1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 WILLIAM JAMES WALLACE, II, Case No. 1:20-cv-00905-JLT (PC)
12 Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO DENY PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR 13 v. TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 14 CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND (Doc. 4) 15 REHABILITATION, et al., 14-DAY DEADLINE 16 Defendants. Clerk of the Court to Assign a District Judge 17 18 Before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary 19 injunction. (Doc. 4.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court recommends that Plaintiff’s 20 motion be denied. 21 I. PLAINTIFF’S MOTION 22 a. Factual Allegations1 23 Plaintiff suffers from a nonunion fracture of his left medial malleolus, which causes his 24 toes to curl inward and affects his ability to walk. (Doc. 4 at 2, 11-13.) In December 2018, and 25 again in April 2019, orthopedic surgeons recommended corrective surgery. (Id.) Plaintiff’s 26 condition has deteriorated to the point that he has “not walked [properly] for over 3 years.” (Id. at 27 12-13.) 1 While incarcerated at the Men’s Central Jail in Los Angeles, a podiatrist scheduled 2 Plaintiff for corrective surgery in May 2020. (Id.) In January 2020, prior to undergoing surgery, 3 Plaintiff was transferred to Wasco State Prison, and then to Substance Abuse Treatment Facility 4 and State Prison, Corcoran (SATF). (See id. at 2, 8.) The medical staff at SATF has denied 5 Plaintiff surgery, stating that X-rays show that his fracture appears to have healed. (Id. at 2, 12.) 6 The staff has also denied Plaintiff a “medical mattress,” orthopedic shoes, and wheelchair repairs, 7 as well as medications previously prescribed at Wasco State Prison. (Id. at 9-11.) 8 b. Requested Relief 9 Plaintiff requests a restraining order and an injunction requiring the defendants to provide 10 him corrective surgery, physical therapy, proper medication, and “durable medical equipment,” 11 including a medical mattress, orthopedic shoes, a brace, and wheelchair repairs. (See id. at 15-16.) 12 II. DISCUSSION 13 “A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.”2 Winter 14 v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008) (citation omitted). “A plaintiff seeking a 15 preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to 16 suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his 17 favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Id. at 20. “The equitable remedy is 18 unavailable absent a showing of irreparable injury, a requirement that cannot be met where there 19 is no showing of any real or immediate threat that the plaintiff will be wronged again—a 20 likelihood of substantial and immediate irreparable injury.” City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 21 U.S. 95, 111 (1983) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 22 a. Plaintiff does not show that he is likely to succeed on the merits of his deliberate 23 indifference claim 24 “Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment if they are ‘deliberate[ly] indifferen[t] to 25 [a prisoner’s] serious medical needs.’” Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076, 1081 (9th Cir. 2014) 26 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). “This is true whether the indifference is 27 2 “The standard for a [temporary restraining order] is the same as for a preliminary injunction.” Rovio Entm’t Ltd. v. 1 manifested by prison doctors in their response to the prisoner’s needs or by prison guards in 2 intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05. “A medical 3 need is serious if failure to treat it will result in significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton 4 infliction of pain.” Peralta, 744 F.3d at 1081 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “A 5 prison official is deliberately indifferent to that need if he ‘knows of and disregards an excessive 6 risk to inmate health.’” Id. at 1082 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)). 7 The test for deliberate indifference thus has objective and subjective components. See 8 Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1122 (9th Cir. 2012). To establish a deliberate indifference 9 claim, a prisoner must first “show a serious medical need by demonstrating that failure to treat 10 [the] prisoner’s condition could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton 11 infliction of pain. Second, the plaintiff must show the defendants’ response to the need was 12 deliberately indifferent.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 13 As to the first, objective prong, “[i]ndications that a plaintiff has a serious medical need 14 include ‘[t]he existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and 15 worthy of comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an 16 individual's daily activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain.’” Colwell v. 17 Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060, 1066 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). 18 As to the second, subjective prong, deliberate indifference “describes a state of mind more 19 blameworthy than negligence” and “requires more than ordinary lack of due care for the 20 prisoner’s interests or safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835 (internal quotation marks and citation 21 omitted). Deliberate indifference exists where a prison official “knows that [an] inmate[] face[s] a 22 substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to 23 abate it.” Id. at 847. In medical cases, this requires showing, “(a) a purposeful act or failure to 24 respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and (b) harm caused by the indifference.” 25 Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1122 (citation omitted). “A prisoner need not show his harm was 26 substantial; however, such would provide additional support for the inmate’s claim that the 27 defendant was deliberately indifferent to his needs.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 1 “Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 2 (9th Cir. 2004). “Under this standard, the prison official must not only ‘be aware of facts from 3 which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,’ but [he] ‘must 4 also draw the inference.’” Id. at 1057 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). “If a [prison official] 5 should have been aware of the risk, but was not, then the [official] has not violated the Eighth 6 Amendment, no matter how severe the risk.’” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 7 Plaintiff does not show that he is likely to succeed on the merits of his deliberate 8 indifference claim.3 Though Plaintiff’s allegations show that he suffers from a serious medical 9 condition, i.e., an ankle fracture that affects his ability to walk, his allegations do not show that 10 the defendants have been deliberately indifferent to that condition. Plaintiff alleges that medical 11 staff at SATF conducted an X-ray and determined that his fracture had healed. (Doc. 4 at 2, 12.) 12 This does not show that the staff purposefully failed to respond his medical needs.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 WILLIAM JAMES WALLACE, II, Case No. 1:20-cv-00905-JLT (PC)
12 Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO DENY PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR 13 v. TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 14 CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND (Doc. 4) 15 REHABILITATION, et al., 14-DAY DEADLINE 16 Defendants. Clerk of the Court to Assign a District Judge 17 18 Before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary 19 injunction. (Doc. 4.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court recommends that Plaintiff’s 20 motion be denied. 21 I. PLAINTIFF’S MOTION 22 a. Factual Allegations1 23 Plaintiff suffers from a nonunion fracture of his left medial malleolus, which causes his 24 toes to curl inward and affects his ability to walk. (Doc. 4 at 2, 11-13.) In December 2018, and 25 again in April 2019, orthopedic surgeons recommended corrective surgery. (Id.) Plaintiff’s 26 condition has deteriorated to the point that he has “not walked [properly] for over 3 years.” (Id. at 27 12-13.) 1 While incarcerated at the Men’s Central Jail in Los Angeles, a podiatrist scheduled 2 Plaintiff for corrective surgery in May 2020. (Id.) In January 2020, prior to undergoing surgery, 3 Plaintiff was transferred to Wasco State Prison, and then to Substance Abuse Treatment Facility 4 and State Prison, Corcoran (SATF). (See id. at 2, 8.) The medical staff at SATF has denied 5 Plaintiff surgery, stating that X-rays show that his fracture appears to have healed. (Id. at 2, 12.) 6 The staff has also denied Plaintiff a “medical mattress,” orthopedic shoes, and wheelchair repairs, 7 as well as medications previously prescribed at Wasco State Prison. (Id. at 9-11.) 8 b. Requested Relief 9 Plaintiff requests a restraining order and an injunction requiring the defendants to provide 10 him corrective surgery, physical therapy, proper medication, and “durable medical equipment,” 11 including a medical mattress, orthopedic shoes, a brace, and wheelchair repairs. (See id. at 15-16.) 12 II. DISCUSSION 13 “A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.”2 Winter 14 v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008) (citation omitted). “A plaintiff seeking a 15 preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to 16 suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his 17 favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Id. at 20. “The equitable remedy is 18 unavailable absent a showing of irreparable injury, a requirement that cannot be met where there 19 is no showing of any real or immediate threat that the plaintiff will be wronged again—a 20 likelihood of substantial and immediate irreparable injury.” City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 21 U.S. 95, 111 (1983) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 22 a. Plaintiff does not show that he is likely to succeed on the merits of his deliberate 23 indifference claim 24 “Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment if they are ‘deliberate[ly] indifferen[t] to 25 [a prisoner’s] serious medical needs.’” Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076, 1081 (9th Cir. 2014) 26 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). “This is true whether the indifference is 27 2 “The standard for a [temporary restraining order] is the same as for a preliminary injunction.” Rovio Entm’t Ltd. v. 1 manifested by prison doctors in their response to the prisoner’s needs or by prison guards in 2 intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05. “A medical 3 need is serious if failure to treat it will result in significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton 4 infliction of pain.” Peralta, 744 F.3d at 1081 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “A 5 prison official is deliberately indifferent to that need if he ‘knows of and disregards an excessive 6 risk to inmate health.’” Id. at 1082 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)). 7 The test for deliberate indifference thus has objective and subjective components. See 8 Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1122 (9th Cir. 2012). To establish a deliberate indifference 9 claim, a prisoner must first “show a serious medical need by demonstrating that failure to treat 10 [the] prisoner’s condition could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton 11 infliction of pain. Second, the plaintiff must show the defendants’ response to the need was 12 deliberately indifferent.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 13 As to the first, objective prong, “[i]ndications that a plaintiff has a serious medical need 14 include ‘[t]he existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and 15 worthy of comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an 16 individual's daily activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain.’” Colwell v. 17 Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060, 1066 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). 18 As to the second, subjective prong, deliberate indifference “describes a state of mind more 19 blameworthy than negligence” and “requires more than ordinary lack of due care for the 20 prisoner’s interests or safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835 (internal quotation marks and citation 21 omitted). Deliberate indifference exists where a prison official “knows that [an] inmate[] face[s] a 22 substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to 23 abate it.” Id. at 847. In medical cases, this requires showing, “(a) a purposeful act or failure to 24 respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and (b) harm caused by the indifference.” 25 Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1122 (citation omitted). “A prisoner need not show his harm was 26 substantial; however, such would provide additional support for the inmate’s claim that the 27 defendant was deliberately indifferent to his needs.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 1 “Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 2 (9th Cir. 2004). “Under this standard, the prison official must not only ‘be aware of facts from 3 which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,’ but [he] ‘must 4 also draw the inference.’” Id. at 1057 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). “If a [prison official] 5 should have been aware of the risk, but was not, then the [official] has not violated the Eighth 6 Amendment, no matter how severe the risk.’” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 7 Plaintiff does not show that he is likely to succeed on the merits of his deliberate 8 indifference claim.3 Though Plaintiff’s allegations show that he suffers from a serious medical 9 condition, i.e., an ankle fracture that affects his ability to walk, his allegations do not show that 10 the defendants have been deliberately indifferent to that condition. Plaintiff alleges that medical 11 staff at SATF conducted an X-ray and determined that his fracture had healed. (Doc. 4 at 2, 12.) 12 This does not show that the staff purposefully failed to respond his medical needs. Plaintiff 13 contends that the defendants, like prior doctors, should have conducted a CT scan, and that the 14 defendants are disregarding the findings of prior doctors at Men’s Central Jail and elsewhere. (See 15 id. at 2, 11-12.) He also contends that the staff at SATF should prescribe the same medications as 16 the staff at Wasco State Prison. (See id. at 11.) Plaintiff’s allegations, at most, show a difference 17 in medical opinion, which does not amount to deliberate indifference. Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1058 18 (citation omitted). To establish deliberate indifference, a prisoner must show that a “chosen 19 course of treatment was medically unacceptable under the circumstances, and was chosen in 20 conscious disregard of an excessive risk to [the prisoner’s] health.” Id. (internal quotation marks 21 and citation omitted) (emphasis added). Plaintiff has not made that showing. 22 b. Plaintiff does not show that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence 23 of his requested relief 24 Plaintiff contends that, without the requested relief, “his condition will continue to 25 deteriorate, he may never walk normally again.” (See id. at 4.) Such contention is speculative. 26 3 The Court’s finding relates only to the present motion. The Court has not screened Plaintiff’s complaint (Doc. 1) 27 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Thus, the Court does not express an opinion on whether the factual allegations in the complaint are sufficient to state a cognizable claim that is “plausible on its face,” under the liberal pleading standards 1 Plaintiff states that he has been unable to walk properly for “over 3 years” (id. at 13), and that an 2 orthopedic surgeon recommended surgery back in 2018 (id. at 2). The Court is therefore unsure 3 how the failure to provide surgery and the requested medical equipment now, in July 2020, will 4 result in “substantial and immediate irreparable injury.” Lyons, 461 U.S. at 111 (emphases 5 added). Plaintiff provides no facts (as opposed to conclusory statements) that show that his 6 condition will likely and significantly deteriorate without his requested relief. 7 Plaintiff’s allegations do not rule out the possibility that harm will result from the 8 defendants’ course of treatment. However, a litigant “seeking preliminary relief [must] 9 demonstrate that irreparable injury is likely in the absence of an injunction.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 10 22 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). “Issuing a preliminary injunction based only on a 11 possibility of irreparable harm is inconsistent with our characterization of injunctive relief as an 12 extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled 13 to such relief.” Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added). Plaintiff does not make such a showing. 14 III. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 15 For the reasons set forth above, the Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s motion for a 16 temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction (Doc. 4) be DENIED. The Court 17 DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to assign a district judge to this action. 18 These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the District Judge assigned to 19 this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636(b)(l). Within 14 days of the date of 20 service of these Findings and Recommendations, Plaintiff may file written objections with the 21 Court. The document should be captioned, “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and 22 Recommendations.” Failure to file objections within the specified time may result in waiver of 23 rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. 24 Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). 25 IT IS SO ORDERED. 26
27 Dated: July 5, 2020 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27