(PC)Jackson v. Pouge

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: May 12, 2025
• Docket: 1:24-cv-01027
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 CORNEL JACKSON, Case No. 1:24-cv-1027-BAM (PC) 12 Plaintiff, ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO RANDOMLY ASSIGN DISTRICT 13 v. JUDGE 14 TYSON POUGE, et al., FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO DISMISS ACTION FOR FAILURE TO 15 Defendants. STATE A CLAIM 16 (ECF No. 9) 17 FOURTEEN (14) DAY DEADLINE 18 Plaintiff Cornel Jackson (“Plaintiff”) is a pretrial detainee proceeding pro se and in forma 19 pauperis in this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court screened Plaintiff’s 20 complaint, and Plaintiff was granted leave to amend. Plaintiff’s first amended complaint is 21 currently before the Court for screening. (ECF No. 9.) 22 I. Screening Requirement and Standard 23 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 24 governmental entity and/or against an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 25 § 1915A(a). Plaintiff’s complaint, or any portion thereof, is subject to dismissal if it is frivolous 26 or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary 27 relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b). 28 1 A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 2 pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 3 required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 4 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 5 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken as 6 true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 7 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 8 To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible, which requires 9 sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable 10 for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss v. U.S. Secret 11 Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully 12 is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the plausibility 13 standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. 14 II. Plaintiff’s Allegations 15 Plaintiff alleges that the events in the complaint occurred while he was housed at the 16 Madera County Jail. Plaintiff names the following defendants: (1) Sgt. Rivera, (2) Guzman 1, 17 correctional officer, (3) Guzman 2,1 correctional officer (4) Taylor, correctional officer (5) 18 Shields, correctional officer, and (6) Cortes, correctional officer. 19 In claim 1, Plaintiff alleges failure to protect in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 20 Between the dates of July 23, 2024 and August 1, 2024, Plaintiff notified Defendants Guzman 1, 21 Guzman 1, Taylor, Shields, Sgt Rivera, Cortes of another inmate’s violent behavior directed 22 towards Plaintiff and other dorm members that “provided a clear and convincing ‘more than mere 23 suspicion’” that an attack would soon occur. An attack on Plaintiff did in fact occur. Each of the 24 defendants knew that the attacker threatened to attack, was a racist actively using racial profanity, 25 against Plaintiff, attempted to provoke Plaintiff by smearing feces on common areas in Plaintiff’s 26

27 1 While Plaintiff includes a last name of “Guzman” for 2 different defendants, it may be difficult to identify each defendant for service. Therefore, Plaintiff may be requested to provided further 28 identifying information if he states a cognizable claim. 1 dorm and to get in Plaintiff’s face and other dorm members faces when threatening to attack and 2 other behavior which was clear and convincing to all Defendants which Defendants could infer 3 that Plaintiff was under substantial risk of harm and had time to intervene to stop this particular 4 attack. Each Defendant also personally witnessed the above behavior. Each Defendant made an 5 intentional decision with respect to the conditions under which Plaintiff was confined, which put 6 Plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering serious harm. Each Defendant’s intentional failure to take 7 reasonable measures to abate that risk against Plaintiff caused Plaintiff medical and 8 physical/emotional injury which a reasonable officer in the circumstance would of appreciated the 9 high degree of risk involved and therefore making Defendants’ conduct obvious. Additional 10 threatening behavior included Defendants witnessing the attacker steal inmates’ food, including 11 but not limited to food trays. 12 The jail policy to abate similar risks to inmates requires Defendants to remove the 13 attacker/presumed attacker, displaying similar behavior from housing similar to that of Plaintiff’s 14 housing to prevent injury to inmates and staff alike. However, Defendants here intentionally 15 neglected to take reasonable measure to abate the risk because the risk was focused to Plaintiff. 16 Plaintiff was injured by the attacker striking Plaintiff face with closed fists resulting in serious 17 and continuous pain. 18 In claim 2, Plaintiff alleges retaliation. Plaintiff alleges that the above named Defendants 19 retaliated against Plaintiff for filing civil suits against fellow officers and grievances against the 20 same officers, defendant and conditions of confinement. (see cases 1:19cv1591 EPG; 21 1:20cv1567KES; 22cv69; 1:24cv34 KES; 1:24cv261 KES; 1:24cv585 JLT). Each defendant in 22 claim 1 retaliated against Plaintiff who exercised Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights by failing to 23 protect Plaintiff from the serious harm alleged in Claim 1. These Defendants took adverse action 24 against Plaintiff by failing to protect Plaintiff as required because Plaintiff was grieving and suing 25 officers and fellow officers to Defendants. These actions had a negative impact on Plaintiff’s 26 First Amendment rights and Defendants’ actions did not advance or promote any legitimate 27 correctional goal. More simply, Plaintiff was not protected from the attacker in claim 1 by 28 Defendants in retaliation of Plaintiff suing and grieving Defendants and/or their co-workers. 1 2 As remedies, Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages. 3 III. Discussion 4 Plaintiff’s complaint fails to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 and fails to 5 state a cognizable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 6 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 7 Pursuant to Rule 8, a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim 8 showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Detailed factual allegations 9 are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 10 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted). Plaintiff must 11 set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on 12 its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). While factual allegations 13 are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id.; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556–57; Moss, 14 572 F.3d at 969. 15 Here, Plaintiff’s complaint is relatively short, but is not a plain statement of his claims. 16 Plaintiff's conclusory of allegations what happened, when it happened, or which defendant was 17 involved are insufficient. In fact, the first amended complaint includes fewer factual allegations 18 than the original complaint. Plaintiff’s allegations merely recite the elements of various causes of 19 action without supporting factual allegations. Each Defendant is entitled to know what conduct 20 allegedly violated Plaintiff's rights. General assertions regarding who knew what about Plaintiff 21 are not sufficient. General assertions regarding the actions or inactions of unspecified or groups 22 Defendants who allegedly violated Plaintiff's rights are not sufficient. Plaintiff fails to include 23 factual allegations identifying what happened, when it happened, which Defendant was involved, 24 and the specific actions or inactions of any involved Defendants. 25 In addition, Section 1983 plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link 26 between the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by 27 Plaintiff. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 28 (1976). Plaintiff’s first amended complaint improperly lumps together defendants in his claims. 1 The allegations do not make clear which defendant is responsible for which act or omission, as 2 Plaintiff lists groups of defendants when discussing each claim. Despite being provided the 3 relevant pleading standards, Plaintiff has been unable to cure this deficiency. 4 Supervisory Liability 5 Liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel for the actions or omissions of 6 their subordinates under the theory of respondeat superior. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676–77; Simmons 7 v. Navajo Cty., Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1020–21 (9th Cir. 2010); Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 8 F.3d 1218, 1235 (9th Cir. 2009); Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). 9 Supervisors may be held liable only if they “participated in or directed the violations, or 10 knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 11 (9th Cir. 1989); accord Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205–06 (9th Cir. 2011); Corales v. 12 Bennett, 567 F.3d 554, 570 (9th Cir. 2009). “The requisite causal connection may be established 13 when an official sets in motion a ‘series of acts by others which the actor knows or reasonably 14 should know would cause others to inflict’ constitutional harms.” Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d at 15 570. Supervisory liability may also exist without any personal participation if the official 16 implemented “a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of the constitutional 17 rights and is the moving force of the constitutional violation.” Redman v. Cty. of San Diego, 942 18 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (citations and quotations marks omitted), abrogated on other 19 grounds by Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1970). When a defendant holds a supervisory 20 position, the causal link between such defendant and the claimed constitutional violation must be 21 specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 22 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978). 23 Plaintiff has not alleged factual support that any supervisor, participated in or directed any 24 constitutional violation or that he implemented a policy so deficient that it was the moving force 25 of any constitutional violation. Plaintiff's allegations are conclusory that each supervisory 26 defendant “failed to protect,” Plaintiff from harm. Such conclusory allegations are insufficient to 27 state a claim for supervisory liability. Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the 28 involvement of supervisory personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Bd. 1 of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 2 Failure to Protect 3 Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee at the county jail when the incident giving rise to his 4 complaint occurred. Therefore, Plaintiff’s rights as a pretrial detainee, as opposed to a convicted 5 prisoner, arise under the Fourteenth Amendment instead of the Eighth Amendment; however, the 6 standard of review is largely the same. Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1067-68 7 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (under both the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, the plaintiff must 8 show that the defendants acted with deliberate indifference). As a pretrial detainee, Plaintiff has 9 the right to be protected from assault by other detainees. Castro, 833 F.3d at 1068. 10 The Ninth Circuit has analyzed such conditions of confinement claims under an objective 11 deliberate indifference standard. See Castro, 833 F.3d at 1071 (adopting objective deliberate 12 indifference standard based on Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389 (2015), to evaluate failure 13 to protect claim brought by pretrial detainee). That standard demands that: (1) the defendant made 14 an intentional decision with respect to the conditions under which the plaintiff was confined; (2) 15 those conditions put the plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering serious harm; (3) the defendant 16 did not take reasonable available measures to abate that risk, even though a reasonable officer in 17 the circumstances would have appreciated the high degree of risk involved—making the 18 consequences of the defendant’s conduct obvious; and (4) by not taking such measures, the 19 defendant caused the plaintiff’s injuries. Castro, 833 F.3d at 1071. 20 The first amended complaint fails to aver that an officer was aware of facts from which 21 the officer could infer that Plaintiff was under a substantial risk of harm or had time to intervene 22 to stop the particular attack. Plaintiff alleges that the attacker threatened to attack, was a racist 23 actively using racial profanity, against Plaintiff and others, attempted to provoke Plaintiff by 24 smearing feces on common areas in Plaintiff’s dorm and to get in Plaintiff’s face and other dorm 25 members’ faces. Plaintiff alleges conclusory allegations that “defendant knew” of an alleged 26 attack. But the allegations are that Plaintiff alerted some defendants to a generalized fear of 27 28 1 attack.2 Generalized fears of attack at not sufficient to state a claim. “[S]peculative and 2 generalized fears of harm at the hands of other prisoners do not rise to a sufficiently substantial 3 risk of serious harm to [an inmate’s] future health.” Williams v. Wood, 223 F. App'x 670, 671 (9th 4 Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). A prison official need not “believe to a moral certainty” that an 5 inmate is at risk of harm “before [he] is obligated to take steps to prevent such an assault,” but 6 “he must have more than a mere suspicion that an attack will occur.” Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 7 457, 459 (9th Cir. 1986) (A “mere suspicion that an attack will occur” is not enough to support a 8 cognizable claim) (citation omitted). A failure to protect claim cannot be stated merely because 9 an inmate is “violent” and is a risk of attacking. Kingsley requires more. 10 With respect to the third element, the defendant's conduct must be objectively 11 unreasonable, a test that “turns on the facts and circumstances of each particular case.” Kingsley 12 v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 397 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff fails to 13 allege any facts from which the Court could infer that any defendant acted objectively 14 unreasonably. “The inquiry into causation must be individualized and focus on the duties and 15 responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a 16 constitutional deprivation.” Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988). 17 There are no allegations that any defendant knew that this particular “attacking inmate” 18 was at risk of injuring Plaintiff and would injure Plaintiff at that particular time. Plaintiff was 19 informed in the prior screening order that each act by each defendant must be viewed separately 20 and not in combination with other defendants. But Plaintiff’s allegations group defendants and 21 2 While an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint, Lacey v. Maricopa Cty., 693 22 F.3d 896, 927 (9th Cir. 2012), Plaintiff also may not omit relevant facts in an attempt to state a 23 cognizable claim. See Azadpour v. Sun Microsys., Inc., No. 06–3272, 2007 WL 2141079, at *2 n. 2 (N.D. Cal. July 23, 2007) (“Where allegations in an amended complaint contradict those in a 24 prior complaint, a district court need not accept the new alleged facts as true, and may, in fact, strike the changed allegations as ‘false and sham.’ ”) (citations omitted). The Court therefore 25 takes judicial notice of the original complaint that alleged Plaintiff was attacked when Plaintiff stopped the aggressive inmate from taking an elderly inmate’s tray and then the aggressive inmate 26 immediately rushed Plaintiff and physically assaulted Plaintiff. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff did not 27 include these particular allegations and the circumstances of the attack in the instant first amended complaint since, as Plaintiff was informed in the Court’s screening, the allegations do 28 not show any defendant could have known of the attack. 1 state all defendant “knew” and failed to act, without stating what any individual defendant did or 2 did not do to violate Plaintiff’s rights. Plaintiff’s broad allegation that all inmates were at risk 3 from the violent inmate is too general and speculative to state a claim that any defendant acted 4 with deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's safety. No defendant was aware that Plaintiff would do 5 an act or was aware that it would trigger a violent response. Plaintiff’s conclusory allegation that 6 “defendant knew” is insufficient to state a claims. 7 Retaliation 8 Allegations of retaliation against a prisoner's First Amendment rights to speech or to 9 petition the government may support a 1983 claim. Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 5527, 532 (9th Cir. 10 1985); see also Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135 (9th Cir. 1989); Pratt v. Rowland, 65 11 F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995). “Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment 12 retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action 13 against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner's protected conduct, and that such action (4) 14 chilled the inmate's exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably 15 advance a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 16 2005); accord Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1114-15 (9th Cir. 2012); Brodheim v. Cry, 584 17 F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir. 2009). 18 It is unclear what conduct Plaintiff engaged in which was protected conduct. Plaintiff 19 alleges that he filed civil lawsuits and filed grievances which are protected conduct. But it is 20 unclear who took an adverse action, because of this conduct, in that Plaintiff does not allege that 21 each of the specific defendants knew of and acted because of the protected conduct. Further 22 Plaintiff fails to allege that each of the defendant’s conduct chilled Plaintiff’s First Amendment 23 rights, that did not advance a legitimate correctional goal. Plaintiff must allege facts for each 24 element of a retaliation claim for each defendant. Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations are 25 insufficient. Plaintiff has been unable to cure this deficiency. 26 State Law Claims 27 To the extent Plaintiff alleges state law claim based on Defendants’ failure to comply with 28 jail policy, the first amended complaint does not allege that Plaintiff complied with the exhaustion 1 requirements of the Government Claims Act (“GCA”) as to his pendent state law claims. Cal. 2 Gov't Code §§ 905, 905.2, 910, 911.2, 945.4, 950–950.2. Under the GCA, a claimant may not 3 maintain a state law tort cause action for damages against a public employee or “local public 4 entity” unless he has first presented a written claim to the state Victim Compensation and 5 Government Claims Board, and the Board has acted on it. See Cal. Gov't.Code §§ 900.4, 905, 6 905.2, 945.4, & 950.2. State law claims are subject to dismissal for failure to comply with GCA. 7 See Karim–Panahi v. LA. Police Dep't, 839 F.2d 621, 627 (9th Cir.1988). If Plaintiff has not done 8 so, he must submit any such claim “not later than six months after the accrual of the cause of 9 action.” See Cal. Gov't.Code § 911.2. Because Plaintiff does not affirmatively allege compliance 10 with the GCA, the Complaint facially fails to state a tort claim for negligence. 11 IV. Conclusion and Recommendation 12 For the reasons discussed, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s first amended complaint fails to 13 state a cognizable claim for relief. Despite being provided with the relevant legal standards, 14 Plaintiff has been unable to cure the deficiencies in his complaint. Further leave to amend is not 15 warranted. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000). 16 Accordingly, the Court HEREBY ORDERS the Clerk of the Court to randomly assign a 17 district judge to this action. 18 Furthermore, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that this action be dismissed for failure 19 to state a cognizable claim upon which relief may be granted. 20 These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District 21 Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within 22 fourteen (14) days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, the parties may 23 file written objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to 24 Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Objections, if any, shall not exceed 25 fifteen (15) pages or include exhibits. Exhibits may be referenced by document and page 26 number if already in the record before the Court. Any pages filed in excess of the 15-page 27 limit may not be considered. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the 28 specified time may result in the waiver of the “right to challenge the magistrate’s factual 1 findings” on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838–39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter 2 v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). 3 IT IS SO ORDERED. 4

5 Dated: May 12, 2025 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _ UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 6

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