Peabody v. Tucker

289 A.2d 438, 447 Pa. 398, 1972 Pa. LEXIS 544
CourtSupreme Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedApril 20, 1972
DocketAppeal, 317
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 289 A.2d 438 (Peabody v. Tucker) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Peabody v. Tucker, 289 A.2d 438, 447 Pa. 398, 1972 Pa. LEXIS 544 (Pa. 1972).

Opinion

Opinion by

Mr. Justice Roberts,

Appellant Endicott Peabody filed a complaint in mandamus in the Commonwealth Court requesting that the Secretary of the Commonwealth be ordered to certify his name for inclusion on the official ballot of the Democratic Party as a candidate for Vice-President of the United States at the primary to be held on April 25, 1972. The Commonwealth Court, after hearing, entered judgment against appellant. Appellant thereupon appealed to this Court. On March 20, 1972, this Court issued an order affirming the judgment of the Commonwealth Court, and indicating that an opinion would follow. 1

*400 Though the Pennsylvania Election Code 2 specifically establishes a preferential primary for candidates for party nominations for the office of President of the United States, the Election Code, as appellant concedes, 3 makes no specific provision for a preferential primary for candidates for the office of Vice-President of the United States. Nevertheless, appellant contends that the Pennsylvania Election Code can and should be construed to provide for a Vice-Presidential preferential primary. We disagree. We believe that the Legislature did not intend to establish a Vice-Presidential preferential primary, and we recognize that we cannot substitute our judgment on this matter for that of the Legislature. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Commonwealth Court.

In our view Section 902 of the Election Code 4 clearly indicates that the Legislature did not intend to provide for a Vice-Presidential primary. • That section expressly provides for a Presidential preferential primary, but makes no mention of a Vice-Presidential primary. The section states:

“CANDIDATES TO BE NOMINATED AND PARTY OFFICERS TO BE ELECTED AT PRIMARIES.

“All candidates of political parties, as defined in Section 801 of this act, for the offices of United States Senator, Representative in Congress and for all other elective public offices within this State, except that of presidential electors, shall be nominated, and party delegates and alternate delegates, committeemen and officers who, under the provisions of Article VIII of this act or under the party rules, are required to be *401 elected by the party electors, shall be elected at primaries held in accordance with the provisions of this act, except as otherwise provided in this act. In the yea/rs when candidates for the office of President of the United States are to be nominated, every registered and enrolled member of a political party shall have the opportunity at the Spring primary in such years to vote his preference for one person to be the candidate of his political party for President(Emphasis added.) We cannot believe that the Legislature, having expressly established a Presidential preferential primary, intended by the same act to establish a Vice-Presidential preferential primary by implication. Moreover, at least six other sections of the Election Code—sections dealing with notice to the county boards of offices for which nominations are to be made, 5 filing of nominating petitions, 6 affidavits of candidates, 7 number of signers required on nominating petitions, 8 filing fees, 9 and determination of victorious candidates 10 —the Legislature expressly refers to candidates for party nominations for President, but says nothing about Vice-Presidential candidates.

Despite the Code’s total lack of any reference to a Vice-Presidential primary, and despite Section 902’s express provision for a Presidential primary, appellant argues that a legislative intent to establish a Vice-Presidential primary is evidenced by Section 907 of the Election Code. 11 Section 907 provides that upon the filing of proper nominating petitions with the Secretary of the Commonwealth “[t]he names of candidates *402 for nomination as President of the United States, and the names of all other candidates for party nominations, . . . shall be printed upon the official primary ballots. . . .” (Emphasis added.) Appellant contends that since he is a candidate for the Democratic nomination for Vice-President, he is a “candidate for party nomination” within the meaning of Section 907, and his name must be placed upon the official primary ballot of the Democratic party as a candidate for that office. We disagree.

Section 907 was designed merely to require the Secretary of the Commonwealth to place on the ballot the names of all candidates who have filed proper nominating petitions. Section 907 was obviously not intended to specify those elective offices or positions that are to appear on the primary ballot. For example, following appellant’s interpretation of Section 907, a candidate for the Democratic nomination for the Governorship of Texas could have his name placed upon the Pennsylvania primary ballot if he presented a proper nominating petition. For such a candidate is surely a “candidate for party nomination”.

We agree with the Commonwealth Court that Section 907 must be read in connection with Section 902. It is Section 902 that specifies which offices or elective positions are to appear on the primary ballot. Section 907 was intended only to establish the obligation of the Secretary to place on the ballot the names of all candidates who file proper nominating petitions, and cannot be interpreted to expand Section 902’s careful enumeration of the contests that are to appear on the primary ballot.

Section 902 provides for only one preferential primary—a Presidential preferential primary. According to Section 902 the only other candidates for party nomination who can appear on the ballot are candi *403 dates for party nominations which will be decided by the primary election—candidates “for the offices of United States Senator, Representative in Congress and for all other elective public offices within this state. . . .” 12 Therefore we agree with the Commonwealth Court that since Section 907 specifically provides for acceptance of nominating petitions for Presidential candidates, the phrase “other candidates for party nominations” contained in Section 907 must be read to include only candidates for office “for which candidates are to be nominated” at the primary. 13 Since Vice-Presidential candidates are nominated by national conventions rather than state primaries, appellant is obviously not a candidate for an office “for which candidates are to be nominated” at the April 25th primary. Accordingly we conclude that Section 907 did not oblige or permit the Secretary to certify appellant’s name for inclusion on the ballot.

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Related

Diamond v. Diamond
519 A.2d 1012 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1987)
Worley v. Augustine
456 A.2d 558 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1983)
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437 A.2d 1074 (Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, 1981)
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Seltzer Appeal
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
289 A.2d 438, 447 Pa. 398, 1972 Pa. LEXIS 544, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/peabody-v-tucker-pa-1972.