(PC) Wilson v. Ramos

Opinion

LUCIOUS WILSON, No. 2:23-CV-0977-DC-DMC-P Plaintiff, v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RAMOS, et al., Defendants. Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court is Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. See ECF No. 30. Plaintiff has filed an opposition. See ECF No. 33. Defendants have filed a reply. See ECF No. 35. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for summary judgment or summary adjudication when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The standard for summary judgment and summary adjudication is the same. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), 56(c); see also Mora v. ChemTronics, 16 F. Supp. 2d. 1192, 1200 (S.D. Cal. 1998). One of the principal purposes of Rule 56 is to dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). Under summary judgment practice, the moving party

. . . always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,” which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Id., at 323 (quoting former Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In attempting to establish the existence of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleadings but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in support of its contention that the dispute exists. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1); see also Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11. The opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987), and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party, Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1436 (9th Cir. 1987). To demonstrate that an issue is genuine, the opposing party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts . . . . Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted). It is sufficient that “the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a trier of fact to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed, see Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party, see Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party’s obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. See Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1987). Ultimately, “[b]efore the evidence is left to the jury, there is a preliminary question for the judge, not whether there is literally no evidence, but whether there is any upon which a jury could properly proceed to find a verdict for the party producing it, upon whom the onus of proof is imposed.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251. This action proceeds on Plaintiff’s original complaint. See ECF No. 1. Plaintiff names the following as defendants: (1) A. Ramos, correctional officer; (2) B. Singh, correctional officer; (3) R. Duran, correctional officer; and (4) Cueva, warden. See id. at 2. Plaintiff alleges that, while in his cell at the California Medical Facility on the night of April 19, 2023, he began experiencing mania due to his bipolar disorder. Id. at 3. He felt distressed hearing homicidal and suicidal voices. Id. Wilson asked correctional officers to see a mental health doctor. Id. He also said he did not want to leave his cell because he did not feel safe around people. Id. Wilson then put paper in the window of the cell to obstruct the vision of those taunting him. Id. Plaintiff contends that correction officers commonly “beat the hell out of” anyone who puts up paper in a cell window and refuses to take it down. Id. After Plaintiff placed paper in the window of his cell, corrections officers ran into Wilson’s cell to extract Wilson. Id. at 3, 5. The officers attacked Wilson, who defended himself. Id. at 3. During the encounter, CO Singh and CO Duran used their batons to repeatedly strike Wilson’s head. Id. Wilson suffered lacerations to his face and skull. Id. Wilson claims that CO Ramos made a threat, refused Wilson medical and mental health services, and incited the cell extraction altercation. Id. at 3-6. Wilson claims that Ramos as well as CO Singh and CO Duran used excessive force when using their batons during the cell extraction. Id. at 4. Wilson names Warden Cueva as a defendant but makes no direct claims. See id. at 4. / / / A. Defendants’ Motion Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is supported by a statement of Defendants’ Undisputed Facts (“DUF”), an excerpt of Plaintiff’s deposition transcript, the declarations of Defendants Ramos, Singh, and Duran, and the declarations of John Tony Diaz and Rachel Fisher. See ECF No. 30. Defendants assert the following facts:

2. On April 19, 2023, Plaintiff was feeling suicidal and had homicidal thoughts. (ECF No. 1 at p.3.) 3. On April 19, 2023, Plaintiff boarded up his cell windows. (ECF No. 1 at p. 3.) 4. Officers Ramos, Duran, and Singh all observed Plaintiff’s window coverings. (Ramos Decl. at ¶ 2, Duran Decl. at ¶ 3, Singh Decl. at ¶ 2.) 5. Plaintiff was ordered to take down his window coverings. (ECF No. 1 at p. 3, Ramos Decl. at ¶ ¶ 2, 3, Duran Decl. at ¶ 4, Singh Decl. at ¶ 2.) 6. Plaintiff refused to take down his window coverings. (ECF No. 1 at p. 3, Fisher Decl., Exhibit 2 at 56:14-57:7.) 7. Because of Plaintiff’s window coverings, custody staff could not physically observe Plaintiff. (Ramos Decl. at ¶ 2, Duran Decl. at ¶ 3, Singh Decl. at ¶ 2.) 8. Defendant Ramos made the decision to conduct an emergency cell extraction for the purpose of a welfare check. (Ramos Decl. at ¶ 4, Duran Decl. at ¶ 5, Singh Decl. at ¶ 3.) 9. At no point before officers entered Plaintiff’s cell did Plaintiff take down the window coverings. (ECF No. 1 at p. 3, Fisher Decl., Exhibit 2 at 56:14-57:7.) 10. The cell extraction team consisted of Officer Ramos as the shield officer, Officer Marquez as key officer, Officer Duran as baton officer, Officer Singh as handcuffs officer, and Officer Russel as leg restraints officer. (Ramos Decl. at ¶ 5, Duran Decl. at ¶ 6, Singh Decl. at ¶ 3.) 11. Officers entered Plaintiff’s cell for the purpose of conducting a welfare check. (Ramos Decl. at ¶ 5, Duran Decl. at ¶ 6, Singh Decl. at ¶ 3.) 12. Plaintiff defended himself when officers entered his cell after he refused to take down his cell window coverings. (ECF No. 1 at p. 3.) 13. Plaintiff struck the shield Officer Ramos was holding when he entered the cell. (Ramos Decl. at ¶ 6, Duran Decl. at ¶ 7, Singh Decl. at ¶ 4.) 14. Officer Ramos ordered Plaintiff to stop resisting, yielding negative results. (Ramos Decl. at ¶ 7, Duran Decl. at ¶ 8.) 15. Plaintiff knocked the shield out of Officer Ramos’s hands. (Ramos Decl. at ¶ 8, Duran Decl. at ¶ 9, Singh Decl. at ¶ 2.) 16. Plaintiff jumped on his bed and made forward movement toward the exit of his cell. (Ramos Decl. at ¶ 9, Duran Decl. at ¶ 10, Singh Decl. at ¶ 6.) 17. After Plaintiff jumped on his bed, Officer Ramos utilized a forward strike with his fist with an intended target of Plaintiff’s right arm, but due to Plaintiff’s resistance and movement, made contact with Plaintiff’s right forehead area. (Ramos Decl. at ¶ 10.) 18. Plaintiff continued to advance toward the exit of his cell after Officer Ramos’s first strike. (Ramos Decl. at ¶ 10.) 19. Officer Singh then used a closed fist to strike Plaintiff in his right rib area in order to effect custody and restore order. (Singh Decl. at ¶ 6.) 20. In response to Officer Singh’s first strike Plaintiff thrashed his body, refusing to be restrained. (Singh Decl. at ¶ 6.) 21. Next, Officer Ramos wrapped his arm around Plaintiff’s upper torso and used physical strength and body weight to try and pull Plaintiff in a downward motion, in an attempt to bring Plaintiff to the floor. (Ramos Decl. at ¶ 11, Duran Decl. at ¶ 10, Singh Decl. at ¶ 7.) 22. Officer Ramos was unable to bring Plaintiff to the floor. (Ramos Decl. at ¶ 11, Duran Decl. at ¶ 10, Singh Decl. at ¶ 7.) 23. Next, Officer Duran used his Monadnock Expendable Baton to deliver a forward strike to Plaintiff’s abdomen while simultaneously ordering Plaintiff to stop resisting and get down on the bed. (Duran Decl. at ¶ 11.) 24. Plaintiff did not get down on the bed as ordered, so Officer Duran attempted to wrap his arms around Plaintiff’s legs. (Duran Decl. at ¶ ¶ 11, 12.) 25. Plaintiff used his left leg to kick Officer Duran in his face and knock off his safety helmet. (Ramos Decl. at ¶ 11, Duran Decl. at ¶ 12, Singh Decl. at ¶ 7.) 26. Officer Duran was diagnosed with a concussion as a result of this contact by Plaintiff. (Duran Decl. at ¶ 14.) 27. Next, Officer Duran was able to grasp Plaintiff’s upper torso and continued to pull Plaintiff in a downward motion, forcing Plaintiff into a prone position on the bed. (Ramos Decl. at ¶ 2, Duran Decl. at ¶ 12.) 28. Plaintiff continued to resist and thrash his body while Officers Ramos and Singh were trying to secure hand restraints on Plaintiff. (Ramos Decl. at ¶ 12, Duran Decl. at ¶ 12.) 29. Because Plaintiff was resisting being handcuffed and thrashing his body, Officer Duran used his baton to strike Plaintiff in the right shoulder blade. (Duran Decl. at ¶ 13.) 30. The strike was effective, and Officers Ramos and Singh were able to secure Plaintiff’s hands behind his back in handcuffs. (Ramos Decl. at ¶ 2, Duran Decl. at ¶ 13, Singh Decl. at ¶ 8.) 31. Once Plaintiff was in hand and leg restraints he stopped resisting. (Ramos Decl. at ¶ 12, Duran Decl. at ¶ 13, Singh Decl. at ¶ 9.) 32. Once Plaintiff stopped resisting, Officers Ramos, Duran, and Singh stopped all use of force and turned over custody of Plaintiff to other officers on the scene. (Ramos Decl. at ¶ 12, Duran Decl. at ¶ 13, Singh Decl. at ¶ 9.) 33. A medical evaluation and CDCR 7219 was completed for Plaintiff. (Fisher Decl., Exhibit 1.) 34. The form indicated that Plaintiff said, “’hearing voices’ I can disclose that.” (Fisher Decl., Exhibit 1.) 35. The form noted swelling, pain and a 2 cm × 0.4 cm cut at Plaintiff’s right eyebrow and a 1.5 cm × 0.5 cm cut on his left knee. (Fisher Decl., Exhibit 1.) ECF No. 30-8, pgs. 2–6. B. Plaintiff’s Opposition Plaintiff has filed an opposition to the motion. See ECF No. 33. In Plaintiff’s supplemental opposition, Plaintiff admits some facts surrounding the extraction, while disputing others. See ECF No. 33. Those admitted facts are as follows: Facts Admitted

2. On April 19, 2023, Plaintiff was feeling suicidal and had homicidal thoughts. (ECF No. 1 at p.3.) 3. On April 19, 2023, Plaintiff boarded up his cell windows. (ECF No. 1 at p. 3.) 4. Officers Ramos, Duran, and Singh all observed Plaintiff’s window coverings. (Ramos Decl. at ¶ 2, Duran Decl. at ¶ 3, Singh Decl. at ¶ 2.) 5. Plaintiff was ordered to take down his window coverings. (ECF No. 1 at p. 3, Ramos Decl. at ¶ ¶ 2, 3, Duran Decl. at ¶ 4, Singh Decl. at ¶ 2.) 6. Plaintiff refused to take down his window coverings. (ECF No. 1 at p. 3, Fisher Decl., Exhibit 2 at 56:14-57:7.) 9. At no point before officers entered Plaintiff’s cell did Plaintiff take down the window coverings. (ECF No. 1 at p. 3, Fisher Decl., Exhibit 2 at 56:14-57:7.) 10. The cell extraction team consisted of Officer Ramos as the shield officer, Officer Marquez as key officer, Officer Duran as baton officer, Officer Singh as handcuffs officer, and Officer Russel as leg restraints officer. (Ramos Decl. at ¶ 5, Duran Decl. at ¶ 6, Singh Decl. at ¶ 3.) 14. Officer Ramos ordered Plaintiff to stop resisting, yielding negative results. (Ramos Decl. at ¶ 7, Duran Decl. at ¶ 8.) 21. Next, Officer Ramos wrapped his arm around Plaintiff’s upper torso and used physical strength and body weight to try and pull Plaintiff in a downward motion, in an attempt to bring Plaintiff to the floor. (Ramos Decl. at ¶ 11, Duran Decl. at ¶ 10, Singh Decl. at ¶ 7.) 22. Officer Ramos was unable to bring Plaintiff to the floor. (Ramos Decl. at ¶ 11, Duran Decl. at ¶ 10, Singh Decl. at ¶ 7.) 24. Plaintiff did not get down on the bed as ordered, so Officer Duran attempted to wrap his arms around Plaintiff’s legs. (Duran Decl. at ¶ ¶ 11, 12.) 25. Plaintiff used his left leg to kick Officer Duran in his face and knock off his safety helmet. (Ramos Decl. at ¶ 11, Duran Decl. at ¶ 12, Singh Decl. at ¶ 7.) 26. Officer Duran was diagnosed with a concussion as a result of this contact by Plaintiff. (Duran Decl. at ¶ 14.) 31. Once Plaintiff was in hand and leg restraints he stopped resisting. (Ramos Decl. at ¶ 12, Duran Decl. at ¶ 13, Singh Decl. at ¶ 9.) 32. Once Plaintiff stopped resisting, Officers Ramos, Duran, and Singh stopped all use of force and turned over custody of Plaintiff to other officers on the scene. (Ramos Decl. at ¶ 12, Duran Decl. at ¶ 13, Singh Decl. at ¶ 9.) 33. A medical evaluation and CDCR 7219 was completed for Plaintiff. (Fisher Decl., Exhibit 1.) 34. The form indicated that Plaintiff said, “’hearing voices’ I can disclose that.” (Fisher Decl., Exhibit 1.) ECF No. 33, pgs. 8-9. / / / / / / / / / Facts Denied Plaintiff denies the remainder of the facts outlined in Defendant’s separate statement. These denials fall into two categories: (1) Defendants’ purpose for entering the cell, and (2) Plaintiff’s interaction with Defendants during the extraction. See id. Regarding Defendants’ purpose for entering the cell, Plaintiff claims that Defendants entered the cell to engage in violent conduct and not to perform a welfare check on Plaintiff. See id at 8. Plaintiff claims that if Defendants’ purpose was to conduct a welfare check on Plaintiff, they could do so through a food port check, which could be accomplished by holding a transparent shield against the food port and looking inside the food port, and there was no need for Defendants to enter the cell and engage in physical contact with Plaintiff. See id. Regarding Plaintiff’s interaction with Defendants during the extraction, Plaintiff claims that he defended himself after Defendant Duran bashed him in the head with a baton. See id. Plaintiff asserts that after Defendants entered the cell, Defendant Ramos attempted to smash Plaintiff against the wall at the back of the cell, and Plaintiff put out his hands to prevent being crushed. See id. Plaintiff claims that Defendant Ramos subsequently dropped his shield after he realized he could no longer push Plaintiff forward due to Plaintiff’s resistance. See id. at 9. Plaintiff asserts that he then jumped on his bed to make it harder for Defendant Duran to strike him in the face with a baton, and his intention was never to escape prison. See id. Plaintiff denies that Defendant Ramos punched him in the head and claims that the wound in his right forehead area was left by a baton. See id. at 5, 9. Plaintiff denies that Defendant Singh struck him in his right rib area and Plaintiff thrashed his body in response. See id. at 9. Plaintiff denies that Defendant Duran struck him in the abdomen and asserts that Defendant Duran instead struck Plaintiff above his right eye. See id. Plaintiff denies that Defendant Duran forced Plaintiff into a prone position on the bed and that Plaintiff continued to resist. Plaintiff further denies that Defendant Duran had to strike Plaintiff in the right shoulder blade with a baton before Defendants Ramos and Singh could secure Plaintiff’s hands in handcuffs. See id. / / / / / / Defendants argue that summary judgment is appropriate because: (1) the force used by Defendants was not applied maliciously and sadistically; and (2) Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity. See ECF No. 30, pg. 1. For the reasons discussed below, the Court finds Defendant’s arguments unpersuasive, and Defendant’s are not entitled to the requested relief. A. Plaintiff's Excessive Force Claim This case proceeds on Plaintiff's excessive force claim against Defendants brought under the Eighth Amendment. See ECF No. 17. The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which the prisoner is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel and unusual punishment. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). The Eighth Amendment “. . . embodies broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976). Conditions of confinement may, however, be harsh and restrictive. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Nonetheless, prison officials must provide prisoners with “food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.” Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986). A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when two requirements are met: (1) objectively, the official’s act or omission must be so serious such that it results in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities; and (2) subjectively, the prison official must have acted unnecessarily and wantonly for the purpose of inflicting harm. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Thus, to violate the Eighth Amendment, a prison official must have a “sufficiently culpable mind.” See id. When prison officials stand accused of using excessive force, the core judicial inquiry is “. . . whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992); Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986). The “malicious and sadistic” standard, as opposed to the “deliberate indifference” standard applicable to most Eighth Amendment claims, is applied to excessive force claims because prison officials generally do not have time to reflect on their actions in the face of risk of injury to inmates or prison employees. See Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320-21. In determining whether force was excessive, the court considers the following factors: (1) the need for application of force; (2) the extent of injuries; (3) the relationship between the need for force and the amount of force used; (4) the nature of the threat reasonably perceived by prison officers; and (5) efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response. See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. The absence of an emergency situation is probative of whether force was applied maliciously or sadistically. See Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1528 (9th Cir. 1993) (en banc). The lack of injuries is also probative. See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7-9. Finally, because the use of force relates to the prison’s legitimate penological interest in maintaining security and order, the court must be deferential to the conduct of prison officials. See Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321-22. In the pending motion for summary judgment, Defendants argue that the force used was not applied maliciously and sadistically. See ECF No. 30-1, pg. 5. More specifically, Defendants argue that their use of force was warranted because they were attempting to subdue Plaintiff’s attack and restore order. See id. The Court disagrees and finds there is a genuine issue of material fact. Plaintiff and Defendants dispute whether the circumstances warranted an emergency cell extraction, whether Plaintiff actively attacked Defendant Ramos or was acting in self-defense, whether Plaintiff attempted to escape his cell, and the specific cause of the wound in Plaintiff’s right forehead area, all of which are questions important in determining whether Defendants’ use of force on Plaintiff was reasonable under the circumstances. See ECF No. 33 at 8-9. Therefore, there exist triable issues of fact that render summary judgment inappropriate in this case. B. Qualified Immunity Government officials enjoy qualified immunity from civil damages unless their conduct violates “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). In general, qualified immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). In ruling upon the issue of qualified immunity, the initial inquiry is whether, taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, the facts alleged show the defendant’s conduct violated a constitutional right. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). If a violation can be made out, the next step is to ask whether the right was clearly established. See id. This inquiry “must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition . . . .” Id. “[T]he right the official is alleged to have violated must have been ‘clearly established’ in a more particularized, and hence more relevant, sense: The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Id. at 202 (citation omitted). Thus, the final step in the analysis is to determine whether a reasonable officer in similar circumstances would have thought his conduct violated the alleged right. See id. at 205. When identifying the right allegedly violated, the court must define the right more narrowly than the constitutional provision guaranteeing the right, but more broadly than the factual circumstances surrounding the alleged violation. See Kelly v. Borg, 60 F.3d 664, 667 (9th Cir. 1995). For a right to be clearly established, “[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand [that] what [the official] is doing violates the right.” See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). Ordinarily, once the court concludes that a right was clearly established, an officer is not entitled to qualified immunity because a reasonably competent public official is charged with knowing the law governing his conduct. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818-19 (1982). However, even if the plaintiff has alleged a violation of a clearly established right, the government official is entitled to qualified immunity if he could have “. . . reasonably but mistakenly believed that his . . . conduct did not violate the right.” Jackson v. City of Bremerton, 268 F.3d 646, 651 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205. The first factors in the qualified immunity analysis involve purely legal questions. See Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 917 (9th Cir. 1996). The third inquiry involves a legal determination based on a prior factual finding as to the reasonableness of the government official’s conduct. See Neely v. Feinstein, 50 F.3d 1502, 1509 (9th Cir. 1995). The district court has discretion to determine which of the Saucier factors to analyze first. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). In resolving these issues, the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff and resolve all material factual disputes in favor of plaintiff. See Martinez v. Stanford, 323 F.3d 1178, 1184 (9th Cir. 2003). In Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity because: (1) Defendants did not violate Plaintiffs constitutional rights; and (2) Defendants could not have recognized, under the circumstances, that their actions violated clearly established constitutional rights. See ECF No. 30-1, pg. 17. The Court finds that Defendants’ arguments are not persuasive. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, a jury could conclude that Plaintiff was not attempting to fight officers or escape cell, and that as Defendants struck Plaintiff repeatedly on the head with a metal baton, Defendants violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights. Additionally, on the current record, a jury could find that areasonable officer would have been aware that their actions violated Plaintiffs rights. Given the factual determinations which remain to be made, the Court cannot at this point find that Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law. Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that Defendant’s unopposed motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 30, be DENIED. These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within 14 days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections with the court. Responses to objections shall be filed within 14 days after service of objections. Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal. See Martinez v. Yist, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). Dated: July 15, 2025 Co UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 12