1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ERIC VALENCIA, No. 1:24-cv-01441-SAB (PC) 12 Plaintiff, ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO RANDOMLY ASSIGN A DISTRICT 13 v. JUDGE TO THIS ACTION 14 MARTINEZ, et al., FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RECOMMENDING DISMISSAL OF 15 ACTION Defendants. 16 (ECF No. 8) 17 18 Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights complaint pursuant 19 to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 20 Plaintiff’s complaint in this action was filed on November 25, 2024. (ECF No. 1.) 21 On February 19, 2025, the Court screened the complaint, found that Plaintiff failed to state 22 a cognizable claim for relief, and granted Plaintiff thirty days to file an amended complaint. 23 (ECF No. 7.) 24 Plaintiff failed to file an amended complaint or otherwise respond to the December 9, 25 2024 order. Therefore, on March 31, 2025, the Court issued an order for Plaintiff to show cause 26 why the action should not be dismissed. (ECF No. 8.) Plaintiff has failed to respond to the order 27 to show cause and the time to do so has now passed. Accordingly, dismissal of the action is 28 warranted. 1 I. 2 SCREENING REQUIREMENT 3 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 4 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 5 Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 6 “frivolous or malicious,” that “fail[] to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or that 7 “seek[] monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 8 1915(e)(2)(B); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). 9 A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 10 pleader is entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 11 required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 12 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 13 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Moreover, Plaintiff must demonstrate 14 that each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of Plaintiff’s rights. Jones v. 15 Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). 16 Prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to have their pleadings 17 liberally construed and to have any doubt resolved in their favor. Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 18 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be 19 facially plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer 20 that each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss 21 v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The “sheer possibility that a defendant 22 has acted unlawfully” is not sufficient, and “facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s 23 liability” falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d 24 at 969. 25 II. 26 COMPLAINT ALLEGATIONS 27 The Court accepts Plaintiff’s allegations in the complaint as true only for the purpose of the 28 screening requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. 1 On November 19, 2024, at approximately 12:00 a.m. to 1:00 a.m., Defendant officer 2 Martinez can be seen on facility surveillance in module “M,” leaving the officer podium after 3 conspiring with Defendant officer Navarro and entering dorm “4,” while Navarro remained 4 stationary. 5 Martinez approached Plaintiff very closely, then walking to storage containers containing 6 inmate Cuellar’s legal property, then telling Plaintiff “you know what is funny? I can throw all 7 these papers away and you can’t grieve me!” Martinez returned to the officers podium and 8 conversed with Navarro. 9 Approximately twenty minutes later and during a routine lockdown, Martinez threatened 10 to attack Plaintiff by pounding his fists together while standing directly in front of Plaintiff, 11 calling him out of his dorm to the laundry room to fight. Martinez waited until the lockdown to 12 begin in minimize witnesses. Plaintiff suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder from Madera 13 police officers attacking hi which resulted in a civil rights complaint in Valencia v. Martinez, et 14 al., No. 1:24-cv-01146-KES-CDB (PC). 15 Plaintiff declined the fight and immediately became in fear for his life. Plaintiff submitted 16 an emergency grievance to the neighbor module officer Bennings. Bennings forwarded the 17 information to the watch commander (Doe 1). Doe 1 failed to take reasonable actions to protect 18 Plaintiff. 19 Martinez returned to the module searching for Plaintiff from the podium. Plaintiff 20 abandoned his legal work and retreated to his cell and eventually fell asleep. Plaintiff had 21 nightmares for the remainder of the night in fear of being beaten by Martinez. Navarro 22 intentionally failed to prevent and encouraged Martinez to act indifferent to Plaintiff. Does 2 23 through 5 also failed to protect Plaintiff. 24 III. 25 DISCUSSION 26 A. Linkage Requirement 27 Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act requires that there be an actual connection or link 28 between the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by 1 Plaintiff. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 2 (1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects another to the deprivation of a 3 constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates 4 in another’s affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that 5 causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th 6 Cir. 1978); see also Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (“A plaintiff must 7 allege facts, not simply conclusions, that show that an individual was personally involved in the 8 deprivation of his civil rights.”). 9 B. Threat to Safety 10 “[P]retrial detainees ... possess greater constitutional rights than prisoners.” Stone v. City 11 of San Francisco, 968 F.2d 850, 857 n.10 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Gary H. v. Hegstrom, 831 F.2d 12 1430, 1432 (9th Cir. 1987). “If a plaintiff “had not been convicted of a crime, but had only been 13 arrested, [then] his rights derive from the due process clause rather than the Eighth Amendment’s 14 protection against cruel and unusual punishment.” Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 15 1187 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ERIC VALENCIA, No. 1:24-cv-01441-SAB (PC) 12 Plaintiff, ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO RANDOMLY ASSIGN A DISTRICT 13 v. JUDGE TO THIS ACTION 14 MARTINEZ, et al., FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RECOMMENDING DISMISSAL OF 15 ACTION Defendants. 16 (ECF No. 8) 17 18 Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights complaint pursuant 19 to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 20 Plaintiff’s complaint in this action was filed on November 25, 2024. (ECF No. 1.) 21 On February 19, 2025, the Court screened the complaint, found that Plaintiff failed to state 22 a cognizable claim for relief, and granted Plaintiff thirty days to file an amended complaint. 23 (ECF No. 7.) 24 Plaintiff failed to file an amended complaint or otherwise respond to the December 9, 25 2024 order. Therefore, on March 31, 2025, the Court issued an order for Plaintiff to show cause 26 why the action should not be dismissed. (ECF No. 8.) Plaintiff has failed to respond to the order 27 to show cause and the time to do so has now passed. Accordingly, dismissal of the action is 28 warranted. 1 I. 2 SCREENING REQUIREMENT 3 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 4 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 5 Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 6 “frivolous or malicious,” that “fail[] to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or that 7 “seek[] monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 8 1915(e)(2)(B); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). 9 A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 10 pleader is entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 11 required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 12 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 13 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Moreover, Plaintiff must demonstrate 14 that each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of Plaintiff’s rights. Jones v. 15 Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). 16 Prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to have their pleadings 17 liberally construed and to have any doubt resolved in their favor. Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 18 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be 19 facially plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer 20 that each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss 21 v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The “sheer possibility that a defendant 22 has acted unlawfully” is not sufficient, and “facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s 23 liability” falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d 24 at 969. 25 II. 26 COMPLAINT ALLEGATIONS 27 The Court accepts Plaintiff’s allegations in the complaint as true only for the purpose of the 28 screening requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. 1 On November 19, 2024, at approximately 12:00 a.m. to 1:00 a.m., Defendant officer 2 Martinez can be seen on facility surveillance in module “M,” leaving the officer podium after 3 conspiring with Defendant officer Navarro and entering dorm “4,” while Navarro remained 4 stationary. 5 Martinez approached Plaintiff very closely, then walking to storage containers containing 6 inmate Cuellar’s legal property, then telling Plaintiff “you know what is funny? I can throw all 7 these papers away and you can’t grieve me!” Martinez returned to the officers podium and 8 conversed with Navarro. 9 Approximately twenty minutes later and during a routine lockdown, Martinez threatened 10 to attack Plaintiff by pounding his fists together while standing directly in front of Plaintiff, 11 calling him out of his dorm to the laundry room to fight. Martinez waited until the lockdown to 12 begin in minimize witnesses. Plaintiff suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder from Madera 13 police officers attacking hi which resulted in a civil rights complaint in Valencia v. Martinez, et 14 al., No. 1:24-cv-01146-KES-CDB (PC). 15 Plaintiff declined the fight and immediately became in fear for his life. Plaintiff submitted 16 an emergency grievance to the neighbor module officer Bennings. Bennings forwarded the 17 information to the watch commander (Doe 1). Doe 1 failed to take reasonable actions to protect 18 Plaintiff. 19 Martinez returned to the module searching for Plaintiff from the podium. Plaintiff 20 abandoned his legal work and retreated to his cell and eventually fell asleep. Plaintiff had 21 nightmares for the remainder of the night in fear of being beaten by Martinez. Navarro 22 intentionally failed to prevent and encouraged Martinez to act indifferent to Plaintiff. Does 2 23 through 5 also failed to protect Plaintiff. 24 III. 25 DISCUSSION 26 A. Linkage Requirement 27 Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act requires that there be an actual connection or link 28 between the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by 1 Plaintiff. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 2 (1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects another to the deprivation of a 3 constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates 4 in another’s affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that 5 causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th 6 Cir. 1978); see also Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (“A plaintiff must 7 allege facts, not simply conclusions, that show that an individual was personally involved in the 8 deprivation of his civil rights.”). 9 B. Threat to Safety 10 “[P]retrial detainees ... possess greater constitutional rights than prisoners.” Stone v. City 11 of San Francisco, 968 F.2d 850, 857 n.10 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Gary H. v. Hegstrom, 831 F.2d 12 1430, 1432 (9th Cir. 1987). “If a plaintiff “had not been convicted of a crime, but had only been 13 arrested, [then] his rights derive from the due process clause rather than the Eighth Amendment’s 14 protection against cruel and unusual punishment.” Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 15 1187 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 537 n.16 (1979) (noting that “the 16 Due Process Clause rather than the Eighth Amendment” is relied upon in considering claims of 17 pretrial detainees because “Eighth Amendment scrutiny is appropriate only after the State has 18 complied with the constitutional guarantees traditionally associated with criminal prosecutions”). 19 To state a claim of unconstitutional conditions of confinement against an individual 20 defendant, a pretrial detainee must allege facts that show: (i) the defendant made an intentional 21 decision with respect to the conditions under which the plaintiff was confined; (ii) those 22 conditions put the plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering serious harm; (iii) the defendant did not 23 take reasonable available measures to abate that risk, even though a reasonable official in the 24 circumstances would have appreciated the high degree of risk involved – making the 25 consequences of the defendant’s conduct obvious; and (iv) by not taking such measures, the 26 defendant caused the plaintiff’s injuries. Gordon v. County of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1125 (9th 27 Cir. 2018). 28 /// 1 Verbal harassment or abuse, including the use of racial epithets, do not state a cognizable 2 civil rights claim are dismissed. Oltarzewski v. Ruggiero, 830 F.2d 136, 139 (9th Cir. 1987); see 3 also Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 738 (9th Cir. 1997) (allegations of verbal harassment and 4 abuse fail to state a claim cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.); Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 5 1092 (9th Cir. 1996) (harassment does not constitute an Eighth Amendment violation); Purcell v. 6 Coughlin, 790 F.2d 263, 265 (2d Cir. 1986) (allegations that prison guards called him names was 7 not sufficient to allege a constitutional violation); McDowell v. Jones, 990 F.2d 433, 434 (8th Cir. 8 1993) (verbal threats and name calling are not actionable under § 1983). Moreover, a mere threat 9 to do an unconstitutional act does not create a constitutional wrong. Gaut v. Sunn, 810 F.2d 923, 10 925 (9th Cir. 1987). Finally, a prisoner may not bring a civil action for emotional or mental 11 injury that he suffered while in custody without showing a physical injury. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e); 12 Oliver v. Keller, 289 F.3d 623, 630 (9th Cir. 2002). 13 Here, while Plaintiff claims he Defendant officer Martinez “challenged” him to a physical 14 fight, his allegations amount to nothing more than verbal threats and/or harassment, which does 15 not give rise to a constitutional violation. Further, even if Defendant’s comments were 16 inappropriate, they do not rise to the level of being “unusually gross even for a prison setting and 17 calculated to” cause Plaintiff psychological damage. Cox v. Kernan, No. 2:19-cv-1637 DB P, 18 2019 WL 6840136, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2019) (alterations in original) (quoting Keenan, 83 19 F.3d at 1092). Moreover, Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant’s verbal statements/threats gave him 20 mental problems does not save the claim from dismissal, as “an institutional employee's verbal 21 harassment or idle threats to an inmate, even if they cause an inmate fear, anxiety, or discomfort, 22 do not constitute an invasion of any identified liberty interest.” McClellan v. Bassett, 2006 WL 23 2079371, at *1 (D. Va. 2006). Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim for relief 24 and further leave would be futile because he has failed to provide factual allegations to give rise 25 to a claim for relief even after granting leave to amend. See Klamath-Lake Pharm. Ass’n v. 26 Klamath Med. Serv. Bureau, 701 F.2d 1276, 1293 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that while leave to 27 amend shall be freely given, the court does not have to allow futile amendments). Accordingly, 28 Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim for relief. 1 C. Conspiracy 2 Plaintiff makes repeated reference to the claim that Defendants conspired with one 3 another. 4 To state a claim for conspiracy under section 1983, Plaintiff must show the existence of an 5 agreement or a meeting of the minds to violate his constitutional rights, and an actual deprivation 6 of those constitutional rights. Avalos v. Baca, 596 F.3d 583, 592 (9th Cir. 2010); Franklin v. Fox, 7 312 F.3d 423, 441 (9th Cir. 2001). “Conspiracy” is not a stand-alone claim. A conspiracy “does 8 not enlarge the nature of the claims asserted by the plaintiff, as there must always be an 9 underlying constitutional violation. Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 935 (9th Cir. 2012) 10 (citations omitted). 11 Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim for conspiracy. Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that 12 any individual Defendant conspired, how such Defendant conspired, and how the conspiracy led 13 to a deprivation of his constitutional rights. See Harris v. Roderick, 126 F.3d 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 14 1997). Plaintiff’s allegations of conspiracy are simply conclusory and merely speculative as he 15 simply alleges that officers “personally conspired to coordinate and/or aided, encouraged and 16 supported a conspiracy to create a risk of dange[r] against Plaintiff….” (Compl. at 33.) There are 17 no specific facts showing that any of the Defendants had an agreement to violate his 18 constitutional rights. There is also no indication of any agreement between any of the Defendants. 19 Therefore, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for conspiracy. 20 IV. 21 FAILURE TO OBEY COURT ORDER AND FAILURE TO PROSECUTE 22 Here, the Court screened Plaintiff’s complaint, and on February 19, 2025, an order issued 23 providing Plaintiff with the legal standards that applied to his claims, advising him of the 24 deficiencies that needed to be corrected, and granting him leave to file an amended complaint within 25 thirty days. (ECF No. 7.) Plaintiff did not file an amended complaint or otherwise respond to the 26 Court’s February 19, 2025 order. Therefore, on March 31, 2025, the Court ordered Plaintiff to 27 show cause within fourteen (14) days why the action should not be dismissed. (ECF No. 8.) 28 Plaintiff failed to respond to the March 31, 2025 order and the time to do so has passed. 1 Local Rule 110 provides that “[f]ailure of counsel or of a party to comply with these Rules 2 or with any order of the Court may be grounds for imposition by the Court of any and all sanctions 3 . . . within the inherent power of the Court.” The Court has the inherent power to control its docket 4 and may, in the exercise of that power, impose sanctions where appropriate, including dismissal of 5 the action. Bautista v. Los Angeles County, 216 F.3d 837, 841 (9th Cir. 2000). 6 A court may dismiss an action based on a party’s failure to prosecute an action, failure to 7 obey a court order, or failure to comply with local rules. See, e.g. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 8 53-54 (9th Cir. 1995) (dismissal for noncompliance with local rule); Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 9 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992) (dismissal for failure to comply with an order to file an amended 10 complaint); Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440-41 (9th Cir. 1988) (dismissal for failure to comply 11 with local rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to keep court apprised of address); Malone v. United States 12 Postal Serv., 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with court order); 13 Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986) (dismissal for lack of prosecution and 14 failure to comply with local rules). 15 “In determining whether to dismiss an action for lack of prosecution, the district court is 16 required to consider several factors: ‘(1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; 17 (2) the court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public 18 policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic 19 sanctions.’ ” Carey, 856 F.2d at 1440 (quoting Henderson, 779 F.2d at 1423). These factors guide 20 a court in deciding what to do, and are not conditions that must be met in order for a court to take 21 action. In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Products Liability Litigation, 460 F.3d 1217, 1226 (9th 22 Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). 23 In this instance, the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of the litigation and the 24 Court’s need to manage its docket weigh in favor of dismissal. In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) 25 Products Liability Litigation, 460 F.3d at 1226. Plaintiff was ordered to file an amended complaint 26 within thirty days of February 19, 2025 and has not done so. Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the 27 order of the Court by filing an amended complaint hinders the Court’s ability to move this action 28 towards disposition. This action can proceed no further without Plaintiff’s compliance with the 1 order and his failure to comply indicates that Plaintiff does not intend to diligently litigate this 2 action. 3 Since it appears that Plaintiff does not intend to litigate this action diligently there arises a 4 rebuttable presumption of prejudice to the defendants in this action. In re Eisen, 31 F.3d 1447, 5 1452-53 (9th Cir. 1994). The risk of prejudice to the defendants also weighs in favor of dismissal. 6 The public policy in favor of deciding cases on their merits is greatly outweighed by the 7 factors in favor of dismissal. It is Plaintiff’s responsibility to move this action forward. In order 8 for this action to proceed, Plaintiff is required to file an amended complaint curing the deficiencies 9 in the operative pleading. Despite being ordered to do so, Plaintiff did not file an amended 10 complaint or respond to the order to show cause and this action cannot simply remain idle on the 11 Court’s docket, unprosecuted. In this instance, the fourth factor does not outweigh Plaintiff’s 12 failure to comply with the Court’s orders. 13 Finally, a court’s warning to a party that their failure to obey the court’s order will result 14 in dismissal satisfies the “consideration of alternatives” requirement. Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1262; 15 Malone, 833 F.2d at 132-33; Henderson, 779 F.2d at 1424. The Court’s February 19, 2025, order 16 requiring Plaintiff to file an amended complaint expressly stated: “If Plaintiff fails to file an 17 amended complaint in compliance with this order, the Court will recommend to a district ju6dge 18 that this action be dismissed consistent with the reasons stated in this order.” (ECF No. 7.) In 19 addition, the Court’s March 31, 2025, order to show cause specifically stated: “Plaintiff’s failure to 20 comply with this order will result in a recommendation to dismiss the action for the reasons stated 21 above.” (ECF No. 8.) Thus, Plaintiff had adequate warning that dismissal would result from his 22 noncompliance with the Court’s orders. 23 V. 24 ORDER AND RECOMMENDATIONS 25 The Court has screened Plaintiff’s complaint and directed Plaintiff to file an amended 26 complaint within thirty days. Plaintiff has failed to comply with the Court’s order to file an 27 amended and has not responded to the Court’s order to show why the action should not be 28 dismissed. In considering the factors to determine if this action should be dismissed, the Court 1 | finds that this action should be dismissed for Plaintiff's failure to obey the February 19, 2025 and 2 | March 31, 2025 orders, failure to prosecute this action, and failure to state a cognizable claim for 3 || relief. 4 Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall randomly assign a 5 | District Judge to this action. 6 Further, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that this action be dismissed for □□□□□□□□□□□ 7 | failure to comply with a court orders, failure to prosecute, and failure to state a cognizable claim 8 | for relief. 9 These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District 10 | Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within fourteen 11 | (14) days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, Plaintiff may file written 12 | objections with the Court, limited to 15 pages in length, including exhibits. The document should 13 | be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is 14 | advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of rights 15 | on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838-39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. 16 | Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). 17 18 IT IS SO ORDERED. DAM Le 19 | Dated: _April 29, 2025 __ OO STANLEY A. BOONE 20 United States Magistrate Judge 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28