(PC) Williams v. Kelso

District Court, E.D. California·Decided August 2, 2021·No. 1:21-cv-00090·Unknown

Opinion

RICHARD WILLIAMS, ) Case No.: 1:21-cv-00090-DAD-SAB (PC) ) Plaintiff, ) ) FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS v. ) RECOMMENDING DISMISSAL OF ACTION FOR FAILURE TO STATE A COGNIZABLE CLARK J. KELSO, et al., ) CLAIM FOR RELIEF ) Defendants. ) (ECF No. 14) ) )

Plaintiff Richard Williams is proceeding pro se in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. I. On January 21, 2021, this action was removed from the Kern County Superior Court by Defendant Kelso. (ECF No. 1.) On January 27, 2021, Defendant Kelso filed a motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 3.) On January 28, 2021, the undersigned issued Findings and Recommendations recommending that Defendant’s motion to dismiss be denied, without prejudice, as premature. (ECF No. 5.) The Findings and Recommendations were adopted in full on March 5, 2021. (ECF No. 7.) On March 8, 2021, the Court screened Plaintiff’s complaint, found that Plaintiff failed to state any cognizable claims, and granted Plaintiff thirty days to file an amended complaint. (ECF No. 8.) Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint on March 22, 2021. (ECF No. 9.) On May 17, 2021, the undersigned issued Findings and Recommendations recommending dismissal of the action, without prejudice, for failure to exhaust the administrative remedies. (ECF No. 10.) On May 28, 2021, Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file a second amended complaint. (ECF No. 11.) The Court granted Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a second amended complaint on June 1, 2021, and Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint on June 28, 2021. (ECF Nos. 12, 14.) II. The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that “fail[] to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or that “seek[] monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Moreover, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of Plaintiff’s rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). Prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to have their pleadings liberally construed and to have any doubt resolved in their favor. Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The “sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully” is not sufficient, and “facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability” falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. On June 9, 2015, Plaintiff had surgery on his keloids, but they unfortunately grew back in 2017, with constant pain. In 2017, the keloids caused pain on the back of Plaintiff’s head, neck, and face. Plaintiff began to have severe pain, distress, and physical discomfort. On January 1, 2017, Plaintiff was seen by Dermatologist Sugarman who recommended keloid removal surgery. Plaintiff was informed of the possibility of reoccurrence of the keloids after removal and Plaintiff agreed that the benefit of surgery outweighed any risks. Dr. Sugarman failed to carry out or perform Plaintiff’s keloid surgery. Dr. Sugarman denied Plaintiff strong pain medication and recommended only Ibuprofen or Tylenol which did not help with the pain. Dr. Sugarman left Plaintiff in severe pain. On June 17, 2017, Plaintiff requested medical attention. However, Plaintiff has been denied pain medications and surgery has been delayed. On September 27, 2017, Plaintiff was seen for plastic surgery consultation and steroid injections were recommended. Dr. Rohrdanz made a decision to not do surgery when he knew and noted that Plaintiff’s keloids were stable and did not appear to be over reactive. Dr. Rohrdanz made a recommendation to leave Plaintiff in pain by not doing surgery when he was not sure if Plaintiff had surgery the risk that his keloids will return larger or bigger. Dr. Rohrdanz was not sure of his recommendations. On January 10, 2018, Plaintiff was examined by Dr. Freeman during which he was in severe pain. Dr. Freeman denied strong pain medication and continued to recommend only Ibuprofen or Tylenol which did not help his pain. Dr. Freeman has only performed the surgery to Plaintiff’s facial area, and not on his neck or back of head. The surgery has been delayed and refused for nine months during leaving Plaintiff in severe pain. On May 9, 2018, Plaintiff requested Gabapentin or Lyrica which is stronger pain medication. However, Dr. Rohrdanz offered Tylenol, Ibuprofen, or Naproxen for pain, which Plaintiff refused because it did not help. Dr. Rohrdanz did not provide Plaintiff with any other medications to help with pain. On September 6, 2018, Plaintiff was seen by Dr. Rohrdanz who informed Plaintiff that the referral was denied. On September 9, 2018, Plaintiff exhausted his administrative grievance appeal at the first level of review which was resolved to his satisfaction. Plaintiff is constantly bleeding heavily from the back of his head and neck area. Plaintiff is also in severe pain in his facial area which occurred during his first keloid surgery. Plaintiff was informed that his upcoming surgery was delayed due to the COVID-19 pandemic which is not true as it is now under control. Plaintiff continues to bleed from the back of his head and neck causing severe pain. IV. A. Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Need A prisoner’s claim of inadequate medical care does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment unless the mistreatment rises to the level of “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). The two-part test for deliberate indifference requires Plaintiff to show (1) “a ‘serious medical need’ by demonstrating that failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,’” and (2) “the defendant’s response to the need was deliberately indifferent.” Jett, 439 F.

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