(PC) Williams v. Department of State Hospitals-Coalinga

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. California
DecidedNovember 20, 2023
Docket2:23-cv-00878
StatusUnknown

This text of (PC) Williams v. Department of State Hospitals-Coalinga ((PC) Williams v. Department of State Hospitals-Coalinga) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
(PC) Williams v. Department of State Hospitals-Coalinga, (E.D. Cal. 2023).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 CHRISTIAN WILLIAMS, No. 2:23-cv-0878 KJN P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER AND FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 14 DEP’T OF STATE HOSPITALS- COALINGA, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff, a civil detainee held by the Department of State Hospitals in Coalinga, brought 18 this action against defendants in the Fresno County Superior Court, small claims division. (ECF 19 No. 1-1 at 2-8.) Plaintiff alleges that defendants unlawfully emailed a patient roster that 20 contained plaintiff’s protected health information, including his date of admission, legal 21 commitment, and unit number. (Id. at 3, 9.) Defendant Gonzalez, the only federal employee 22 sued, removed the state action to this court under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(3), which permits removal 23 of cases involving federal officials. Plaintiff did not object to the removal. As discussed below, 24 it is recommended that defendant Gonzalez be dismissed from this action, and all other claims be 25 remanded to the Superior Court of Fresno County. 26 Screening 27 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), this court is required to screen plaintiff’s complaint, and 28 may dismiss any portion of the complaint if the complaint “seeks monetary relief from a 1 defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(2). The screening obligation 2 applies where a complaint is removed from state court. See, e.g., Morris v. Horel, 2008 WL 3 686874, *1 (N.D. Cal., March 12, 2008) (screening civil rights action removed from state court 4 pursuant to Section 1915A); Walker v. Departmental Review Board, 2017 WL 11517550, *1 5 (E.D. Cal., Oct. 24, 2017). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner 6 has raised claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which 7 relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such 8 relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 9 A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 10 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th 11 Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous when it is based on an 12 indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 13 490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully 14 pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th 15 Cir. 1989), superseded by statute as stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 16 2000) (“[A] judge may dismiss [in forma pauperis] claims which are based on indisputably 17 meritless legal theories or whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.”); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 18 1227. 19 Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “requires only ‘a short and plain 20 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the 21 defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atlantic 22 Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). 23 In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain more than “a 24 formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain factual allegations 25 sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555. 26 However, “[s]pecific facts are not necessary; the statement [of facts] need only ‘give the 27 defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. 28 Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (quoting Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555, citations and internal 1 quotations marks omitted). In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as 2 true the allegations of the complaint in question, Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93, and construe the 3 pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 4 (1974), overruled on other grounds, Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984). 5 Discussion 6 Immunity 7 Plaintiff’s complaint shows that defendant Gonzalez emailed plaintiff’s personal 8 information in the course of her duties as an operational supervisor in the Clerk’s Office of the 9 Fresno Division of this district court. (ECF No. 1-1 at 9.) Defendant Gonzalez’ email confirmed 10 that the personal information was sought to “identify patients who might file a lawsuit,” and “was 11 needed to determine their eligibility for in forma pauperis status.” (Id.) 12 “Court clerks have absolute quasi-judicial immunity from damages for civil rights 13 violations when they perform tasks that are an integral part of the judicial process.” Mullis v. 14 U.S. Bankr. Ct. for Dist. of Nevada, 828 F.2d 1385, 1390 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 15 1040 (1988); Morrison v. Jones, 607 F.2d 1269, 1273 (9th Cir. 1979). Indeed, “a mistake or an 16 act in excess of jurisdiction does not abrogate judicial immunity, even if it results in ‘grave 17 procedural errors.’” Mullis, 828 F.2d at 1390. 18 In this case, defendant Gonzalez’s actions in determining litigants’ ability to proceed in 19 forma pauperis is properly categorized as part of the judicial process. Therefore, defendant 20 Gonzalez is entitled to immunity. As such, the claims against defendant Gonzalez should be 21 dismissed. 22 Remaining State Law Claims 23 Because the only federal defendant should be dismissed, “the balance of the factors to be 24 considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine -- judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and 25 comity -- will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law 26 claims.” Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988); Acri v. Varian Assocs., 27 Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1001 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). 28 //// ] Here, all remaining claims are based solely on state law, the case is in its early stages, and 2 || state court is a convenient forum and was plaintiffs original choice of forum. Thus, all factors 3 || weigh in favor of remanding the remaining claims.

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Related

Conley v. Gibson
355 U.S. 41 (Supreme Court, 1957)
Scheuer v. Rhodes
416 U.S. 232 (Supreme Court, 1974)
Davis v. Scherer
468 U.S. 183 (Supreme Court, 1984)
Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill
484 U.S. 343 (Supreme Court, 1988)
Neitzke v. Williams
490 U.S. 319 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Erickson v. Pardus
551 U.S. 89 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Harry Franklin v. Ms. Murphy and Hoyt Cupp
745 F.2d 1221 (Ninth Circuit, 1984)
George Acri v. Varian Associates, Inc.
114 F.3d 999 (Ninth Circuit, 1997)
Lopez v. Smith
203 F.3d 1122 (Ninth Circuit, 2000)
Morrison v. Jones
607 F.2d 1269 (Ninth Circuit, 1979)

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Bluebook (online)
(PC) Williams v. Department of State Hospitals-Coalinga, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pc-williams-v-department-of-state-hospitals-coalinga-caed-2023.