Pearl Packing Co. v. Ransdell

148 S.W.2d 350, 285 Ky. 456, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 416
CourtCourt of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976)
DecidedFebruary 18, 1941
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 148 S.W.2d 350 (Pearl Packing Co. v. Ransdell) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976) primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Pearl Packing Co. v. Ransdell, 148 S.W.2d 350, 285 Ky. 456, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 416 (Ky. 1941).

Opinion

Opinion op the Court by

Judge Ratlipp

Affirming.

The appellee, plaintiff below, brought this action in the Trimble circuit court against appellant, a corporation, defendant below, to recover damages for breach of an oral contract, the terms of which, according to the contentions of the respective parties, are set out in the pleadings.

Plaintiff alleged that on the 7th day of February, 1938, he entered into a contract with defendant by which defendant agreed to sell and deliver to plaintiff at its place of business in Trimble County, Kentucky, five hundred country cured hams that would be in condition to be immediately smoked and would then be in a condition to be sold to the general public as “country cured” hams for which plaintiff agreed to pay and did pay the price of $1,630.32. Plaintiff further stated that defendant further agreed that the hams would be “country cured” by the defendant according to the best practices and usage known to the packing industry and to people in general who are in the business of country curing hams, and that defendant further represented to the plaintiff that it had experts to country cure the hams and was well versed in the practices and usage of country curing hams, and after they had been country cured! *458 by defendant they would be good and marketable to the general public; that be accepted the terms and conditions of tbe agreement with defendant and paid tbe price therefor. .

Plaintiff further stated that on or about the 11th day of February and the 15th day of February, 1938, the hams were delivered to him at his place of business in Trimble County, Kentucky, by the defendant, and plaintiff sold several of the hams to the general public and he later discovered that the hams he sold and the ones he still has in his possession were not in a marketable condition for sale and that they were negligently and improperly cured by the defendant in violation of the contract and agreement.

Plaintiff further alleged that by reason of the improper curing of the hams and by the violation of the contract, all the hams were spoiled and condemned by the State Board of Health of the State of Kentucky and were a total loss to the plaintiff, and by reason thereof he had been damaged in that account in the sum of $1,458.63.

It appears that plaintiff sold a few of the hams, which accounts for the reduction of his alleged damages from the purchase price of the hams to the sum prayed for stated above. Further allegations were made with reference to the cost of the hams and the price which plaintiff could or might have sold them and he asked to recover the further sum of $1,146.42 as anticipated profits. However, the court struck from the petition all the allegations relating to anticipated profits and that item is not involved in this appeal.

Defendant filed its answer traversing the allegations of the petition, and after certain other motions and steps were taken, not necessary to discuss herein, defendant filed its amended answer pleading in substance that at the time of entering into the alleged contract with plaintiff it was engaged in the meat packing-industry in the city of Madison, Indiana, and that by the laws of the United States in force at that time, the defendant was not permitted to “country cure” hams and likewise plaintiff was not permitted to sell hams purchased from defendant as “country cured” hams and for that reason the contract alleged by the plaintiff was illegal and void.

*459 By paragraph two of the amended answer, defendant admitted that it sold to the plaintiff five hundred hams at an agreed price of 15% cents per pound, but alleged that they were to be paid for by the plaintiff at the defendant’s place of business as the hams were produced and at which time they were to become the property of the plaintiff; and by separate contract defendant agreed to cure the hams for the price of 1% cents per pound in the same manner it cured hams which it sold to the general public, with the understanding and agreement that any loss by reason of weight or by reason of faulty curing should be borne by the plaintiff; that plaintiff paid for the hams as they were produced and cured in the same manner as it cured hams which it sold to the general public, and that the hams were accepted by plaintiff at defendant’s place of business and after plaintiff had tested and accepted them, they were in good marketable condition and cured according to the contract, and that if the hams proved to be unsound or spoiled same was caused by the negligent handling of them by the plaintiff after they became his property.

Upon motion of the plaintiff the court struck the first paragraph of defendant’s answer (pleading that the contract between the parties was void) with leave to defendant to amend, whereupon defendant filed its second amended answer in which it, in substance, reiterated, but more elaborately and definitely, the same paragraph which had been stricken, by alleging that by title seven, Section 192 of the United States Code Laws, 7 U. S. C. A. Section 192, it was provided:

“It shall be unlawful for any packer * * * to * * * Engage in or use any unfair, unjustly discriminatory, or deceptive practice or device in commerce, ’ ’

and Section 228, Title 7, U. S. C. A. provides that:

“The Secretary may make such rules, regulations and orders as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this chapter.”

It was further alleged that the Secretary of Agriculture of the United States did, in November, 1922, adopt regulations providing that:

“Such terms as ‘country,’ ‘farm,’ and the like, shall not be used on labels in connection with meat and *460 products unless such, meat and products are actually prepared in the country or on the farm.”

The court also struck this amended answer, and defendant excepted.

We have before us a copy of the regulations promulgated by the United States Department of Agriculture referred to and quoted above, and immediately following the above quotation appears this language:

“However, if the articles are prepared in the same way as in the country or on the farm, these terms, if qualified by the word ‘ style ’ in the same size and style of lettering, may be used.”

In reference to the qualification of the rule just stated,, as will later be seen from our discussion of the evidence, defendant’s own witnesses testified that it contracted to-sell to plaintiff country “style” hams. It would appear, therefore, that such contract is permissible under the rules of the United States Department of Agriculture relied on by defendant. However, aside from that proviso of the rule and, considering the rule as a whole, we do not think it prohibited the parties from entering into the contract as alleged by plaintiff or the defendant. Defendant relies principally upon the language of the rule in reference to “deceptive practice or device in commerce.” So far as the record shows, there was no deceptive devices resorted to by either of the contracting parties. Presumably the contract was made in good faith and free from “unjustly discriminatory, or deceptive practice,” regardless of whether or not it was subsequently breached.

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Related

Wilhoit v. Cundiff
163 S.W.2d 280 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976), 1942)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
148 S.W.2d 350, 285 Ky. 456, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 416, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pearl-packing-co-v-ransdell-kyctapphigh-1941.