1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 DAVOOD KHADEMI, No. 2:19-CV-1494-KJM-DMC-P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. FINDINGS AND RECCOMMENDATIONS 14 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF 15 PLACER, et al., 16 Defendants. 17 18 Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 19 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court is plaintiff’s complaint (ECF No. 1). 20 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 21 against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. 22 § 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or 23 malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief 24 from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover, 25 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that complaints contain a “. . . short and plain 26 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This 27 means that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 28 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied if the 1 complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon which it 2 rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because plaintiff must allege 3 with at least some degree of particularity overt acts by specific defendants which support the 4 claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is 5 impossible for the court to conduct the screening required by law when the allegations are vague 6 and conclusory. 7 8 I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS 9 Plaintiff names the following as defendants: (1) Superior Court of the State of 10 California for the County of Placer (Superior Court); and (2) the United States of America. See 11 ECF No. 1, pg. 1. Below are plaintiff’s factual allegations as best understood by this court. 12 It appears that on April 29, 2017, plaintiff was arrested as the result of a physical 13 altercation between himself and another individual. After this arrest, he was booked, charged with 14 an offense, and provided with legal counsel from the Placer County Public Defender’s Office. 15 According to plaintiff, this counsel apparently gave “inadequate representation” and plaintiff was 16 subsequently placed in a state mental health facility. At this facility, plaintiff was given 17 psychiatric medication which caused him adverse side-effects including memory damage. 18 Plaintiff alleges that defendants violated his constitutional rights by failing to provide him with 19 adequate legal counsel and then subsequently ordering him to receive unnecessary mental health 20 treatment. Plaintiff also alleges that, after his arrest, he was denied adequate law library access 21 and access to a speedy trial. As a result of these instances of misconduct, plaintiff claims to have 22 suffered a deprivation of his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. See id. 23 /// 24 /// 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 1 II. DISCUSSION 2 The court finds plaintiff’s complaint suffers from a number of defects. 3 Specifically: (1) neither named defendant may be sued under § 1983; and (2) claims related to the 4 validity of his underlying criminal proceedings or judgment are not cognizable under § 1983. 5 A. Improper Defendants 6 1. Superior Court of the State of California 7 Defendant Superior Court of the State of California is immune from suit under the 8 Eleventh Amendment. “[S]tates, state agencies, and state officials cannot be sued in their official 9 capacities for money damages, under § 1983, because of the protection under the Eleventh 10 Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.” Cox v. Cty. of L.A., No. 2:19-cv-07702-PA (SHK), 2019 11 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 198014, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 8, 2019) (citations omitted). It is well 12 established that the Superior Court is a California state agency. See id.; see also Greater Los 13 Angeles Counsel on Deafness, Inc. v. Zolin, 812 F.2d 1103, 1110 (9th Cir. 1987). Therefore, this 14 federal action is barred under the Eleventh Amendment as to the Superior Court and it would be 15 futile to grant plaintiff leave to amend. 16 2. United States of America 17 Plaintiff has failed to state a valid claim against defendant United States of 18 America. “Traditionally, the requirements for relief under [§] 1983 have been articulated as: (1) a 19 violation of rights protected by the Constitution or created by federal statute, (2) proximately 20 caused (3) by conduct of a ‘person’ (4) acing under color of state law.” Crumpton v. Gates, 947 21 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991). While municipalities and other local government units are 22 considered “persons” to which § 1983 may apply, the “United States of America,” as a named 23 defendant, is not. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). This defect is 24 fatal as to plaintiff’s § 1983 action against the United States and may not be cured by granting 25 leave to amend. 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 1 B. Non-Cognizable Claims 2 Plaintiff alleges two claims related to his underlying state court criminal 3 proceedings and/or judgement. Specifically, plaintiff alleges ineffective assistance of counsel and 4 violation of his speedy trial rights. Neither claim is cognizable under § 1983. When a state 5 prisoner challenges the legality of his custody and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is 6 entitled to an earlier or immediate release, such a challenge is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 7 1983 and the prisoner’s sole federal remedy is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. See Preiser 8 v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973); see also Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 824 (9th Cir. 9 1997); Trimble v. City of Santa Rosa, 49 F.3d 583, 586 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam). Thus, where 10 a § 1983 action seeking monetary damages or declaratory relief alleges constitutional violations 11 which would necessarily imply the invalidity of the prisoner’s underlying conviction or sentence, 12 or the result of a prison disciplinary hearing resulting in imposition of a sanction affecting the 13 overall length of confinement, such a claim is not cognizable under § 1983 unless the conviction 14 or sentence has first been invalidated on appeal, by habeas petition, or through some similar 15 proceeding. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 DAVOOD KHADEMI, No. 2:19-CV-1494-KJM-DMC-P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. FINDINGS AND RECCOMMENDATIONS 14 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF 15 PLACER, et al., 16 Defendants. 17 18 Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 19 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court is plaintiff’s complaint (ECF No. 1). 20 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 21 against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. 22 § 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or 23 malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief 24 from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover, 25 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that complaints contain a “. . . short and plain 26 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This 27 means that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 28 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied if the 1 complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon which it 2 rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because plaintiff must allege 3 with at least some degree of particularity overt acts by specific defendants which support the 4 claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is 5 impossible for the court to conduct the screening required by law when the allegations are vague 6 and conclusory. 7 8 I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS 9 Plaintiff names the following as defendants: (1) Superior Court of the State of 10 California for the County of Placer (Superior Court); and (2) the United States of America. See 11 ECF No. 1, pg. 1. Below are plaintiff’s factual allegations as best understood by this court. 12 It appears that on April 29, 2017, plaintiff was arrested as the result of a physical 13 altercation between himself and another individual. After this arrest, he was booked, charged with 14 an offense, and provided with legal counsel from the Placer County Public Defender’s Office. 15 According to plaintiff, this counsel apparently gave “inadequate representation” and plaintiff was 16 subsequently placed in a state mental health facility. At this facility, plaintiff was given 17 psychiatric medication which caused him adverse side-effects including memory damage. 18 Plaintiff alleges that defendants violated his constitutional rights by failing to provide him with 19 adequate legal counsel and then subsequently ordering him to receive unnecessary mental health 20 treatment. Plaintiff also alleges that, after his arrest, he was denied adequate law library access 21 and access to a speedy trial. As a result of these instances of misconduct, plaintiff claims to have 22 suffered a deprivation of his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. See id. 23 /// 24 /// 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 1 II. DISCUSSION 2 The court finds plaintiff’s complaint suffers from a number of defects. 3 Specifically: (1) neither named defendant may be sued under § 1983; and (2) claims related to the 4 validity of his underlying criminal proceedings or judgment are not cognizable under § 1983. 5 A. Improper Defendants 6 1. Superior Court of the State of California 7 Defendant Superior Court of the State of California is immune from suit under the 8 Eleventh Amendment. “[S]tates, state agencies, and state officials cannot be sued in their official 9 capacities for money damages, under § 1983, because of the protection under the Eleventh 10 Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.” Cox v. Cty. of L.A., No. 2:19-cv-07702-PA (SHK), 2019 11 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 198014, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 8, 2019) (citations omitted). It is well 12 established that the Superior Court is a California state agency. See id.; see also Greater Los 13 Angeles Counsel on Deafness, Inc. v. Zolin, 812 F.2d 1103, 1110 (9th Cir. 1987). Therefore, this 14 federal action is barred under the Eleventh Amendment as to the Superior Court and it would be 15 futile to grant plaintiff leave to amend. 16 2. United States of America 17 Plaintiff has failed to state a valid claim against defendant United States of 18 America. “Traditionally, the requirements for relief under [§] 1983 have been articulated as: (1) a 19 violation of rights protected by the Constitution or created by federal statute, (2) proximately 20 caused (3) by conduct of a ‘person’ (4) acing under color of state law.” Crumpton v. Gates, 947 21 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991). While municipalities and other local government units are 22 considered “persons” to which § 1983 may apply, the “United States of America,” as a named 23 defendant, is not. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). This defect is 24 fatal as to plaintiff’s § 1983 action against the United States and may not be cured by granting 25 leave to amend. 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 1 B. Non-Cognizable Claims 2 Plaintiff alleges two claims related to his underlying state court criminal 3 proceedings and/or judgement. Specifically, plaintiff alleges ineffective assistance of counsel and 4 violation of his speedy trial rights. Neither claim is cognizable under § 1983. When a state 5 prisoner challenges the legality of his custody and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is 6 entitled to an earlier or immediate release, such a challenge is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 7 1983 and the prisoner’s sole federal remedy is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. See Preiser 8 v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973); see also Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 824 (9th Cir. 9 1997); Trimble v. City of Santa Rosa, 49 F.3d 583, 586 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam). Thus, where 10 a § 1983 action seeking monetary damages or declaratory relief alleges constitutional violations 11 which would necessarily imply the invalidity of the prisoner’s underlying conviction or sentence, 12 or the result of a prison disciplinary hearing resulting in imposition of a sanction affecting the 13 overall length of confinement, such a claim is not cognizable under § 1983 unless the conviction 14 or sentence has first been invalidated on appeal, by habeas petition, or through some similar 15 proceeding. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 483-84 (1994) (concluding that § 1983 claim 16 not cognizable because allegations were akin to malicious prosecution action which includes as 17 an element a finding that the criminal proceeding was concluded in plaintiff’s favor); Butterfield 18 v. Bail, 120 F.3d 1023, 1024-25 (9th Cir. 1997) (concluding that § 1983 claim not cognizable 19 because allegations of procedural defects were an attempt to challenge substantive result in parole 20 hearing); cf. Neal, 131 F.3d at 824 (concluding that § 1983 claim was cognizable because 21 challenge was to conditions for parole eligibility and not to any particular parole determination); 22 cf. Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74 (2005) (concluding that § 1983 action seeking changes in 23 procedures for determining when an inmate is eligible for parole consideration not barred because 24 changed procedures would hasten future parole consideration and not affect any earlier parole 25 determination under the prior procedures). 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 1 Here, neither of plaintiffs claims relating to his underlying court proceedings 2 | and/or judgement relate to his condition of confinement. Claims alleging ineffective legal counsel 3 | or violation of constitutional rights at trial are better addressed in a petition for writ of habeas 4 | corpus than under § 1983. 5 6 I. CONCLUSION 7 Because it does not appear possible that the deficiencies identified herein can be 8 | cured by amending the complaint, plaintiff is not entitled to leave to amend prior to dismissal of 9 | the entire action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 10 Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that this action be dismissed 11 | with prejudice. 12 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District 13 | Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within 14 days 14 | after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 15 | objections with the court. Responses to objections shall be filed within 14 days after service of 16 | objections. Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal. See 17 | Martinez v. Yist, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 18 19 | Dated: February 13, 2020 20 DENNIS M. COTA 21 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 22 23 24 25 26 27 28