(PC)Gaines v. Beaver

District Court, E.D. California·Decided August 6, 2020·No. 1:16-cv-01689·Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 10 11 MARY LEE GAINES, Case No. 1:16-cv-01689-NONE-JLT (PC)

12 Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO GRANT DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR 13 v. SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR FAILURE TO EXHAUST (Doc. 55) 15 Defendant. 21-DAY DEADLINE 16 17 Defendant moves for summary judgment on the grounds that Plaintiff failed to exhaust 18 administrative remedies prior to filing suit. (Doc. 55.) Plaintiff has failed to file an opposition or a 19 statement of non-opposition to Defendant’s motion, and the time to do so has passed. (See Doc. 20 68.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court recommends that Defendant’s motion be granted 21 and this action dismissed. 23 Mary Lee Gaines has chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and chronic asthma, and she 24 often requires an oxygen tank to assist her with breathing. Pl.’s Compl. 3 (Doc. 24). At all times 25 relevant to this action, Plaintiff was incarcerated at Central California Women’s Facility. Id. 26 Plaintiff alleges that she had difficulty breathing while at a prison chapel on May 10, 2015. Id. 4. 27 Prison officials activated an “emergency code” and brought Plaintiff an oxygen tank. Id. While being transported back to the “Skilled Nursing Facility,” Correctional Officer Voltz 1 stopped Plaintiff and told her she needed to be strip searched. Id. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant- 2 Correctional Officer Beavers and other correctional officers removed Plaintiff’s oxygen tank and 3 ordered her to be strip searched. Id. According to Plaintiff, although she had difficulty breathing, 4 Officer Beavers told her, “I don’t care if you can’t breathe.” Id. Plaintiff alleges that, while being 5 strip searched, she fainted and fell to the floor. Id. 5. 6 Plaintiff filed an administrative grievance regarding the incident on July 8, 2015. Defs.’ 7 Statement of Undisputed Facts (“SUF”) ¶ 9 (Doc. 55-3); Gates Decl. Ex. B (Doc. 55-4). In the 8 grievance, Plaintiff alleged that Nursing Assistants Betty, Ray, and Thomas deprived her of an 9 oxygen tank at the prison chapel and when returning from the chapel. Id. Plaintiff does not 10 mention Officer Beavers. Prison officials partially granted Plaintiff’s grievance at the first level of 11 review, permitting Plaintiff to carry her oxygen tank with her as necessary. Id. Plaintiff did not 12 appeal the decision to the second level of review. 13 Plaintiff also filed a “reasonable accommodation request” regarding the incident on June 14 5, 2015. SUF ¶ 13; Thissen Decl. Ex. B (Doc. 55-6). In her request, Plaintiff alleged that prison 15 staff were deliberately indifferent to her shortness of breath. Id. The request did not provide any 16 staff names. Id. When interviewed about the request, Plaintiff identified Officer Voltz, “who was 17 the primary driving force as to … having to complete an unclothed body search.” Id. Officials 18 partially granted Plaintiff’s request at the first level of review, approving Plaintiff for use of an 19 oxygen tank, a walker, and a wheelchair. Id. Plaintiff did not appeal the decision to the second 20 level of review. SUF ¶ 13. 21 Plaintiff filed a second reasonable accommodation request on June 19, 2015. SUF ¶ 14; 22 Thissen Decl. Ex. C. In the request, Plaintiff complains that staff were not allowing her to carry 23 her oxygen tank with her wheelchair, and she requested an eggcrate mattress. Id. The request did 24 not provide any staff names or incident dates. Id. Officials partially granted the request at the first 25 level of review, approving Plaintiff for carrying an oxygen tank while using her wheelchair. Id. 26 Plaintiff did not appeal the decision to the second level of review. SUF ¶ 14. 27 Plaintiff filed no other grievances concerning the events underlying this action. See id. ¶¶ 2 A. Summary Judgment 3 Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party “shows that there is no genuine 4 dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. 5 Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party “initially bears the burden of proving the absence of a genuine 6 issue of material fact.” In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., 627 F.3d 376, 387 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing 7 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). The moving party may accomplish this by 8 “citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, 9 electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations …, admissions, 10 interrogatory answers, or other materials,” or by showing that such materials “do not establish the 11 absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible 12 evidence to support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A), (B). When the non-moving party bears 13 the burden of proof at trial, “the moving party need only prove that there is an absence of 14 evidence to support the non-moving party’s case.” Oracle Corp., 627 F.3d at 387 (citing Celotex, 15 477 U.S. at 325); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B). 16 Summary judgment should be entered against a party who fails to make a showing 17 sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that 18 party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. “[A] complete failure of 19 proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other 20 facts immaterial.” Id. at 322–23. In such a circumstance, summary judgment should be granted, 21 “so long as whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the standard for the entry of 22 summary judgment … is satisfied.” Id. at 323. 23 B. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies 24 The Prison Litigation Reform Act provides that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect 25 to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in 26 any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available 27 are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Exhaustion of administrative remedies is mandatory and 1 Inmates are required to “complete the administrative review process in accordance with the 2 applicable procedural rules, including deadlines, as a precondition to bringing suit in federal 3 court.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 88, 93 (2006). The exhaustion requirement applies to all 4 inmate suits relating to prison life, Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002), regardless of the 5 relief sought by the prisoner or offered by the administrative process, Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 6 731, 741 (2001). 7 The failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative defense, which the 8 defendant must plead and prove. Jones, 549 U.S. at 204, 216. The defendant bears the burden of 9 producing evidence that proves a failure to exhaust; and, summary judgment is appropriate only if 10 the undisputed evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, shows the plaintiff 11 failed to exhaust. Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 2014).

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