1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 FREDDIE LAMONT ROYAL, No. 2:20-CV-0218-DMC-P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 ALEXANDER IEROKOMOS, 15 Defendant. 16 17 Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 18 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court is plaintiff’s complaint. See ECF No. 1. 19 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 20 against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. 21 § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or 22 malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief 23 from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover, 24 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that complaints contain a “. . . short and plain 25 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This 26 means that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 27 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied if the 28 complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon which it 1 rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because plaintiff must allege 2 with at least some degree of particularity overt acts by specific defendants which support the 3 claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is 4 impossible for the Court to conduct the screening required by law when the allegations are vague 5 and conclusory. 6 This action proceeds on plaintiff s original complaint. See ECF No. 1. Plaintiff 7 claims defendant, a doctor at San Joaquin General Hospital, was negligent in performing a 8 surgical procedure on October 31, 2018. According to plaintiff, defendant’s alleged conduct 9 violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment. 10 The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which the 11 prisoner is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel 12 and unusual punishment. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993); Farmer v. Brennan, 13 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). The Eighth Amendment “. . . embodies broad and idealistic concepts 14 of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 15 (1976). Conditions of confinement may, however, be harsh and restrictive. See Rhodes v. 16 Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Nonetheless, prison officials must provide prisoners with 17 “food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.” Toussaint v. McCarthy, 18 801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986). A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when 19 two requirements are met: (1) objectively, the official’s act or omission must be so serious such 20 that it results in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities; and (2) 21 subjectively, the prison official must have acted unnecessarily and wantonly for the purpose of 22 inflicting harm. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Thus, to violate the Eighth Amendment, a prison 23 official must have a “sufficiently culpable mind.” See id. 24 Deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or injury, or risks of serious 25 injury or illness, gives rise to a claim under the Eighth Amendment. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105; 26 see also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. This applies to physical as well as dental and mental health 27 needs. See Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1253 (9th Cir. 1982). An injury or illness is 28 sufficiently serious if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant 1 injury or the “. . . unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 2 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Doty v. County of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546 (9th Cir. 1994). 3 Factors indicating seriousness are: (1) whether a reasonable doctor would think that the condition 4 is worthy of comment; (2) whether the condition significantly impacts the prisoner’s daily 5 activities; and (3) whether the condition is chronic and accompanied by substantial pain. See 6 Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 7 The requirement of deliberate indifference is less stringent in medical needs cases 8 than in other Eighth Amendment contexts because the responsibility to provide inmates with 9 medical care does not generally conflict with competing penological concerns. See McGuckin, 10 974 F.2d at 1060. Thus, deference need not be given to the judgment of prison officials as to 11 decisions concerning medical needs. See Hunt v. Dental Dep’t, 865 F.2d 198, 200 (9th Cir. 12 1989). The complete denial of medical attention may constitute deliberate indifference. See 13 Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1111 (9th Cir. 1986). Delay in providing medical 14 treatment, or interference with medical treatment, may also constitute deliberate indifference. See 15 Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1131. Where delay is alleged, however, the prisoner must also demonstrate 16 that the delay led to further injury. See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060. 17 Negligence in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not, however, give 18 rise to a claim under the Eighth Amendment. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. Moreover, a 19 difference of opinion between the prisoner and medical providers concerning the appropriate 20 course of treatment does not give rise to an Eighth Amendment claim. See Jackson v. McIntosh, 21 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996). 22 In this case, it appears that the only theory of liability alleged is negligence. 23 Therefore, the Court finds the complaint as currently plead fails to state a claim. To the extent 24 plaintiff may be able to allege additional facts to assert a theory of liability other than negligence, 25 plaintiff will be provided an opportunity to amend.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 FREDDIE LAMONT ROYAL, No. 2:20-CV-0218-DMC-P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 ALEXANDER IEROKOMOS, 15 Defendant. 16 17 Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 18 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court is plaintiff’s complaint. See ECF No. 1. 19 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 20 against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. 21 § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or 22 malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief 23 from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover, 24 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that complaints contain a “. . . short and plain 25 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This 26 means that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 27 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied if the 28 complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon which it 1 rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because plaintiff must allege 2 with at least some degree of particularity overt acts by specific defendants which support the 3 claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is 4 impossible for the Court to conduct the screening required by law when the allegations are vague 5 and conclusory. 6 This action proceeds on plaintiff s original complaint. See ECF No. 1. Plaintiff 7 claims defendant, a doctor at San Joaquin General Hospital, was negligent in performing a 8 surgical procedure on October 31, 2018. According to plaintiff, defendant’s alleged conduct 9 violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment. 10 The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which the 11 prisoner is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel 12 and unusual punishment. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993); Farmer v. Brennan, 13 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). The Eighth Amendment “. . . embodies broad and idealistic concepts 14 of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 15 (1976). Conditions of confinement may, however, be harsh and restrictive. See Rhodes v. 16 Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Nonetheless, prison officials must provide prisoners with 17 “food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.” Toussaint v. McCarthy, 18 801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986). A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when 19 two requirements are met: (1) objectively, the official’s act or omission must be so serious such 20 that it results in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities; and (2) 21 subjectively, the prison official must have acted unnecessarily and wantonly for the purpose of 22 inflicting harm. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Thus, to violate the Eighth Amendment, a prison 23 official must have a “sufficiently culpable mind.” See id. 24 Deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or injury, or risks of serious 25 injury or illness, gives rise to a claim under the Eighth Amendment. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105; 26 see also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. This applies to physical as well as dental and mental health 27 needs. See Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1253 (9th Cir. 1982). An injury or illness is 28 sufficiently serious if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant 1 injury or the “. . . unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 2 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Doty v. County of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546 (9th Cir. 1994). 3 Factors indicating seriousness are: (1) whether a reasonable doctor would think that the condition 4 is worthy of comment; (2) whether the condition significantly impacts the prisoner’s daily 5 activities; and (3) whether the condition is chronic and accompanied by substantial pain. See 6 Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 7 The requirement of deliberate indifference is less stringent in medical needs cases 8 than in other Eighth Amendment contexts because the responsibility to provide inmates with 9 medical care does not generally conflict with competing penological concerns. See McGuckin, 10 974 F.2d at 1060. Thus, deference need not be given to the judgment of prison officials as to 11 decisions concerning medical needs. See Hunt v. Dental Dep’t, 865 F.2d 198, 200 (9th Cir. 12 1989). The complete denial of medical attention may constitute deliberate indifference. See 13 Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1111 (9th Cir. 1986). Delay in providing medical 14 treatment, or interference with medical treatment, may also constitute deliberate indifference. See 15 Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1131. Where delay is alleged, however, the prisoner must also demonstrate 16 that the delay led to further injury. See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060. 17 Negligence in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not, however, give 18 rise to a claim under the Eighth Amendment. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. Moreover, a 19 difference of opinion between the prisoner and medical providers concerning the appropriate 20 course of treatment does not give rise to an Eighth Amendment claim. See Jackson v. McIntosh, 21 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996). 22 In this case, it appears that the only theory of liability alleged is negligence. 23 Therefore, the Court finds the complaint as currently plead fails to state a claim. To the extent 24 plaintiff may be able to allege additional facts to assert a theory of liability other than negligence, 25 plaintiff will be provided an opportunity to amend. 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 Because it is possible that the deficiencies identified in this order may be cured by 2 | amending the complaint, plaintiff is entitled to leave to amend prior to dismissal of the entire 3 | action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Plaintiff is 4 | informed that, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See 5 | Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, following dismissal with leave to 6 | amend, all claims alleged in the original complaint which are not alleged in the amended 7 | complaint are waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). Therefore, if 8 | plaintiff amends the complaint, the court cannot refer to the prior pleading in order to make 9 | plaintiffs amended complaint complete. See Local Rule 220. An amended complaint must be 10 | complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. See id. 11 If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the 12 || conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiffs constitutional rights. See 13 Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how 14 || each named defendant is involved, and must set forth some affirmative link or connection 15 || between each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. See May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 16 | 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 17 Finally, plaintiff is warned that failure to file an amended complaint within the 18 | time provided in this order may be grounds for dismissal of this action. See Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 19 | 1260-61; see also Local Rule 110. Plaintiff is also warned that a complaint which fails to comply 20 | with Rule 8 may, in the court’s discretion, be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b). 21 | See Nevijel v. North Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1981). 22 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 23 1. Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed with leave to amend; and 24 2. Plaintiff shall file a first amended complaint within 30 days of the date of 25 || service of this order. 26 | Dated: April 1, 2020 Sx