(PC)Laguer v. Arreola

District Court, E.D. California·Decided July 2, 2025·No. 1:24-cv-00979·Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 10 11 GEORGE A. LAGUER, No. 1:24-cv-00979-KES-SAB (PC) 12 Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RECOMMENDING DEFENDANTS’ 13 v. MOTION TO DISMISS BE GRANTED 14 H. ARREOLA, et al., (ECF No. 20)

15 Defendants.

16 17 Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this action filed pursuant to 42 18 U.S.C. § 1983. 19 Currently before the Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s official capacity 20 claims, filed May 10, 2025. (ECF No. 20.) 21 I. 23 This action is proceeding on Plaintiff’s failure to protect claim against Defendants August 24 Vasquez, L. Pantoja, F. Correia, and John Does 1 through 3. 25 Defendants filed the instant motion to dismiss on May 10, 2025. Plaintiff did not file an 26 opposition and the time to do has passed. Local Rule 230(l). 27 /// 28 1 II. 3 Plaintiff, as a LGBTQ inmate, was set-up to be harmed and attacked with weapons by 4 officers at Kern Valley State Prison (KVSP). On September 18, 2023, Plaintiff spoke with 5 Vasquez and other unknown officers about the STG’s 25er gang threats to stab her. Plaintiff was 6 later let out of her cell and attacked the STG 25er gang for no reason. Lieutenant Arreola knew 7 the assault was going to happen, and L. Pantoja and F. Correia were told about the possible 8 threats to her life. The patio security and escort officers (John Does 1 through 3) were notified as 9 well and they turned a blind eye. Defendants failed to take reasonable measures to protect 10 Plaintiff from the other inmates who threatened harm to her life. Plaintiff received injuries to his 11 hands, body, face and suffered emotional and mental distress. 12 After the incident was over, lieutenant Arreola ordered Doe officers to handcuff Plaintiff 13 and left him on the patio for over 11 hours in over 90 degrees temperature. Plaintiff was forced to 14 eat while handcuffed, despite continuing to ask for the handcuffs to be removed due to the pain 15 and swelling. All of the Defendants refused to uncuff Plaintiff stating that lieutenant Arreola 16 ordered to leave her handcuffed. Plaintiff was seen by a nurse and given a CDCR form 7219 17 (medical report). 20 Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures provides for motions to dismiss for 21 “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In 22 considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the court must accept as true the 23 allegations of the complaint in question, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007), and construe the 24 pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 25 (1969); Meek v. County of Riverside, 183 F.3d 962, 965 (9th Cir. 1999). Still, to survive 26 dismissal for failure to state a claim, a pro se complaint must contain more than “naked 27 assertions,” “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of 28 action.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007). In other words, 1 “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 2 statements do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Furthermore, a claim 3 upon which the court can grant relief must have facial plausibility. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A 4 claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw 5 the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. 6 at 678. 7 “As a general rule, a district court may not consider any material beyond the pleadings in 8 ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.” Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001) 9 (internal quotes and citation omitted), overruled on other grounds by Galbraith v. County of Santa 10 Clara, 307 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2002). Otherwise, the motion is treated as one for summary 11 judgment. Lee, 250 F.3d at 688. There are exceptions for material which is properly submitted as 12 part of the complaint and “matters of public record” which may be judicially noticed. Id. at 688- 13 89. “If the documents are not physically attached to the complaint, they may be considered if the 14 documents’ ‘authenticity ... is not contested’ and ‘the plaintiff's complaint necessarily relies’ on 15 them.” Id. at 688 (quoting Parrino v. FHD, Inc., 146 F.3d 699, 705-06 (9th Cir. 1998)). 16 A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should not be granted unless it appears 17 beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claims which would 18 entitle him to relief. Hishon v. King & Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984). In general, pro se 19 pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 20 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). The court has an obligation to construe such pleadings liberally. Bretz 21 v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc). However, the court’s liberal 22 interpretation of a pro se complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not 23 pled. Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 24 IV. 26 Claims for damages against the state, its agencies, or its officers for actions performed in 27 their official capacities are barred under the Eleventh Amendment, unless the state waives its 28 immunity. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 (1985). Section 1983 does not abrogate the 1 states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 344-45 2 (1979); see also Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 30 (1991) (clarifying that the Eleventh Amendment 3 does not bar suits against state officials sued in their individual capacities, nor does it bar suits for 4 prospective injunctive relief against state officials sued in their official capacities). Although a 5 “narrow exception exists” for prospective relief under the Ex Parte Young doctrine, Krainski v. 6 Nevada ex rel. Bd. of Regents of Nevada Sys. of Higher Educ., 616 F.3d 963, 967 (9th Cir. 2010). 7 Plaintiff seeks no prospective relief here. (See ECF No. 1 at 8.) In this action, Plaintiff is seeking 8 only monetary compensation from Defendants, but she is doing so in both their official and 9 individual capacities. (ECF No. 1 at 5:27-28.) Because the State has not consented to this action, 10 Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity bars all damage claims against Defendants in their 11 official capacities.

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