is also stricken without prejudice for him to file: a motion to withdraw served pursuant to Rule 9A or a withdrawal of appearance accompanied by notice of appearance of successor counsel.

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Related

Opinion of the Justices to the Senate
289 Mass. 607 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1934)
In re Shoe Manufacturers Protective Ass'n
3 N.E.2d 746 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1936)
Lowell Bar Ass'n v. Loeb
52 N.E.2d 27 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1943)
LAS Collection Management v. Pagan
858 N.E.2d 273 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 2006)
Kitras v. Zoning Administrator
453 Mass. 245 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 2009)
Hutchings v. City of Gardner
26 Mass. L. Rptr. 404 (Massachusetts Superior Court, 2010)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
30 Mass. L. Rptr. 59, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pease-v-vendenakker-masssuperct-2012.