(PC) Villery v. Crounse

District Court, E.D. California·Decided October 29, 2021·No. 1:18-cv-01623·Unknown

Opinion

JARED M. VILLERY, Case No. 1:18-cv-01623-NONE-SKO (PC)

Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S v. MOTION TO COMPEL PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS FROM DEFENDANT D. CROUNSE, et al., CROUNSE

Defendants. (Doc. 58) Before the Court is Plaintiff Villery’s motion to compel Defendant Crounse to produce documents responsive to Plaintiff’s first and second sets of requests for production of documents. (Doc. 58.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants in part and denies in part Plaintiff’s motion. This case proceeds on Plaintiff’s claims of retaliation and conspiracy to commit retaliation in violation of the First Amendment, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 56.) At all times relevant to this action, Plaintiff was incarcerated at California Correctional Institution (“CCI”) in Tehachapi, California. (Doc. 49 at 3.) In his first amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges Defendants Crounse and Groves placed him in administrative segregation (“ad seg”), and Defendants Crounse, Garcia, Guerrero, and Haak caused him to remain in ad seg and transferred him to a On September 22, 2019, Plaintiff served his First Set of Requests for Production of Documents (“RFPs”) on Defendant Crounse (“Defendant”). (Doc. 58 at 9.) Defendant responded to the requests on November 13, 2019. (Id.) In July of 2020, Defendant retired from the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”). (Doc. 66 at 2.) On August 25, 2020, Defendant served supplemental responses to Plaintiff’s First Set of RFPs. (Doc. 58 at 11.) On August 13, 2020, Plaintiff served a Second Set of RFPs on Defendant. (See id.) On November 9, 2020, Defendant’s current counsel substituted in to represent Defendant, while the remaining defendants continue to be represented by the California Attorney General. (Doc. 66 at 2.) Defendant responded to the Second Set of RFPs on December 14, 2020. (Doc. 58 at 12.) In his motion to compel, Plaintiff contends that Defendant failed to adequately respond to 25 of his requests for production—six from set one, and 19 from set two. (See Doc. 58 at 21-31.) Plaintiff moves the Court to order Defendant to produce all responsive documents, without objection, and for an adverse inference instruction if this matter proceeds to trial. (Id. at 37.) Plaintiff has narrowed the scope of 14 of the disputed requests. (Doc. 58 at 22-23, 29; Doc. 73 at 9.) “Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Within the scope of Rule 26(b), “[a] party may serve on any other party a request . . . to produce and permit the requesting party . . . to inspect . . . any designated documents or electronically stored information” that are “in the responding party’s possession, custody, or control.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a)(1)(A). “Property is deemed within a party’s ‘possession, custody, or control’ if the party has actual possession, custody, or control thereof or the legal right to obtain the property on demand.” Allen v. Woodford, No. 1:05-cv-01104-OWW-LJO, 2007 WL 309945, at *2 (E.D. Cal. 2007) (citation omitted). In response to a request, the responding party “must either state that inspection [or grounds for objecting to the request, including the reasons.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(B). “An objection must state whether any responsive materials are being withheld on the basis of that objection.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(C). If “a party fails to produce documents . . . as requested under Rule 34,” the “party seeking discovery may move for an order compelling . . . production.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(3)(B)(iv). Generally, the moving party must certify that it has conferred or attempted to confer in good faith with the responding party to resolve the dispute without court action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(1); Local Rule 251(b). However, in prisoner cases involving pro se plaintiffs, the meet-and-confer requirements of Rule 37 and Local Rule 251 do not apply, though they are still encouraged. (See Doc. 23 at 2.) Plaintiff contends that Defendant failed to adequately respond to six of his requests in his First Set of RFPs and all 19 of his requests in his Second Set of RFPs. (See Doc. 58 at 21-31.) In meet-and-conferral letters, the present motion, and his reply, Plaintiff narrows the scope of 14 of these disputed requests. (Doc. 58 at 22-23, 29; Doc. 73 at 8-9.) Below, the Court provides the disputed requests in their original forms, Defendant’s responses, Defendant’s current positions (as provided in his opposition to Plaintiff’s motion), Plaintiff’s narrowed requests (where applicable), and the Court’s analyses and rulings. 1. Plaintiff’s First Set of RFPs a. Request No. 2 Request: Please identify and produce any and all emails that you have sent or received, from January 1, 2009 through June 30, 2015, including, without limitation, incoming, outgoing, forwarded, drafted, and deleted emails, which reference, and/or are in any way related to the following words, terms, and/or subjects: (a) administrative segregation; (b) ASU; (c) “up the hill”; (d) staff complaints; (e) grievances; (f) inmate appeals; (g) retaliation; (h) staff misconduct; (i) criminal activity by staff; (j) serious misconduct by staff; (k) RVR; (l) Rules Violation Reports; (m) Ombudsman; (n) Karin Richter; (o) Response: Defendant objects to this request on the grounds that it is overly broad, excessive proportional to the needs of the case, and unduly burdensome, harassing, and oppressive because it seeks documents far beyond the scope of the relevant time frame at issue for Plaintiffs claims. The allegations in this case took place exclusively between December 2014 and January 2015. Plaintiff’s request does not even seek documents related to himself or his claims. Furthermore, several of the seventeen search terms identified by Plaintiff in Request No. 2 (such as “administrative segregation” and “ASU”) are so general and widely used as to make the search meaningless. Without waiving these objections, and after a reasonable search and diligent inquiry, 3,168 emails matching the search criteria were located in CDCR’s archives. It would be unduly burdensome to review these emails for potentially privileged or confidential information, and the vast majority of these emails are not relevant to Plaintiffs claims. Without some narrowing of the requested search terms, Defendant will produce no documents in response to this request. Defendant’s Current Position: Defendant is retired, and has no possession, custody, or control of CDCR documents. As a retiree, Defendant has no continuing relationship with CDCR, and no constructive control of the CDCR documents requested. . . . [In addition,] Plaintiff’s request easily falls outside the boundaries set by Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1), as the majority of the information would not be relevant to any party’s claim or defense. Plaintiff’s Narrowed Request: Plaintiff seeks an order compelling Crounse to produce emails from his CDCR account, sent or received from June 1, 2012 through June 30, 2015, which are related to the terms “up the hill;” retaliation;

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