(PC) Tran v. Smith

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. California
DecidedFebruary 28, 2022
Docket1:19-cv-00148
StatusUnknown

This text of (PC) Tran v. Smith ((PC) Tran v. Smith) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
(PC) Tran v. Smith, (E.D. Cal. 2022).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10

11 BINH CUONG TRAN, ) Case No.: 1:19-cv-00148-DAD-SAB (PC) ) 12 Plaintiff, ) ) FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION 13 v. ) REGARDING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 14 S. SMITH, et al., ) ) (ECF No. 85) 15 ) Defendants. ) 16 )

17 Plaintiff Binh Cuoung Tran is proceeding pro se in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 18 U.S.C. § 1983. 19 Currently before the Court is Defendants’ motion for summary judgment for failure to exhaust 20 the administrative remedies, filed September 30, 2021. (ECF No. 85.) 21 I. 22 PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 23 This action is proceeding against Defendants J. Garcia and A. Brown, Jericoff and Munsel for 24 deliberate indifference to a serious medical need in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 25 On July 22, 2021, Defendants filed an answer to the first amended complaint. (ECF No. 79.) 26 On July 23, 2021, the Court issued an amended scheduling order. (ECF No. 80.) 27 On September 30, 2021, Defendants filed the instant motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 28 85.) 1 On October 15, 2021, Plaintiff filed an opposition, and Defendants filed a reply on October 22, 2 2021. (ECF Nos. 86, 87.) 3 II. 4 LEGAL STANDARD 5 A. Statutory Exhaustion Requirement 6 Section 1997e(a) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”) provides that “[n]o 7 action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other 8 Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such 9 administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Exhaustion is 10 mandatory unless unavailable. Exhaustion is required regardless of the relief sought by the prisoner 11 and regardless of the relief offered by the process, Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001), and 12 the exhaustion requirement applies to all prisoner suits relating to prison life, Porter v. Nussle, 534 13 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). 14 Section 1997e(a) also requires “proper exhaustion of administrative remedies, which ‘means 15 using all steps that the agency holds out, and doing so properly (so that the agency addresses the issues 16 on the merits).’” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90 (2006) (citation omitted). “Proper exhaustion 17 demands compliance with an agency’s deadlines and other critical procedural rules because no 18 adjudicative system can function effective without imposing some orderly structure on the course of 19 its proceedings.” Id. at 90-91. “[I]t is the prison’s requirements, and not the PLRA, that define the 20 boundaries of proper exhaustion.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007). “The obligation to 21 exhaust ‘available’ remedies persists as long as some remedy remains ‘available.’ Once that is no 22 longer the case, then there are no ‘remedies … available,’ and the prisoner need not further pursue the 23 grievance.” Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 935 (9th Cir. 2005) (emphasis in original) (citing Booth 24 v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 739 (2001)). 25 The failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense, and the defendant or defendants bear the 26 burden of raising and proving the absence of exhaustion. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. at 216; Albino v. 27 Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 2014). “In the rare event that a failure to exhaust is clear on the 28 face of the complaint, a defendant may move for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).” Albino, 747 F.3d at 1 1166. Otherwise, the defendant or defendants must produce evidence proving the failure to exhaust, 2 and they are entitled to summary judgment under Rule 56 only if the undisputed evidence, viewed in 3 the light most favorable to the plaintiff, shows the plaintiff failed to exhaust. Id. 4 The PLRA recognizes no exception to the exhaustion requirement, and the court may not 5 recognize a new exception, even in “special circumstances.” Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 1862 6 (2016). The one significant qualifier is that “the remedies must indeed be ‘available’ to the prisoner.” 7 Id. at 1856. The Supreme Court has explained when an administrative procedure is unavailable: 8 [A]n administrative procedure is unavailable when (despite what regulations or guidance materials may promise) it operates as a simple dead end—with officers unable or consistently 9 unwilling to provide any relief to aggrieved inmates.... Next, an administrative scheme might be so opaque that it becomes, practically speaking, incapable of use.... And finally, the same is 10 true when prison administrators thwart inmates from taking advantage of a grievance process 11 through machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation.... [S]uch interference with an inmate's pursuit of relief renders the administrative process unavailable. And then, once again, § 12 1997e(a) poses no bar.

13 Id. at 1859-60 (citations omitted 14 B. Summary Judgment Standard 15 Any party may move for summary judgment, and the Court shall grant summary judgment if 16 the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 17 judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (quotation marks omitted); Albino, 747 F.3d at 18 c1166; Wash. Mut. Inc. v. United States, 636 F.3d 1207, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). Each party’s position, 19 whether it be that a fact is disputed or undisputed, must be supported by (1) citing to particular parts of 20 materials in the record, including but not limited to depositions, documents, declarations, or discovery; 21 or (2) showing that the materials cited do not establish the presence or absence of a genuine dispute or 22 that the opposing party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 56(c)(1) (quotation marks omitted). The Court may consider other materials in the record not cited to 24 by the parties, although it is not required to do so. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3); Carmen v. S.F. Unified 25 Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2001); accord Simmons v. Navajo Cnty., Ariz., 609 F.3d 26 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2010). “The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the 27 nonmoving party.” Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1191 (9th Cir. 2014). 28 1 Initially, “the defendant’s burden is to prove that there was an available administrative remedy, 2 and that the prisoner did not exhaust that available remedy.” Albino, 747 F.3d at 1172. If the 3 defendant meets that burden, the burden of production then shifts to the plaintiff to “come forward 4 with evidence showing that there is something in his particular case that made the existing and 5 generally available administrative remedies effectively unavailable to him.” Id. However, the 6 ultimate burden of proof on the issue of administrative exhaustion remains with the defendant. Id.

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Related

Booth v. Churner
532 U.S. 731 (Supreme Court, 2001)
Woodford v. Ngo
548 U.S. 81 (Supreme Court, 2006)
Jones v. Bock
549 U.S. 199 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Diaz-Garcia v. Holder
609 F.3d 21 (First Circuit, 2010)
Calderon-Serra v. Banco Santander Puerto Rico
747 F.3d 1 (First Circuit, 2014)
Juan Albino v. Lee Baca
747 F.3d 1162 (Ninth Circuit, 2014)
J. Wilkerson v. B. Wheeler
772 F.3d 834 (Ninth Circuit, 2014)
Lonnie Williams, Jr. v. Daniel Paramo
775 F.3d 1182 (Ninth Circuit, 2015)
Brown v. Valoff
422 F.3d 926 (Ninth Circuit, 2005)
David Reyes v. Christopher Smith
810 F.3d 654 (Ninth Circuit, 2016)
Ross v. Blake
578 U.S. 632 (Supreme Court, 2016)

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(PC) Tran v. Smith, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pc-tran-v-smith-caed-2022.