MARIO VALENZUELA, No. 2:23-cv-02494-DAD-EFB (PC) Plaintiff, v. ORDER THORNTONA, et al., Defendants. Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding without counsel in an action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In addition to filing a complaint, plaintiff has filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. ECF Nos. 2, 6. Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis Plaintiff’s application makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) and (2). Accordingly, by separate order, the court directs the agency having custody of plaintiff to collect and forward the appropriate monthly payments for the filing fee as set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) and (2). Screening Standards Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint “is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id. § 1915A(b). A pro se plaintiff, like other litigants, must satisfy the pleading requirements of Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 8(a)(2) “requires a complaint to include a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554, 562-563 (2007) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)). While the complaint must comply with the “short and plaint statement” requirements of Rule 8, its allegations must also include the specificity required by Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain more than “naked assertions,” “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-557. In other words, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Furthermore, a claim upon which the court can grant relief must have facial plausibility. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. When considering whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted, the court must accept the allegations as true, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007), and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, see Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). Screening Order Plaintiff alleges the following. Defendant correctional officer Thorntona approached plaintiff’s cell door at approximately 4:10 p.m. on April 30, 2023 during “feeding time.” ECF No. 13 at 5. Plaintiff was experiencing suicidal ideations and yelled multiple times for help. Id. Thorntona ignored plaintiff’s “pleas for assistance” for 20 minutes. Id. Defendant correctional officer Stephens arrived, and plaintiff informed him of his urgent need for medical attention. Id. Stephens apologized, admitting that he should have been monitoring plaintiff but was otherwise engaged. Id. Defendant correctional officer Xiong “was in proximity and could hear plaintiff’s cries for help but also failed to respond appropriately.” Id. Defendants “violated D.O.M. policies by failing to secure plaintiff in restraints, failing to start a holding log, and failing to involve mental health personnel upon being informed of plaintiff’s suicidal ideations.” Id. at 2. Plaintiff seeks to impose supervisory liability on defendants Sergeant Akins, Gavin Newsom, Jeff Lynch, and the County of Sacramento. Id. He alleges that he “suffered physical and emotional injuries” as a result of the incident but does not further elaborate on those injuries. Id. at 6. Plaintiff asserts claims under the Eighth Amendment, the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), the Rehabilitation Act (“RA”), and California law. To succeed on an Eighth Amendment claim predicated on indifference to medical needs, a plaintiff must establish that: (1) he had a serious medical need and (2) the defendant’s response to that need was deliberately indifferent. Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). A serious medical need exists if the failure to treat the condition could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. To act with deliberate indifference, a prison official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). Plaintiff’s allegations fail to state a cognizable claim for deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff does not allege that he was denied care for his suicidal ideations, but only that such care was delayed by 20 minutes. Where a prisoner alleges that delay of medical treatment evinces deliberate indifference, he must also allege that the delay led to further injury. See Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 746 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Plaintiffs could not prove an Eighth Amendment violation because they have not demonstrated that delays occurred to patients with problems so severe that delays would cause significant harm and that Defendants should have known this to be the case.”); Shapley v. Nev. Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (holding that a mere delay of surgery did not give rise to an Eighth Amendment claim unless the delay was harmful). Plaintiff’s complaint lacks facts that would show that he suffered greater harm due to the 20-minute delay than he would have if there had been no delay. In addition, plaintiff’s conclusory allegation that he suffered “physical and emotional injuries” is insufficient to support a deliberate indifference claim, he must state the injuries he suffered as a result of defendants’ conduct. Id. The ADA prohibits public entities, which include state prisons, from discriminating against qualified disabled individuals by excluding them from or denying them the benefits of services, programs, or activities of the public entities. 42 U.S.C. §
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MARIO VALENZUELA, No. 2:23-cv-02494-DAD-EFB (PC) Plaintiff, v. ORDER THORNTONA, et al., Defendants. Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding without counsel in an action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In addition to filing a complaint, plaintiff has filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. ECF Nos. 2, 6. Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis Plaintiff’s application makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) and (2). Accordingly, by separate order, the court directs the agency having custody of plaintiff to collect and forward the appropriate monthly payments for the filing fee as set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) and (2). Screening Standards Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint “is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id. § 1915A(b). A pro se plaintiff, like other litigants, must satisfy the pleading requirements of Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 8(a)(2) “requires a complaint to include a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554, 562-563 (2007) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)). While the complaint must comply with the “short and plaint statement” requirements of Rule 8, its allegations must also include the specificity required by Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain more than “naked assertions,” “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-557. In other words, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Furthermore, a claim upon which the court can grant relief must have facial plausibility. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. When considering whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted, the court must accept the allegations as true, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007), and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, see Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). Screening Order Plaintiff alleges the following. Defendant correctional officer Thorntona approached plaintiff’s cell door at approximately 4:10 p.m. on April 30, 2023 during “feeding time.” ECF No. 13 at 5. Plaintiff was experiencing suicidal ideations and yelled multiple times for help. Id. Thorntona ignored plaintiff’s “pleas for assistance” for 20 minutes. Id. Defendant correctional officer Stephens arrived, and plaintiff informed him of his urgent need for medical attention. Id. Stephens apologized, admitting that he should have been monitoring plaintiff but was otherwise engaged. Id. Defendant correctional officer Xiong “was in proximity and could hear plaintiff’s cries for help but also failed to respond appropriately.” Id. Defendants “violated D.O.M. policies by failing to secure plaintiff in restraints, failing to start a holding log, and failing to involve mental health personnel upon being informed of plaintiff’s suicidal ideations.” Id. at 2. Plaintiff seeks to impose supervisory liability on defendants Sergeant Akins, Gavin Newsom, Jeff Lynch, and the County of Sacramento. Id. He alleges that he “suffered physical and emotional injuries” as a result of the incident but does not further elaborate on those injuries. Id. at 6. Plaintiff asserts claims under the Eighth Amendment, the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), the Rehabilitation Act (“RA”), and California law. To succeed on an Eighth Amendment claim predicated on indifference to medical needs, a plaintiff must establish that: (1) he had a serious medical need and (2) the defendant’s response to that need was deliberately indifferent. Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). A serious medical need exists if the failure to treat the condition could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. To act with deliberate indifference, a prison official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). Plaintiff’s allegations fail to state a cognizable claim for deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff does not allege that he was denied care for his suicidal ideations, but only that such care was delayed by 20 minutes. Where a prisoner alleges that delay of medical treatment evinces deliberate indifference, he must also allege that the delay led to further injury. See Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 746 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Plaintiffs could not prove an Eighth Amendment violation because they have not demonstrated that delays occurred to patients with problems so severe that delays would cause significant harm and that Defendants should have known this to be the case.”); Shapley v. Nev. Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (holding that a mere delay of surgery did not give rise to an Eighth Amendment claim unless the delay was harmful). Plaintiff’s complaint lacks facts that would show that he suffered greater harm due to the 20-minute delay than he would have if there had been no delay. In addition, plaintiff’s conclusory allegation that he suffered “physical and emotional injuries” is insufficient to support a deliberate indifference claim, he must state the injuries he suffered as a result of defendants’ conduct. Id. The ADA prohibits public entities, which include state prisons, from discriminating against qualified disabled individuals by excluding them from or denying them the benefits of services, programs, or activities of the public entities. 42 U.S.C. § 12132; Duffy v. Riveland, 98 F.3d 447, 455-56 (9th Cir. 1996). To allege a violation of the ADA, a plaintiff must state facts showing that (1) he is disabled; (2) he is otherwise qualified to participate; (3) the defendant prevented his participation in or denied him the benefits of a service, program, or activity or otherwise subjected him to discrimination; (4) the defendant’s decision was based on plaintiff’s disability. Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2002). Section 504 of the RA provides: “No otherwise qualified individual with a disability . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance[.]” 29 U.S.C. § 794. To state a § 504 claim, a plaintiff must allege facts showing that (1) he is an individual with a disability; (2) he is otherwise qualified to receive the benefit; (3) he was denied the benefits of the program solely by reason of his disability; and (4) the program receives federal financial assistance. Updike v. Multnomah Cty., 870 F.3d 939, 949 (9th Cir. 2017). Courts analyze ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims together because the statutes provide identical remedies, procedures and rights, and the cases interpreting either are interchangeable. Vos v. City of Newport Beach, 892 F.3d 1024, 1036 (9th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted); Douglas v. Cal. Dep't of Youth Auth., 285 F.3d 1226, 1229 n.3 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). Both the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act apply in the context of correctional facilities and prohibit disabled inmates from being excluded from participation in inmate services, programs, or activities, including medical programs, for which they are otherwise qualified. Pierce v. County of Orange, 526 F.3d 1190, 1215 (9th Cir. 2008). A plaintiff can allege disability discrimination in the provision of inmate services, programs, or activities under the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act by pleading either (1) discrimination based on disparate treatment or impact, or (2) denial of reasonable modifications or accommodations. Dunlap v. Ass'n of Bay Area Gov'ts, 996 F. Supp. 962, 965 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (“[T]he ADA not only protects against disparate treatment, it also creates an affirmative duty in some circumstances to provide special, preferred treatment, or ‘reasonable accommodation.’”). Plaintiff asserts that defendants failed to accommodate him in violation of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. To plead such a claim, a plaintiff must allege that a public entity knew of plaintiff's disability but failed to provide reasonable accommodations that would allow the plaintiff to access services, programs, etc. that the plaintiff was otherwise qualified to access. See Robertson v. Las Animas Cnty. Sherriff's Dep't, 500 F.3d 1185, 1196 (9th Cir. 2007). “[K]ey elements of an ADA or RA claim cannot be reconciled with medical treatment decisions for the underlying disability.” O’Guinn v. Nev. Dep’t of Corr., 468 Fed. Appx. 651, 653 (9th Cir. 2012).1 Thus, a plaintiff’s claim that he was discriminatorily denied mental health treatment because of his mental health disability does not lie under the ADA or RA, because the plaintiff needed the treatment only because he was disabled and was not, therefore, “otherwise qualified” to receive the treatment. Id. See also Atayde v. Napa State Hosp., 255 F. Supp. 3d 978, 1001-02 (E.D. Cal. 2017) (collecting cases). In some circumstances, a denial of medical care that is “so extreme as to suggest discriminatory refusal to accommodate a disability-related need, such as when a disabled detainee is denied a broad range of medical services beyond those necessary for treating his underlying disability” may state a cognizable ADA and RA claim. 1 “A court may not prohibit or restrict the citation of federal judicial opinions … designated as ‘unpublished’ … and issued on or after January 1, 2007.” Fed. R. App. Proc. 32.1. Atayde, 255 F. Supp. 3d at 1001-03. Plaintiff’s allegations do not meet these standards. Because he alleges only that defendants’ conduct delayed his access to medical care that he needed for his disability, the allegations fail to state a cognizable claim under the ADA or RA. Plaintiff’s claims against defendants Lynch, Akins, and Newsom fail because there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983, and plaintiff’s complaint lacks allegations showing the personal involvement of any of these defendants in the incident or some wrongful conduct on the part of these defendants that bears a sufficient causal connection to the incident. Felarca v. Birgeneau, 891 F.3d 809, 819–20 (9th Cir. 2018) (“An official may be liable as a supervisor only if either (1) he or she was personally involved in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal connection exists between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.”). Plaintiff has also failed to state facts sufficient to impose liability on the County of Sacramento. “[T]o establish municipal liability, a plaintiff must show that a ‘policy or custom’ led to the plaintiff’s injury.” Castro v. County of L.A., 833 F.3d 1060, 1073 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (quoting Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)); see also Endy v. County of L.A., 975 F.3d 757, 769 (9th Cir. 2020); Garmon v. County of Los Angeles, 828 F.3d 837, 845 (9th Cir. 2016) (“[P]laintiffs who seek to impose liability on local governments under § 1983 must prove that action pursuant to official municipal policy caused their injury.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). The complaint lacks allegations that any defendant acted pursuant to a county policy. This court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state-law claims provided that they “are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Until plaintiff states a cognizable federal claim, the court is without jurisdiction to address his state law claims. //// //// Accordingly, the complaint must be dismissed for failure to state a cognizable claim. Leave to Amend Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed with leave to amend. If plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint it should observe the following: Any amended complaint must identify as a defendant only persons who personally participated in a substantial way in depriving him of a federal constitutional right. Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978) (a person subjects another to the deprivation of a constitutional right if he does an act, participates in another’s act or omits to perform an act he is legally required to do that causes the alleged deprivation). The complaint should also describe, in sufficient detail, how each defendant personally violated or participated in the violation of his rights. The court will not infer the existence of allegations that have not been explicitly set forth in the amended complaint. The amended complaint must contain a caption including the names of all defendants. Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a). Plaintiff may not change the nature of this suit by alleging new, unrelated claims. See George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007). Any amended complaint must be written or typed so that it so that it is complete in itself without reference to any earlier filed complaint. E.D. Cal. L.R. 220. This is because an amended complaint supersedes any earlier filed complaint, and once an amended complaint is filed, the earlier filed complaint no longer serves any function in the case. See Forsyth v. Humana, 114 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997) (the “‘amended complaint supersedes the original, the latter being treated thereafter as non-existent.’”) (quoting Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967)). Finally, the court notes that any amended complaint should be as concise as possible in fulfilling the above requirements. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Plaintiff should avoid the inclusion of procedural or factual background which has no bearing on his legal claims. //// //// Conclusion Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that: 1. Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 4) is GRANTED; 2. Plaintiff shall pay the statutory filing fee of $350. All payments shall be collected in accordance with the notice to the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation filed concurrently herewith; 3. Plaintiff's amended complaint (ECF No. 13) is DISMISSED with leave to amend within 30 days of service of this order; and 4. Failure to comply with this order may result in dismissal of this action for the reasons stated herein. 1] Dated: February 20, 2025 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE