(PC) Wright v. Naranjo

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. California
DecidedApril 9, 2025
Docket2:24-cv-02983
StatusUnknown

This text of (PC) Wright v. Naranjo ((PC) Wright v. Naranjo) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
(PC) Wright v. Naranjo, (E.D. Cal. 2025).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 DEWAYNE A. WRIGHT, No. 2:24-cv-2983 CSK P 12 Plaintiff, ORDER 13 v. 14 OFFICER J. NARANJO, 15 Defendant. 16 17 Plaintiff is a county jail inmate proceeding pro se. Plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to 18 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and requested leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. 19 This proceeding was referred to this court by Local Rule 302 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 20 Plaintiff submitted a declaration that makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). 21 Accordingly, the request to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. 22 Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 28 U.S.C. 23 §§ 1914(a), 1915(b)(1). By this order, plaintiff is assessed an initial partial filing fee in 24 accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). By separate order, the court will direct 25 the appropriate agency to collect the initial partial filing fee from plaintiff’s trust account and 26 forward it to the Clerk of the Court. Thereafter, plaintiff is obligated to make monthly payments 27 of twenty percent of the preceding month’s income credited to plaintiff’s trust account. These 28 payments will be forwarded by the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court each time the 1 amount in plaintiff’s account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C. 2 § 1915(b)(2). 3 As discussed below, plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed with leave to amend. 4 I. SCREENING STANDARDS 5 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 6 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 7 court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner raised claims that are legally 8 “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek 9 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 10 A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 11 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th 12 Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous when it is based on an 13 indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 14 490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully 15 pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th 16 Cir. 1989), superseded by statute as stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 17 2000) (“[A] judge may dismiss [in forma pauperis] claims which are based on indisputably 18 meritless legal theories or whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.”); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 19 1227. 20 Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “requires only ‘a short and plain 21 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the 22 defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atlantic 23 Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). 24 In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain more than “a 25 formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain factual allegations 26 sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555. 27 However, “[s]pecific facts are not necessary; the statement [of facts] need only ‘give the 28 defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. 1 Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (quoting Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555, citations and internal 2 quotations marks omitted). In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as 3 true the allegations of the complaint in question, Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93, and construe the 4 pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 5 (1974), overruled on other grounds, Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984). 6 II. PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT 7 Plaintiff Dewayne A. Wright alleges that on October 10, 2023, defendant J. Naranjo, an 8 officer at the Stanton Correctional Facility in Fairfield, opened plaintiff’s legal mail and either 9 “intentionally or mistakenly delivered [plaintiff’s] legal[] mail to inmate Dequan Wright.” (ECF 10 No. 1 at 3.) Plaintiff alleges defendant was required to have inmates state their names before 11 delivering legal mail, yet plaintiff’s legal mail was still delivered to another inmate. Plaintiff 12 appended copies of his grievance and the response. (ECF No. 1 at 7-9.) In his grievance, 13 plaintiff confirmed he received the opened legal mail. (Id. at 7.) As injury, plaintiff alleges his 14 constitutional rights were violated. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff seeks money damages. (Id. at 6.) 15 III. DISCUSSION 16 Plaintiff’s claim against defendant J. Naranjo rests on a single incident. Plaintiff grieved 17 the issue and then filed this suit, asserting a constitutional violation based on the legal mail being 18 opened outside plaintiff’s presence. 19 First, plaintiff’s claim fails because he has not alleged sufficient facts identifying the mail 20 as “legal mail.” Plaintiff did not identify who sent the mail or whether it was properly marked as 21 “legal mail.” (ECF No. 1, passim.) Thus, plaintiff fails to meet his burden of plausibly alleging 22 that the item opened outside his presence was protected legal mail. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. 23 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). For example, “[m]ail from the courts, as contrasted to mail 24 from a prisoner’s lawyer, is not legal mail.” Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1094 (9th Cir. 1996). 25 Thus, the First Amendment does not prohibit opening mail from the courts outside the prisoner’s 26 presence.

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Related

Conley v. Gibson
355 U.S. 41 (Supreme Court, 1957)
Scheuer v. Rhodes
416 U.S. 232 (Supreme Court, 1974)
Rizzo v. Goode
423 U.S. 362 (Supreme Court, 1976)
Davis v. Scherer
468 U.S. 183 (Supreme Court, 1984)
Neitzke v. Williams
490 U.S. 319 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Erickson v. Pardus
551 U.S. 89 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ivey v. Board of Regents of University of Alaska
673 F.2d 266 (Second Circuit, 1982)
Harry Franklin v. Ms. Murphy and Hoyt Cupp
745 F.2d 1221 (Ninth Circuit, 1984)
Sergio Ramirez v. County of San Bernardino
806 F.3d 1002 (Ninth Circuit, 2015)
United States v. Delgado-Sanchez
849 F.3d 1 (First Circuit, 2017)
Lopez v. Smith
203 F.3d 1122 (Ninth Circuit, 2000)
May v. Enomoto
633 F.2d 164 (Ninth Circuit, 1980)

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Bluebook (online)
(PC) Wright v. Naranjo, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pc-wright-v-naranjo-caed-2025.