Peabody & Co. v. United States

10 Ct. Cust. 220, 1920 WL 19892, 1920 CCPA LEXIS 47
CourtCourt of Customs and Patent Appeals
DecidedDecember 3, 1920
DocketNo. 1989
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 10 Ct. Cust. 220 (Peabody & Co. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Customs and Patent Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Peabody & Co. v. United States, 10 Ct. Cust. 220, 1920 WL 19892, 1920 CCPA LEXIS 47 (ccpa 1920).

Opinion

Smith, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

This case involves the dutiable status of Chinese reeds, which were classified by the collector of customs at the port of New York as chair canes and assessed for duty at 10 per cent ad valorem under that part of paragraph 173 of the tariff act of 1913, which reads as follows:

173. Chair cane or reeds wrought or manufactured from rattans or reeds, 10 per centum ad valorem * * *

The importers protested that the goods were reeds unmanufactured, and that they were therefore free of duty under the provisions of the free list, which, in so far as pertinent, reads as follows:

FREE LIST.
* * * The articles mentioned in the following paragraphs shall, when imported into the United States * * * , be exempt from duty:
648. * * * Reeds unmanufactured, * * * and other woods not specially provided for in this section, in the rough, or not further advanced than cut into lengths suitable for sticks for umbrellas, parasols, sunshades, whips, fishing rods, or walking canes.

[222]*222The board overruled the protest and the importers appealed.

Reeds unmanufactured were first free-listed by section 3 of the act of 1832, but the courts were not called upon to determine just what were “unmanufactured reeds” until the passage of the tariff act of 1883, which admitted free rattans and reeds unmanufactured and imposed a duty of 10 per cent ad valorem on manufactured rattans and reeds manufactured nob made up into completed articles. “Round,” “square,” “oval,” and “flat” reeds imported in 1887 and 1888 were assessed by the collector of customs under the act of 1883 at 10 per cent ad valorem as “reeds manufactured, but not made up into completed articles.” The importer protested that the reeds were not manufactured and were therefore not dutiable as found by the collector. On the trial of that issue it was proved that raw rattan was submitted to a mechanical process which removed the outer enamel or bark from the inner core. It appeared from the testimony that the bark or enamel cut into strips was known to the trade as “chair cane,” and that the inner core, or pith left in its cylindrical form, was the crudest form of reed, and was known to the trade as “round reed.” It was also shown that there was a “square reed,” an “oval reed,” and a “flat reed.” The “square reed” was made in two ways, either by so cutting the rattan from the core as to square the cylindrical core or by squaring the cylindrical core after the outer bark had been removed. The “flat reeds” and the “oval reeds” were produced invariably by cutting either the “round reed” or the “square reed” to the form and size required.

On this state of the case Lacombe, Judge, held that inasmuch as the cylindrical core which was left after stripping off the enamel and bark of the rattan was a reed in its condition as first produced, it was a reed unmanufactured, and that as “oval” and “flat” reeds were made from the cylindrical core by a second process of cutting, they were reeds manufactured. Judge Lacombe ruled that “square reeds” manufactured by cutting them out of the'original rattan were unmanufactured reeds, but that if they were produced by cutting the core they were reeds manufactured. In view of the fact that it was not shown in what way the reeds were produced, the jury was directed to find a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs for the “round reeds” only. Foppes et al. v. Magone (40 Fed., 570).

Paragraph 229 of the tariff act of 1890 omitted the provision for rattans and reeds manufactured, but not made into completed articles, and levied a duty of 10 per cent ad valorem on “chair cane, or reeds, wrought or manufactured from rattans or reeds, and whether round, square, or in any other shape.” Standing by itself that provision might well have been regarded as intended to meet the decision in the Foppes case and to subject all reeds to duty. No such legislative intent could very well be implied, however, inasmuch as paragraph 756 of the very same act expressly exempted from [223]*223duty “reeds * * * in the rough, or not further manufactured than cut into lengths suitable for sticks for umbrellas, parasols, sunshades, whips, or walking-canes.” Notwithstanding the terms of paragraph 756 the collector of customs at the port of New York evidently considered the duty paragraph as controlling and accordingly assessed a duty of 10 per cent ad valorem on reeds in the rough cut into lengths suitable for sticks for whips and imported soon after the passage of the act of 1890. The Board of General Appraisers disagreed with the collector and construing paragraph 229 as if it read “chair canes, or chair reeds, wrought or manufactured, from rattans or reeds,” sustained the importers’ protest that the importation was free of duty. (T. D. 11586; G. A. 761.)

A little over a year after that decision the Board of General Appraisers was again called upon to classify first, reeds not further manufactured than cut into lengths for whips; second, thin flat reeds wrought from reeds manufactured from rattans, and third, Chinese reeds about one-eighth of an inch in diameter and suitable for the manufacture of brooms. The board rejected the construction of paragraph 229 announced in T. D. 11586 and held that reeds not further manufactured than cut into lengths for whips were free of duty, and that fiat reeds wrought from reeds and Chinese reeds used in the manufacture of brooms, were dutiable under paragraph 229. (T. D. 13244; G. A. 1665.)

In August, 1892, the board again ruled on the classification of reeds and held that reeds made from rattans or reeds .were not free of duty. That decision was affirmed by the Circuit Court which held that the reeds in issue were “not exactly in the rough” and in effect that paragraph 229 was not confined to chair canes and chair reeds. (T. D. 28144.) Although neither the decision of the board nor that of the Circuit Court contains any definite description of the merchandise, it -is apparent from what the board said in a subsequent decision (T. D. 22533; G. A. 4780) that the reeds were soft reeds and not suitable for the uses specified in paragraph 756. Accepting that as the description of the merchandise it is clear that the board at least so construed the free list provision as to exclude from it all reeds in the rough not suitable for the making of sticks for umbrellas, parasols, sunshades, whips, or walking-canes. The Circuit Court without opinion in Gerdau v. United States, (suit No. 2736) held that soft reeds were suitable for the purposes specified and that decision was accepted as final by the Government. (T. D. 22371.)

Paragraph 206 of the tariff act of 1897 struck out of paragraph 229 of the tariff act of 1890 the words “and whether round, square, or in any other shape,” and read “chair cane or reeds, wrought or manufactured from rattans or reeds,” which phraseology was repeated in paragraph 212 of the act of 1909 and in paragraph 173 of the tariff act of 1913.

[224]*224Paragraph 756 of the act of 1890, exempting from duty reeds in the rough or not further manufactured than cut into lengths suitable for sticks for umbrellas, was reenacted in paragraph 700 of the act of 1897, in paragraph 713 of the act of 1909,. and also in paragraph 648 of the act of 1913, with the exception that fishing rods were added to the list of sticks for which reeds might be cut into lengths.

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Bluebook (online)
10 Ct. Cust. 220, 1920 WL 19892, 1920 CCPA LEXIS 47, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/peabody-co-v-united-states-ccpa-1920.