(PC) Wolinski v. Eldridge

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: July 27, 2023
• Docket: 2:19-cv-02037
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 KRZYSZTOF F. WOLINSKI, No. 2:19-CV-02037-DAD-DMC-P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 LAURA ELDRIDGE, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 18 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before this Court is Plaintiff’s second amended complaint, ECF No. 19 51. 20 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 21 against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. 22 § 1915A(a). This provision also applies if the plaintiff was incarcerated at the time the action was 23 initiated even if the litigant was subsequently released from custody. See Olivas v. Nevada ex rel. 24 Dep’t of Corr., 856 F.3d 1281, 1282 (9th Cir. 2017). The Court must dismiss a complaint or 25 portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can 26 be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 27 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that 28 complaints contain a “. . . short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 1 entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This means that claims must be stated simply, 2 concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to 3 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied if the complaint gives the defendant fair notice 4 of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon which it rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 5 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because Plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of particularity 6 overt acts by specific defendants which support the claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail 7 to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is impossible for the Court to conduct the screening 8 required by law when the allegations are vague and conclusory. 9 10 I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS 11 This action proceeds on Plaintiff’s second amended complaint. See ECF No. 51. 12 Plaintiff names the following as defendants: (1) Laura Eldridge, warden at California Health Care 13 Facility (CHCF); (2) M. Navarro, correctional lieutenant at CHCF; (3) K. Mim, correctional 14 lieutenant at CHCF; (4) P. Linehan, correctional lieutenant at CHCF; (5) R. Nava, correctional 15 lieutenant at CHCF; (6) N. Lucca, correctional sergeant at CHCF; (7) Z. Barraza, correctional 16 sergeant at CHCF; (8) S. De Jesus, appeals/grievances coordinator; (9) S. Richardson, 17 appeals/grievances coordinator; (10) G. Gill, registered nurse; (11) D. Harms, correctional officer, 18 (12) C. Tennis, correctional officer. Id. at 2-5. 19 Plaintiff Wolinski is a prisoner at the California Health Care Facility in Stockton, 20 California. Id. at 2. There, he was under the care of nurse Gill. Id. at 6. Wolinski received 21 inadequate care from Gill, who sometimes denied Plaintiff his prescribed incontinence supplies. 22 Id. Wolinski reported Gill for her lack of care. Id. 23 In retaliation, it is alleged that Gill maliciously lied and fabricated a rule violation 24 report (RVR) around January 26, 2019. Id. Gill wanted to rid herself of Wolinski and have him 25 moved to administrative segregation as punishment. Id. There is video evidence and witnesses 26 supporting Wolinski’s claim. Id. 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 Sergeant Lucca spoke with Gill and decided to transfer Wolinski to administrative 2 segregation. Id. at 7. Lucca refused to review video evidence or speak to witnesses. Id. Lucca 3 also coerced statements from officers. Id. Wolinski was kept in administrative segregation for 4 around five months until the Office of Inspector General and Internal Affairs became involved. 5 Id. 6 Wolinski was then released from administrative segregation. Id. He was advised 7 (it is unclear by whom) to appeal to have his credits restored and the RVR expunged. Id. Wilson 8 did as advised, but appeals/grievance coordinator S. De Jesus allegedly manipulated the process 9 and denied the appeal. Id. 10 About 45 days later, Wolinski had an RVR hearing with Lieutenant Nava. Id. at 11 8. The hearing lasted less than three minutes and Nava allegedly ignored regulations. Id. 12 Wolinski was not allowed to submit evidence or call witnesses. Id. Nava found Wolinski guilty. 13 Id. 14 On May 26, 2018, Officer D. Harms used his closed fist to strike Wolinski twice in 15 the face. Id. at 10. Wolinski was thrown from his wheelchair onto the floor. Id. Officer Harms 16 acted in retaliation for a report that had been made to his supervisor. Id. After an alarm was 17 triggered, nursing staff and officers helped Wolinski back into his wheelchair. Id. Wolinski 18 spoke about the incident with Lieutenant M. Banks, who confirmed Plaintiff’s allegations and 19 advised about previous victim inmates who suffered similar assaults from Harms. Id. 20 Wolinski filed a staff complaint against Harms for excessive use of force and 21 battery. Id. The complaint was ultimately suppressed by De Jesus. Id. 22 One month later, Lieutenant P. Linehan found him guilty (presumably of an RVR 23 for the altercation with Harms, though this is not specified in the complaint). Id. Linehan refused 24 to allow Wolinski to admit evidence or call witnesses. Id. 25 The CHCF Grievance/Appeals Coordinators have refused to process Wolinski’s 26 filed staff complaints or 602 grievances. Id. at 13. Wolinski filed a writ of mandamus in 27 California State Court. Id. However, interference from prison staff prevented Wolinski from 28 litigating his grievances or the writ. Id. Wolinski was transferred to another prison and his legal 1 papers were confiscated so that he would be unable to pursue his claims. Id. 2 In retaliation for his attempts to litigate, Wolinski was deprived of several 3 rehabilitative and educational programs provided by CDCR and deprived placement in better 4 CDCR prison institutions. Id. 5 On March 16, 2020, Wolinski pressed his call light and requested nurse assistance 6 to advise Officer R. Wall to enable Wolinski to go to groups that started at 8:00 a.m. Id. at 15. 7 When Wall did not come, Wolinski re-requested assistance. Id. Wall ignored the requests, 8 allegedly because he was watching pornography on the prison computers. Id. At around 8:15 9 a.m., Wall came by to release Wolinski. Id. at 16. Wall was irate and verbally abused Wolinski, 10 saying he did not care about Wolinski’s desire to attend groups. Id. By the time Wolinski made 11 it to the room for groups, it was sealed. Id. Wolinski decided to go to the next group and waited 12 around. Id. Wolinski was approached and asked what he was doing, and Wolinski explained. Id. 13 The prison’s investigative services unit was called, and they took a report from 14 Wolinski. Id. A sergeant and Lieutenant Navarro also interviewed Wolinski. Id. 15 Wolinski then went back to his unit. Id. Other inmates told Wolinski that Officer 16 Wall had trashed his room. Id. Wolinski’s air mattress, wrist brace, television set, and boom box 17 were destroyed. Id. 18 Wolinski requested an investigation, and Navarro and a sergeant came by. Id. 19 They refused to investigate but said “I know [Wall] fucked up.” Id. 20 At some point (the complaint does not clarify when), Wall filed an RVR against 21 Wolinski as a form of retaliation. Id. at 14. On April 10, 2020, Navarro held a hearing for the 22 RVR and refused to allow Wolinski to admit evidence or call witnesses. Id. at 17. 23 Wolinski appealed, and the matter was reviewed by Warden Eldridge. Id. The 24 appeal was converted into a grievance instead of processed as a staff complaint. Id. Eldridge 25 ordered the RVR be reissued and reheard. Id. 26 The matter was reheard on May 26, 2020, by a different lieutenant. Id. The RVR 27 was re-issued. Id. Wolinski alleges his due process rights were again violated, but he does not 28 specify how they were violated. Id. 1 On July 1, 2020, Wolinski was found guilty of an RVR for possession of 2 prescription medications and the RVR filed by Wall. Id. at 18. De Jesus again suppressed 3 Wolinski’s appeals. Id. Wolinski was unable submit to evidence or call witnesses. Id. 4 Eldridge refused to investigate or address staff complaints. Id. Eldridge denied 5 Wolinski’s grievance on June 1, 2020, without allowing Wolinski to present witnesses or 6 evidence. Id. at 20. As an act of retaliation against Wolinski, Eldridge denied Wolinski 7 endorsement to CHCF Stockton Prison, disregarding Wolinski’s medical needs. Id. at 19. 8 On June 3, 2019, Wolinski and other inmates witnessed two inmates conspiring to 9 stab a doctor. Id. at 21. Wolinski reported what he overheard. Id. Two weeks later, Barazza 10 made an RVR about the incident. Id. Wolinski sent a letter to Eldridge complaining about 11 retaliation, but Eldridge did not step in. Id. 12 On August 20, 2019, Barraza and Lieutenant Mim found Wolinski guilty of 13 making a false report of a criminal offense. Id. at 22. After Wolinski asked if he was being 14 denied his due process right to testify he was then allowed to call an inmate. Id. However, Mim 15 hung up the phone before the inmate could testify. Id. Wolinski was disciplined and sent to “C” 16 status. Id. Officers damaged Wolinski’s property when packing his belongings. Id. After 17 investigation by the Office of Internal Affairs, Wolinski’s “C” status was revoked. Id. 18 Wolinski alleges C. Tennis destroyed his property in retaliation for his complaint 19 against Harms. Id. at 25. Tennis also subjected Wolinski to strip searches. See id. Tennis also 20 forged an RVR and Wolisnki was found guilty. Id. Appellate coordinators De Jesus and 21 Richardson suppressed any appeal. Id. 22 On June 8, 2018, Linehan held a hearing for another forged RVR. Id. at 26. 23 Linehan denied Wolisnky the opportunity to present evidence or call witnesses. Id. 24 / / / 25 / / / 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 II. DISCUSSION 2 Plaintiff states cognizable retaliation claims against Defendants Lucca, Barazza, 3 De Jesus, Richardson, Gill, Harms, Tennis and Eldridge. Plaintiff also states cognizable due 4 process claims against Defendants Eldridge, Navarro, Mim, Linehan, Nava, De Jesus, and 5 Richardson. Finally, Plaintiff states a cognizable excessive force claim against Defendant Harms. 6 Plaintiff’s complaint is insufficient, however, to sustain a supervisor liability claim against 7 Eldridge or an Eighth Amendment claim against Tennis. 8 A. Supervisor Liability Claim 9 Supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of their 10 employees. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that there is no 11 respondeat superior liability under § 1983). A supervisor is only liable for the constitutional 12 violations of subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed the violations. See id. The 13 Supreme Court has rejected the notion that a supervisory defendant can be liable based on 14 knowledge and acquiescence in a subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct because government 15 officials, regardless of their title, can only be held liable under § 1983 for his or her own conduct 16 and not the conduct of others. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009). Supervisory 17 personnel who implement a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of 18 constitutional rights and the moving force behind a constitutional violation may, however, be 19 liable even where such personnel do not overtly participate in the offensive act. See Redman v. 20 Cnty of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc). 21 When a defendant holds a supervisory position, the causal link between such 22 defendant and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. 23 Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 24 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of supervisory personnel in 25 civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th 26 Cir. 1982). “[A] plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the 27 official’s own individual actions, has violated the constitution.” Iqbal, 662 U.S. at 676. 28 / / / 1 Wolinski alleges that Eldridge did not adequately supervise her staff, specifically 2 in how they addressed RVRs. ECF No. 51 at 2. Mere inadequate supervision is insufficient to 3 maintain a claim. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Wolinski is granted leave 4 to amend his supervisor liability claim against Eldridge. 5 B. Excessive Force Claim Against Defendant Tennis 6 The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which the 7 prisoner is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel 8 and unusual punishment. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993); Farmer v. Brennan, 9 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). The Eighth Amendment “. . . embodies broad and idealistic concepts 10 of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 11 (1976). Conditions of confinement may, however, be harsh and restrictive. See Rhodes v. 12 Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Nonetheless, prison officials must provide prisoners with 13 “food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.” Toussaint v. McCarthy, 14 801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986). A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when 15 two requirements are met: (1) objectively, the official’s act or omission must be so serious such 16 that it results in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities; and (2) 17 subjectively, the prison official must have acted unnecessarily and wantonly for the purpose of 18 inflicting harm. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Thus, to violate the Eighth Amendment, a prison 19 official must have a “sufficiently culpable mind.” See id. 20 When prison officials stand accused of using excessive force, the core judicial 21 inquiry is “. . . whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, 22 or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992); 23 Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986). The “malicious and sadistic” standard, as 24 opposed to the “deliberate indifference” standard applicable to most Eighth Amendment claims, 25 is applied to excessive force claims because prison officials generally do not have time to reflect 26 on their actions in the face of risk of injury to inmates or prison employees. See Whitley, 475 27 U.S. at 320-21. In determining whether force was excessive, the court considers the following 28 factors: (1) the need for application of force; (2) the extent of injuries; (3) the relationship 1 between the need for force and the amount of force used; (4) the nature of the threat reasonably 2 perceived by prison officers; and (5) efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response. 3 See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. The absence of an emergency situation is probative of whether force 4 was applied maliciously or sadistically. See Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1528 (9th Cir. 5 1993) (en banc). The lack of injuries is also probative. See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7-9. Finally, 6 because the use of force relates to the prison’s legitimate penological interest in maintaining 7 security and order, the court must be deferential to the conduct of prison officials. See Whitley, 8 475 U.S. at 321-22. 9 Wolinski’s complaint does not allege that Tennis physically injured him, only that 10 Tennis destroyed his property. See ECF No. 51 at 25. An excessive force claim is only 11 cognizable when an inmate suffers injury to his person. See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. Wolisnki is 12 granted leave to amend this claim. 13 14 III. CONCLUSION 15 Because it is possible that the deficiencies identified in this order may be cured by 16 amending the complaint, Plaintiff is entitled to leave to amend. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 17 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Plaintiff is informed that, as a general rule, an 18 amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 19 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Therefore, if Plaintiff amends the complaint, the Court cannot refer to the 20 prior pleading in order to make Plaintiff's amended complaint complete. See Local Rule 220. An 21 amended complaint must be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. See id. 22 If Plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, Plaintiff must demonstrate how the 23 conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See 24 Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how 25 each named defendant is involved, and must set forth some affirmative link or connection 26 between each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. See May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 27 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 28 / / / ] Because the complaint appears to otherwise state cognizable claims, if no amended 2 || complaint is filed within the time allowed therefor, the Court will issue findings and 3 || recommendations that the claims identified herein as defective be dismissed, as well as such 4 | further orders as are necessary for service of process as to the cognizable claims. 5 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff may file a third amended 6 || complaint within 30 days of the date of service of this order. 7 8 Dated: July 26, 2023 Ss..c0_, ? DENNIS M. COTA 10 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 1] 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28