(PC) Yakini D. Byrd v. Razo

District Court, E.D. California·Decided September 11, 2020·No. 1:20-cv-00814·Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 YAKINI DEANDRE BYRD, Case No. 1:20-cv-00814-BAM (PC) 12 Plaintiff, ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO RANDOMLY ASSIGN DISTRICT JUDGE TO 13 v. ACTION 14 E. RAZO, et al., FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING DISMISSAL OF ACTION FOR 15 Defendants. FAILURE TO STATE A COGNIZABLE CLAIM 16 (ECF No. 10) 17 FOURTEEN-DAY DEADLINE 18

19 20 Plaintiff Yakini DeAndre Byrd (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in 21 forma pauperis in this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On August 17, 2020, the Court 22 screened Plaintiff’s complaint and granted him leave to amend. (ECF No. 9.) Plaintiff’s first 23 amended complaint, filed on August 31, 2020, is currently before the Court for screening. (ECF 24 No. 10.) 25 I. Screening Requirement and Standard 26 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 27 governmental entity and/or against an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 28 § 1915A(a). Plaintiff’s complaint, or any portion thereof, is subject to dismissal if it is frivolous 1 or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary 2 relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b). 3 A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 4 pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 5 required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 6 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 7 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken 8 as true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, 9 Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 10 To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible, which requires 11 sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable 12 for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss v. U.S. 13 Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant acted 14 unlawfully is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the 15 plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. 16 II. Plaintiff’s Allegations 17 Plaintiff is currently housed at California State Prison, Corcoran in Corcoran, California, 18 where the events in the amended complaint are alleged to have occurred. Plaintiff names the 19 following defendants: (1) Sergeant E. Razo; (2) Associate Warden R. Juarez; (3) SHU Property 20 Officer M. Medina; and (4) Appeals Coordinator J. Ceballos. 21 Plaintiff asserts a “Torts act” violation and alleges, “Officer M. Medina Refuse to give me 22 my package and had my signature missused to embezzle me of it. Then had all the above names 23 try to cover it up.” (ECF No. 10 at 3) (unedited text). As relief, Plaintiff seeks return of his 24 package or compensatory damages. He also requests punitive damages. (Id. at 6.) 25 III. Discussion 26 A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 27 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, a complaint must contain “a short and plain 28 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Detailed 1 factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 2 supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation 3 omitted). Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to 4 relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 5 127 S.Ct. at 1974). While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id.; 6 see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556–557. 7 Although Plaintiff’s amended complaint is short, it is not a plain statement of his claims. 8 As a basic matter, the complaint does not clearly state what happened, when it happened or who 9 was involved. Despite being provided with the relevant pleading standard, Plaintiff has been 10 unable to cure this deficiency. 11 B. Linkage Requirement 12 The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

13 Every person who, under color of [state law] ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 14 immunities secured by the Constitution ... shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 15 16 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link between 17 the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by Plaintiff. See 18 Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). The 19 Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional 20 right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s 21 affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the 22 deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 23 Here, Plaintiff fails to adequately link Defendants Razo, Juarez and Ceballos to the 24 allegations in his complaint. Plaintiff’s conclusory statement regarding a cover up is not 25 sufficient. Plaintiff fails to state what each of these defendants did or did not do that resulted in a 26 deprivation of his rights. Despite being provided with the relevant standard, Plaintiff has been 27 unable to cure this deficiency. 28 /// 1 C. Fourteenth Amendment - Deprivation of Property 2 Prisoners have a protected interest in their personal property. Hansen v. May, 502 F.2d 3 728, 730 (9th Cir. 1974). An authorized, intentional deprivation of property is actionable under 4 the Due Process Clause. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 532 n.13 (1984) (citing Logan v. 5 Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 435–36 (1982)); Quick v.

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