(PC) Winn v. Zuniga

Opinion

RONNIE WINN, No. 2:22-CV-0706-DMC-P Plaintiff, ORDER v. Defendant. Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court is Defendant's motion for clarification. See ECF No. 40. Plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion for clarification on September 30, 2024. See ECF No. 41. Also before the Court is Defendant's motion to extent the discovery cut-off deadline. See ECF No. 42. A. Plaintiff's Allegations This action proceeds on Plaintiff's original complaint. See ECF No. 1. Plaintiff claims Defendant Zuniga violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment and First Amendment. See id. at 3. Plaintiff had permission from Lieutenant Valadez to stay in the shade because Plaintiff’s “heat meds” were causing him dizziness, a known side effect in temperatures over ninety degrees. See id. Valadez then instructed Plaintiff to call if Plaintiff was ordered to leave the shade. See id. at 4. However, Defendant Zuniga ordered Plaintiff and other inmates taking “heat meds” to leave the shade in contradiction to Valadez’s orders. See id. at 4-5. Plaintiff informed Defendant that Valadez gave Plaintiff permission to remain, and Defendant replied, “I don’t give a fuck what Sgt. Valadez said; stand up and put your hands behind your back!” Id. at 1, 5. Plaintiff complied, but Defendant placed handcuffs on Plaintiff “extremely tight.” Id. Defendant then “slammed Plaintiff’s head into the wall, while squeezing the handcuffs even tighter, stating, ‘You move again, and I will burst your fucking face and head all over this entire wall!’” Id. at 6. Plaintiff told Defendant he would “write him up” for assault, and Defendant grabbed him by the handcuffs, causing pain, and threatened to put Plaintiff in “the hole.” See id. at 6-7. Plaintiff then alleges that Defendant made a false Rules Violation Report on June 18, 2019, claiming that Plaintiff resisted orders and attempted to strike Defendant. Id. at 7. Plaintiff denied any resistance against Defendant at the administrative hearing, and inmate witnesses also gave statements supporting Plaintiff’s lack of resistance. Id. at 8. Plaintiff also claims Defendant retaliated against him in violation of the First Amendment because Plaintiff complained of tight handcuffs and threatened to file an inmate grievance against Defendant (described in Claim I.) Id. at 9. Plaintiff alleges Defendant’s response “would have chilled or silenced a person of ordinary firmness from pursuing or continuing to exercise his First Amendment rights.” Id. According to Plaintiff, he was placed into administrative segregation because of his protected activity. Id. at 10. B. Procedural History The Court determined service was appropriate on Defendant as to Plaintiff's First Amendment retaliation claim and Eighth Amendment excessive force claim. See ECF No. 10. Defendant filed an answer on November 18, 2022. See ECF No. 19. On May 1, 2023, Plaintiff filed a motion to compel production of documents. See ECF No. 27. Defendant filed a response to the motion to compel on May 17, 2023. See ECF No. 28. On September 4, 2024, the Court granted in part and denied in part Plaintiff’s motion to compel. See ECF No. 38. The Court granted the motion to compel as to request nos. 3, 4, and 5. See id. The decision was based on the finding that information is relevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) for one of several non- propensity inquiries and because “the requests do not seek confidential information insofar as each request relates to the existence of grievances filed with Defendant’s employer.” Id. at 5. The Court denied the motion to compel as to request no. 10 because Plaintiff did not state why Defendant’s response to that request was inadequate. See id. Additionally, the Court granted the motion to compel as to request no. 11 after balancing the competing interests of the parties. Id. at 6. In response to Defendant’s concern about confidentiality, the Court stated:

. . . [T]o the extent Defendant contends there exists an interest in maintaining the confidentiality of claims made against him by other inmates, there has been no showing in support of such protections and no effort to establish a protective order. Id. at 6-7. In response to the Court’s order granting in part the motion to compel, Defendant filed the pending motion for clarification on September 12, 2024. See ECF No. 40. Plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion for clarification on September 30, 2024. See ECF No. 41. A. Defendant’s position Defendant requests clarification as to request nos. 3, 4, 5, and 11 regarding redaction of confidential or irrelevant information and the conditions of production. See ECF No. 40, pg. 1. As to request nos. 3, 4, 5, Defendant asks that the Court clarify whether Defendant can redact irrelevant or identifying information of third-party inmates because providing such information “raises privacy and safety concerns.” Id. at 3. In support of this request, Defendant cites two cases where the District Court ordered redaction of identifying information before requiring production. See id.; Ramirez v. Gutierrez No. 20-cv-1109-MMA (BLM), 2021 WL 4776332, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2021) (citing Lamon v. Adams, 2010 WL 4513405, at *3-4 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2010). As to request no. 11, seeking portions of Defendant’s personnel file as they relate to specific allegations, Defendant asks to limit Plaintiff’s access to the responsive documents to the prison Litigation Coordinator’s office and permission to redact personal identifying information of third-party officers and inmates. See id. at 4. Defendant asserts that the information is confidential and thus contraband and subject to seizure in violation of sections 30006(d) and 3321(a) of the California Code of Regulations. See id. (citing ECF No. 28 pg. 14- 16). In support, Defendant cites Sanchez v. City of Santa Ana, 936 F.2d 1027, 1033-34 (9th Cir. 1990), where the Ninth Circuit held that there exists a qualified privilege for official information, including personnel files, in federal common law. See id. Thus, Defendant requests that Plaintiff’s access to such documents be restricted to the Litigation Coordinator’s office and that Plaintiff not be allowed to bring copies to his cell nor distribute the files, or any copies. See ECF No. 40, pg. 4. Defendant also seeks to redact personal identifying information of third-party officers and inmates from the document. See id. B. Plaintiff’s Response Plaintiff’s response to Defendant’s motion for clarification raises two issues. First, Plaintiff argues that Defendant should not be permitted to determine what information is relevant when redacting information. See ECF No. 41. Second, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant’s request to limit production of relevant portions of Defendant’s personnel file to Plaintiff accessing such document in the prison litigation office first requires the Court to determine that information is privileged and second requires a motion for protective order. See id. To the first point, Plaintiff argues that Defendant should not have “the power to determine what is relevant or not in this case.” Id. at 2. As to the manner of production, Plaintiff argues that for the Court to restrict Plaintiff’s access to documents, the Court must first make the determination that such documents are privileged, citing Jones v. McElroy, No. 2:13-CV-1375 GEB, 2015 WL 1014653 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2015) in support. See id. at 2-3. Additionally, Plaintiff cites Soto v. City of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603, 613 (N.D. Cal. 1995), where the district court held that when “a defendant meets the threshold requirements, the court will . . . balance each party’s interests.” ECF No. 41, pg. 3. Plaintiff asserts that the Court already conducted a balancing test of the parties’ interests and found there was “no showing in support of such protections and no effort to establish a protective order.” Id. at 3 (citing ECF No. 38 pg. 9). Thus, Plaintiff concludes “that Defendant’s remedy is to seek a protective order, not administrative clarification.” Id. A. Redaction Defendant seeks to redact personal identifying information of inmates and third- party officers, not Defendant, from documents responsive to request nos. 3, 4, 5, and 11 to resolve privacy and safety concerns. As Plaintiff’s opposition notes, Defendant’s motion for clarification requests that Defendant be permitted to redact “portions of the document that are confidential or not relevant.” ECF No. 40, pg. 1. This request will be denied. The Court’s prior order addressed the relevance of the requested documents and ruled such documents are relevant for non- propensity purposes. See ECF No. 38 pgs. 5-6. Indeed, the Court was clear in that ruling that documents responsive to request no. 11 be limited to documents which evidence claims against Defendant arising out of the seven enumerated categories: (1) filing false reports, (2) use of excessive force, (3) retaliation, (4) medical indifference, (5) perjury, (6) false statements, falsifying evidence, and (7) issuing false Rule Violation Reports, within the period of June 18, 2014, through June 18, 2019. See ECF No. 38, pgs. 6-8. Defendant is not required to disclose Defendant’s entire personnel file. Given that the Court already made a definitive ruling about the relevance of the documents, Defendant cannot redact information on the basis of relevance. Defendant's motion, however, raises a valid concern for the privacy and safety of other inmates and officers. Defendant offers case law in support of redacting of personal identifying information for such reasons and Defendant made a sufficient showing of such a need in their initial filing. See ECF No. 28. Therefore, the Court concludes it is proper for Defendant to redact personal identifying information of third parties prior to production. Such redactions must be limited to personal identifying information for inmates other than Plaintiff and officers other than Defendant. This includes names, any identification numbers, or similar information. Redacting such information will protect the third-party individuals and the integrity of the grievance process without hindering Plaintiff’s meaningful access to such documents. B. This motion will be construed as a motion for protective order. Defendant next seeks a protective order to limit Plaintiff’s access to documents responsive to request no. 11 to the Litigation Coordinator’s office and a restriction barring Plaintiff from copying or distributing said documents. See ECF No. 40, pg. 4. Plaintiff opposes this motion, arguing that such a restriction requires the Court to determine such information is privileged and that Defendant's current motion for clarification is an improper use of an administrative motion. See ECF No. 41, pg. 3. Beginning with Plaintiff’s argument that a motion for clarification is not the proper avenue for Defendant to restrict the manner of production, the Court looks to the Local Rules for guidance. Eastern District of California Local Rule 141 outlines the procedure for protective orders and Rule 141(c) requires that proposed protective orders contain:

(1) A description of the types of information eligible for protection under the order, with the description provided in general terms sufficient to reveal the nature of the information (e.g., customer list, formula for soda, diary of a troubled child); (2) A showing of particularized need for protection as to each category of information proposed to be covered by the order; and (3) A showing as to why the need for protection should be addressed by a court order, as opposed to a private agreement between or among the parties.

E. Dist. Cal. L.R. 141(c). While Defendant filed an administrative motion for clarification, not a motion for a protective order, Defendant’s filing and Plaintiff’s opposition satisfy all three requirements of a proposed protective order. Defendant argues that: (1) request no. 11, portions of Defendant’s personnel file, is eligible for a protective order, and (2) a personnel file is privileged and presents a risk to institutional safety if it were “disseminated to the larger prison population.” See ECF No. 28 pgs. 6, 16. Third, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s filing in opposition demonstrates Plaintiff is not interested in a private agreement in lieu of a Court issued protective order. See ECF No. 41. / / / / / / Another possible concern about Defendant filing a motion for administrative relief as opposed to requesting a protective order is prejudice to Plaintiff. Administrative motions require the non-moving party to file an opposition or supporting statement within five days after the motion is filed. See E. Dist. Cal. L.R. 233 (b). Here, Plaintiff filed the opposition more than five days after Defendant’s motion. See ECF No. 41. To prevent potential prejudice against Plaintiff, the Court has considered and addressed Plaintiff’s opposition herein. Given that the requirements of a protective order are satisfied, and that Plaintiff is not prejudiced, the Court will construe Defendant’s administrative motion as a motion for a protective order. C. Manner of production Defendant requests that Plaintiff’s access to documents responsive to request no. 11 be restricted to viewing and reviewing in the Litigation Coordinator's office and that Plaintiff not be permitted to make or distribute originals or copies of the documents. See ECF No. 40. Plaintiff contends that the Court must first determine this information is privileged before issuing a protective order. ECF No. 41, pgs. 2-3. Defendant’s opposition to the motion to compel cites case law holding that personnel files are official information that may qualify as privileged under federal common law. See ECF No. 28, pg. 6 (citing Sanchez v. City of Santa Ana, 936 F.2d 1027, 1033-34 (9th Cir. 1990)). Sanchez does not confer a general privilege over all government personnel files but directs courts to “weigh the potential benefits of disclosure against the possible disadvantages.” Sanchez at 1033-1034. Plaintiff is correct that this Court did conduct such a balancing test and concluded “the greater prejudice would be to deny otherwise appropriate discovery.” ECF No. 38 pg. 7. However, the “threshold showing” Plaintiff seeks to impose on Defendant’s protective order is a standard for baring production entirely, not the standard for whether to impose a protective order. See Soto v. City of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (citing Kelly v. San Jose, 114 F.R.D. 653 (N.D. Cal. 1987)). Indeed, one of the elements required for this “threshold showing” is a showing that a protective order would not sufficiently resolve privacy concerns. Id. at 613. In Soto, the court decided the privilege did not extend to the requested files and ordered Plaintiff to turn the files over but did so subject production to a protective order. See id. at 617. Here, the Court affirms its previous decision to order disclosure of documents responsive of request no. 11, but the Court recognizes that the manner of production Defendant seeks can be, as discussed above, considered a request for a protective order. Such an order does not bar disclosure, but rather imposes restrictions on access, reproduction, and dissemination. The Court finds this manner of production to satisfy both the disclosure of discovery and the safety concerns Defendant raises. Plaintiff will be given meaningful access to documents responsive to request no. 11 at the Litigation Coordinator's office and be permitted to take notes so Plaintiff can prepare this case. However, the Court requires said documents to stay in that office, not be copied, and bars dissemination of the documents, or copies, to others. This is in accordance with Soto, where the Court required disclosure subject to a protective order. See Soto at 617. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 1. Defendant’s motion for clarification, ECF No. 40, is granted as to the redaction of personal identifying information of third parties for documents responsive to request nos. 3, 4, 5, and 11. Documents responsive to these requests are to be produced without further objection within 30 days of the date of this order. 2. Defendant’s motion for clarification, ECF No. 40, is denied as to the redaction of irrelevant information for documents responsive to request nos. 3, 4, 5, and 11. 3. Defendant’s motion for clarification, ECF No. 40, is granted as to the manner of production and Plaintiff’s access to documents responsive to request no. 11. Such documents shall be made available to Plaintiff for inspection in the prison Litigation Coordinator’s office, where Plaintiff is permitted to take notes on said documents and bring them with him elsewhere but cannot make copies nor disseminate originals or copies of said documents to others. / / / ] 4. Defendant's motion for an extension of time to conduct discovery, ECF No. 42, is granted. 5. Except for the discovery addressed herein as well as the taking of Plaintiff's deposition, discovery in this case is closed. 6. For the discovery addressed herein and the taking of Plaintiff's deposition, the discovery cut-off deadline is extended to January 6, 2025. 7. Dispositive motions are due by April 7, 2025. Dated: November 20, 2024 Ss..c0_, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE