Pearce v. Boberg

Nevada Supreme Court

Pearce v. Boberg

510 P.2d 1358, 89 Nev. 266, 1973 Nev. LEXIS 488

CourtNevada Supreme Court

DecidedJune 13, 1973

Docket6971

StatusPublished

Cited by4 cases

This text of 510 P.2d 1358 (Pearce v. Boberg) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Nevada Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Pearce v. Boberg, 510 P.2d 1358, 89 Nev. 266, 1973 Nev. LEXIS 488 (Neb. 1973).

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Opinion

OPINION

By the Court,

Gunderson, J.:

This appeal seeks reversal of a judgment for personal injuries caused to respondent by her husband’s negligence before marriage. The primary appellate contention is that the trial court erred in allowing respondent to prosecute her action, because a wife may not sue her husband in tort. We disagree.

, In an automobile owned by appellant Stephen Dale Pearce’s father, appellant Frederick Pearce, Stephen and respondent Debra Kay Boberg left California together, enroute to Idaho where they planned to be married. In Nevada, Stephen negligently caused the automobile to leave the highway and overturn, injuring Debra Kay. Two days later, they were married and, shortly thereafter, Debra Kay commenced this action. The jury favored respondents with its verdict; from a judgment thereon, this appeal ensued.

In Morrissett v. Morrissett, 80 Nev. 566, 397 P.2d 184 (1964), a majority of this court reaffirmed the rule that a wife may not sue her husband for a personal tort occurring during marriage. Since then, a number of jurisdictions have repudiated that common-law doctrine. See, for example: Brooks v. Robinson, 284 N.E.2d 794 (Ind. 1972); Freehe v. Freehe, 500 P.2d 771 (Wash. 1972); Hosko v. Hosko, 187 N.W.2d 236 (Mich. 1971); Immer v. Risko, 267 A.2d 481 (NJ. 1970); Beaudette v. Frana, 173 N.W.2d 416 (Minn. 1969). However, because Stephen’s tort occurred before marriage, we need not re-examine our prior holding in Morrissett, except to *268 note that here the reasons underlying that decision are absent. Cf. Mosier v. Carney, 138 N.W.2d 343, 352 (Mich. 1965).

Since respondent’s right of action against appellants accrued prior to marriage, we perceive no warrant for holding that the subsequent marriage somehow “extinguished” that right, which was and is respondent’s separate property. Nev. Const, art. 4, § 31; Choate v. Ransom, 74 Nev. 100, 104, 323 P.2d 700, 702 (1958); F. & W. Const. Co. v. Boyd, 60 Nev. 117, 102 P.2d 627 (1940).

Other assignments of error have been reviewed, and are deemed without merit.

Affirmed.

Thompson, C. J., and Mowbray, Batjer, and Zenoff, JJ., concur.

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OPINION

By the Court,

Gunderson, J.:

This appeal seeks reversal of a judgment for personal injuries caused to respondent by her husband’s negligence before marriage. The primary appellate contention is that the trial court erred in allowing respondent to prosecute her action, because a wife may not sue her husband in tort. We disagree.

, In an automobile owned by appellant Stephen Dale Pearce’s father, appellant Frederick Pearce, Stephen and respondent Debra Kay Boberg left California together, enroute to Idaho where they planned to be married. In Nevada, Stephen negligently caused the automobile to leave the highway and overturn, injuring Debra Kay. Two days later, they were married and, shortly thereafter, Debra Kay commenced this action. The jury favored respondents with its verdict; from a judgment thereon, this appeal ensued.

In Morrissett v. Morrissett, 80 Nev. 566, 397 P.2d 184 (1964), a majority of this court reaffirmed the rule that a wife may not sue her husband for a personal tort occurring during marriage. Since then, a number of jurisdictions have repudiated that common-law doctrine. See, for example: Brooks v. Robinson, 284 N.E.2d 794 (Ind. 1972); Freehe v. Freehe, 500 P.2d 771 (Wash. 1972); Hosko v. Hosko, 187 N.W.2d 236 (Mich. 1971); Immer v. Risko, 267 A.2d 481 (NJ. 1970); Beaudette v. Frana, 173 N.W.2d 416 (Minn. 1969). However, because Stephen’s tort occurred before marriage, we need not re-examine our prior holding in Morrissett, except to *268 note that here the reasons underlying that decision are absent. Cf. Mosier v. Carney, 138 N.W.2d 343, 352 (Mich. 1965).

Since respondent’s right of action against appellants accrued prior to marriage, we perceive no warrant for holding that the subsequent marriage somehow “extinguished” that right, which was and is respondent’s separate property. Nev. Const, art. 4, § 31; Choate v. Ransom, 74 Nev. 100, 104, 323 P.2d 700, 702 (1958); F. & W. Const. Co. v. Boyd, 60 Nev. 117, 102 P.2d 627 (1940).

Other assignments of error have been reviewed, and are deemed without merit.

Affirmed.

Thompson, C. J., and Mowbray, Batjer, and Zenoff, JJ., concur.

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510 P.2d 1358, 89 Nev. 266, 1973 Nev. LEXIS 488, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pearce-v-boberg-nev-1973.

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