(PC) Tran v. Smith

District Court, E.D. California·Decided February 28, 2022·No. 1:19-cv-00148·Unknown

Opinion

BINH CUONG TRAN, ) Case No.: 1:19-cv-00148-DAD-SAB (PC) ) Plaintiff, ) ) FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION v. ) REGARDING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT S. SMITH, et al., ) ) (ECF No. 85) ) Defendants. ) )

Plaintiff Binh Cuoung Tran is proceeding pro se in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Currently before the Court is Defendants’ motion for summary judgment for failure to exhaust the administrative remedies, filed September 30, 2021. (ECF No. 85.) I. This action is proceeding against Defendants J. Garcia and A. Brown, Jericoff and Munsel for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need in violation of the Eighth Amendment. On July 22, 2021, Defendants filed an answer to the first amended complaint. (ECF No. 79.) On July 23, 2021, the Court issued an amended scheduling order. (ECF No. 80.) On September 30, 2021, Defendants filed the instant motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 85.) On October 15, 2021, Plaintiff filed an opposition, and Defendants filed a reply on October 22, 2021. (ECF Nos. 86, 87.) II. A. Statutory Exhaustion Requirement Section 1997e(a) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”) provides that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Exhaustion is mandatory unless unavailable. Exhaustion is required regardless of the relief sought by the prisoner and regardless of the relief offered by the process, Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001), and the exhaustion requirement applies to all prisoner suits relating to prison life, Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). Section 1997e(a) also requires “proper exhaustion of administrative remedies, which ‘means using all steps that the agency holds out, and doing so properly (so that the agency addresses the issues on the merits).’” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90 (2006) (citation omitted). “Proper exhaustion demands compliance with an agency’s deadlines and other critical procedural rules because no adjudicative system can function effective without imposing some orderly structure on the course of its proceedings.” Id. at 90-91. “[I]t is the prison’s requirements, and not the PLRA, that define the boundaries of proper exhaustion.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007). “The obligation to exhaust ‘available’ remedies persists as long as some remedy remains ‘available.’ Once that is no longer the case, then there are no ‘remedies … available,’ and the prisoner need not further pursue the grievance.” Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 935 (9th Cir. 2005) (emphasis in original) (citing Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 739 (2001)). The failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense, and the defendant or defendants bear the burden of raising and proving the absence of exhaustion. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. at 216; Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 2014). “In the rare event that a failure to exhaust is clear on the face of the complaint, a defendant may move for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).” Albino, 747 F.3d at 1166. Otherwise, the defendant or defendants must produce evidence proving the failure to exhaust, and they are entitled to summary judgment under Rule 56 only if the undisputed evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, shows the plaintiff failed to exhaust. Id. The PLRA recognizes no exception to the exhaustion requirement, and the court may not recognize a new exception, even in “special circumstances.” Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 1862 (2016). The one significant qualifier is that “the remedies must indeed be ‘available’ to the prisoner.” Id. at 1856. The Supreme Court has explained when an administrative procedure is unavailable: [A]n administrative procedure is unavailable when (despite what regulations or guidance materials may promise) it operates as a simple dead end—with officers unable or consistently unwilling to provide any relief to aggrieved inmates.... Next, an administrative scheme might be so opaque that it becomes, practically speaking, incapable of use.... And finally, the same is true when prison administrators thwart inmates from taking advantage of a grievance process through machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation.... [S]uch interference with an inmate's pursuit of relief renders the administrative process unavailable. And then, once again, § 1997e(a) poses no bar.

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Related

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