(PC) Tri v. Gutierrez

Opinion

LY TRI, Case No.: 1:22-cv-00836-KES-SKO (PC) Plaintiff, ORDER ADOPTING FINDINGS AND v. RECOMMENDATIONS TO GRANT DEFENDANT MCNUTT’S MOTION TO C. GUTIERREZ, et al., DISMISS

Defendants. Docs. 16, 32

Plaintiff Ly Tri is proceeding pro se in this civil rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This matter was referred to a United States magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302. Plaintiff commenced this action on July 8, 2022. Doc. 1. After the assigned magistrate judge screened the complaint and ordered service of process, the action proceeded on plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claim against defendant D. Gutierrez and Fourteenth Amendment due process claim against defendant McNutt (“McNutt”). Docs. 9, 10. On July 26, 2023, McNutt filed a motion to dismiss. Doc. 16. The motion to dismiss is fully briefed. Doc. 27 (“Opp’n”); Doc. 29 (“Reply”). On April 25, 2024, the assigned magistrate judge issued findings and recommendations recommending that McNutt’s motion to dismiss be granted. Doc. 32. Specifically, the magistrate judge recommended plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment due process claim against McNutt be dismissed and that McNutt be dismissed from the action. Id. at 6–14. Following an extension of time, plaintiff filed objections on June 20, 2024. Doc. 35. McNutt filed a response to the objections on June 24, 2024. Doc. 36. In his objections, plaintiff contends the magistrate judge erred in taking judicial notice of redacted prison records because, in the supporting declaration, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation’s (“CDCR”) custodian of records purported to authenticate only unredacted versions of those records. See Doc. 35 at 3; Doc. 16-1 at 5. Plaintiff contends the magistrate judge’s judicial notice of the documents was improper because they contain redactions. Doc. 35 at 3–4. Plaintiff also disputes the magistrate judge’s substantive findings. First, plaintiff disagrees that the subsequent disciplinary hearing rendered moot any due process violation that occurred in the initial disciplinary hearing. Id. Second, he objects to the dismissal of his claim that McNutt submitted false evidence against him in his initial hearing. Id. at 4. Last, plaintiff objects to the finding that there was sufficient evidence to support his guilt in the second disciplinary hearing and contends that the hearing officer applied the wrong legal standard. Id. at 5. In response, McNutt notes that plaintiff’s arguments were previously addressed by the parties in the underlying briefing on the motion to dismiss and were correctly considered by the magistrate judge in the findings and recommendations. See generally Doc. 36. In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the Court conducted a de novo review of this case. Having carefully reviewed the matter, including plaintiff’s objections and McNutt’s response, the Court concludes the findings and recommendations are supported by the record and proper analysis. Plaintiff’s objections do not undermine the magistrate judge’s conclusions. McNutt’s motion to dismiss asserts that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff’s due process claim against him. Doc. 16-2 at 5. “[W]here the moving party makes a factual challenge to the court’s subject matter jurisdiction by offering affidavits or other evidence in support of the motion, the opposing or non-moving party must present similar evidence ‘necessary to satisfy the City of Chico, 880 F.2d 199, 201 (9th Cir. 1989). Plaintiff has not identified disputed factual issues that preclude the Court’s determination of its subject matter jurisdiction. While plaintiff argues that the magistrate judge should not have taken judicial notice of the CDCR records because they were (minimally) redacted, plaintiff provided many of those same records in unredacted form in his own complaint. See generally Doc. 1. Moreover, the custodian authenticated the records in unredacted form and a court may take judicial notice of such official CDCR records. See Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 931 n.7 (9th Cir. 2004). Therefore, plaintiff’s first objection lacks merit. The magistrate judge also correctly determined that the alleged due process violation in plaintiff’s first disciplinary hearing was cured through the administrative appeals process, which resulted in a second disciplinary hearing at which plaintiff’s requested witness was allowed to testify. See Frank v. Schultz, 808 F.3d 762, 763 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding procedural errors may be corrected through the prison appeals process). Plaintiff also contends McNutt falsified documents in connection with the first disciplinary hearing and attributed a statement to him that plaintiff denies having made. Doc. 1 at 4. As the magistrate judge correctly determined, however, a false allegation against a prisoner does not independently support a section 1983 claim where any procedural deficiency in the first hearing was cured through the administrative appeal process. Last, plaintiff challenges the merits of his guilty conviction in the second disciplinary hearing, contending he could not have had constructive possession of the contraband cellphone, but this argument does not establish a procedural due process claim. The federal Constitution does not require evidence that logically precludes any conclusion but the one reached by the disciplinary board. Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 456–57 (1985). All that is necessary is that “some evidence” support the hearing officer’s conclusion. Id. Here, among other evidence, the hearing officer relied on the reporting officer’s observation that the contraband was located “on the chair of the inmate desk” in plaintiff’s shared cell, and “[t]he location of the cell phone made it easily accessible by both inmates housed in the cell.” Doc. 1 at 11. “Even just one piece sufficient indicia of reliability.” Bruce v. YsIt, 351 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 2003); Cato v. Rushen, 824 F.2d 703, 705 (9th Cir. 1987) (stating the “relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board) (emphasis in original). The evidence relied upon by the hearing officer is sufficient to meet the Hill standard. See, e.g., Dickerson v. Foulk, Case No. 2:14-cv-0731 WBS CKD P, 2014 WL 6612094, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2014) (finding inmates’ shared access to a place where contraband was stored sufficient to establish constructive possession and culpability); Lucas v. Janda, Case No. 15cv1923 AJB (BLM), 2016 WL 4196654 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2016) (same). Therefore, the findings and recommendations appropriately found that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff’s due process claim against defendant McNutt. Accordingly: 1. The Findings and Recommendations issued on April 25, 2024 (Doc. 32) are ADOPTED in full; 2. Defendant McNutt’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 16) is GRANTED. 3. Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment due process claim against Defendant McNutt is DISMISSED; 4. Defendant McNutt is DISMISSED from this action; and 5. This matter is referred back to the assigned magistrate judge for further proceedings. 91 TIS SO ORDERED. _ Dated: _ June 6, 2025 4h UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE