1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 TYRONE THOMPSON, Case No. 2:19-cv-01651-JDP (PC) 12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL 13 v. ECF No. 24 14 BICK, et al., ORDER DENYING AS MOOT 15 Defendants. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR AN EXTENSION OF TIME 16 ECF No. 31 17 18 19 Plaintiff Thompson is a state prisoner proceeding without counsel in this action brought 20 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in which he alleges that defendants violated his Eighth Amendment 21 rights by failing to treat adequately his chronic pain issues. He has filed a motion to compel 22 defendants to produce several documents. ECF No. 24. Defendants have filed an opposition. 23 ECF No. 25. For the reasons stated below, I will grant plaintiff’s motion to compel. 24 Legal Standards 25 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26 through 37 are designed to facilitate the process of 26 discovery without judicial intervention. To obtain documents or electronically stored 27 information, or to conduct an inspection of physical evidence, Rule 34 requires a party to serve a 28 request on the opposing party that describes “with reasonable particularity the item or category of 1 items to be inspected.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(1)(A). 2 If a party follows these procedures and is not provided with the requested discovery, 3 Rule 37 allows that party to file a motion to compel, but only after “confer[ing] or attempt[ing] to 4 confer with the person or party . . . in an effort to obtain it without court action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 5 37(a)(1). “[T]he party moving to compel bears the burden of demonstrating why [defendants’] 6 objections are not justified.” Anderson v. Hansen, No. 1:09-CV-01924-LJO-MJS (PC), 2013 WL 7 428737, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2013). Although pro se litigants in civil rights cases are not held 8 to the same standard as parties with counsel, see Blaisdell v. Frappiea, 729 F.3d 1237, 1241 (9th 9 Cir. 2013), a plaintiff must at a minimum “inform[] the court of which discovery requests are the 10 subject of his motion to compel,” Waterbury v. Scribner, No. 1:05-CV-0764-OWW-DLB (PC), 11 2008 WL 2018432 at *1 (E.D. Cal. May 8, 2008); see also Eastern District Local Rule 251(d) 12 (“Each specific interrogatory, deposition question or other item objected to . . . shall be 13 reproduced in full.”). 14 Discussion 15 As an initial matter, defendants argue that plaintiff’s motion should be denied because he 16 did not satisfy Rule 37’s requirement to meet and confer with defense counsel before filing a 17 motion to compel. See ECF No. 25 at 2. The court is vested with broad discretion to manage 18 discovery in the interests of justice, subject to the overriding limitation of good faith. See Hunt v. 19 Cnty. of Orange, 672 F.3d 606, 616 (9th Cir. 2012). Here, there is no indication of bad faith on 20 the part of plaintiff, and I am mindful that defendants had failed to serve responses to plaintiff’s 21 requests before the discovery deadline. See ECF No. 23. In such circumstances, the court may 22 relieve pro se prisoner litigants of the requirement to meet and confer prior to involving the court 23 in a discovery dispute. See, e.g., Anderson, 2013 WL 428737, at *1 (relieving pro se “state 24 prisoner challenging his conditions of confinement . . . [of] the need to meet and confer in good 25 faith prior to involving the Court in a discovery dispute”). Accordingly, I will proceed to the 26 merits. 27 A. Requests for Production Numbers 3, 4, 5, 9, 10, and 12 28 Requests 3, 4, 5, and 12 seek “[a]ny and all rules and regulations, and policies of the 1 California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation [(“CDCR”)] concerning[:] (3) the 2 treatment of prisoners with diabetes”; (4) the denial of plaintiff’s pain medication and treatment 3 by Petras; (5) Bick’s authorization of Petras’ decisions with respect to plaintiff’s pain medication 4 and treatment; and (12) drug testing of prisoners. ECF No. 24 at 13-14, 17. Request 9 seeks “any 5 and all documents relating to plaintiff being denied pain medication or medical treatment.” ECF 6 No. 24 at 16. Request 10 seeks “any and all information, documents, reports, rules, regulations, 7 and policies by Dr. Bick or the pain committee to allow Dr. Petras to deny plaintiff medical 8 treatment and pain medication.” Id. at 16. 9 Defendants object to these requests primarily on the grounds that “rules, regulations, and 10 policies have no bearing on a claim of deliberate indifference.” See id. at 13-17; ECF No. 25-1 at 11 3-4. They claim that plaintiff has access to the documents in his medical record and that only 12 those documents are relevant to a claim of deliberate indifference. Id. Plaintiff argues that 13 policies, rules, and regulations can help show that defendants “knew that plaintiff face[d] a 14 substantial risk of serious harm.” ECF No. 24 at 8. 15 Plaintiff is correct that policies, rules, regulations, and other facility- or department-wide 16 materials can help prove or defend a claim of deliberate indifference. The Federal Rules of Civil 17 Procedure permit discovery into “any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the claim or 18 defense of any party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b). Moreover, as defendants acknowledge, plaintiff’s 19 claims center on “a policy change instituted by CDCR regarding the prescription of opium-based 20 pain medications.” ECF No. 25 at 2. The knowing administration of harmful policies can form 21 the basis of a deliberate indifference claim. See Colwell v. Bannister, 743 F.3d 1060, 1063 (9th 22 Cir. 2014) (“[T]he blanket, categorical denial of medically indicated surgery solely on the basis of 23 an administrative policy . . . is the paradigm of deliberate indifference.”). Accordingly, this 24 request seeks documents that are within the proper scope of discovery. 25 Nevertheless, defendants argue that they are not custodial officers of CDCR and therefore 26 do not “have possession, custody, or control to (sic) the type of rules, regulations, and policies 27 sought here.” ECF No. 25 at 5. While defendants might lack legal custody of the documents 28 requested, I am not persuaded that they lack possession or control, “defined as the legal right to 1 obtain documents upon demand.” United States v. International Union of Petroleum and Indus. 2 Workers, AFL-CIO, 870 F.2d 1450, 1451 (9th Cir. 1989). It is this court’s experience that 3 individual defendants employed by CDCR can obtain documents—including rules, regulations, 4 and policies—by requesting them from CDCR. See Mitchell v. Adams, No. CIV S-06-2321 GEB 5 GGH (P), 2009 WL 674348, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2009); Nible v. Knowles, No. 1:06-CV- 6 01716-DLB PC, 2011 WL 2160907, at *5 (E.D. Cal. June 1, 2011); Dickey v. Churray, No. CIV 7 S-03-2215 MCE PA, 2006 WL 1153796, at *2 (E.D. Cal. May 2, 2006). During the relevant 8 period, defendant Petras was employed as a physician at California Medical Facility (“CMF”) and 9 defendant Bick was the Chief Medical Executive at CMF; neither Petras nor Bick claim that they 10 are no longer employed by CDCR. ECF No.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 TYRONE THOMPSON, Case No. 2:19-cv-01651-JDP (PC) 12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL 13 v. ECF No. 24 14 BICK, et al., ORDER DENYING AS MOOT 15 Defendants. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR AN EXTENSION OF TIME 16 ECF No. 31 17 18 19 Plaintiff Thompson is a state prisoner proceeding without counsel in this action brought 20 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in which he alleges that defendants violated his Eighth Amendment 21 rights by failing to treat adequately his chronic pain issues. He has filed a motion to compel 22 defendants to produce several documents. ECF No. 24. Defendants have filed an opposition. 23 ECF No. 25. For the reasons stated below, I will grant plaintiff’s motion to compel. 24 Legal Standards 25 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26 through 37 are designed to facilitate the process of 26 discovery without judicial intervention. To obtain documents or electronically stored 27 information, or to conduct an inspection of physical evidence, Rule 34 requires a party to serve a 28 request on the opposing party that describes “with reasonable particularity the item or category of 1 items to be inspected.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(1)(A). 2 If a party follows these procedures and is not provided with the requested discovery, 3 Rule 37 allows that party to file a motion to compel, but only after “confer[ing] or attempt[ing] to 4 confer with the person or party . . . in an effort to obtain it without court action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 5 37(a)(1). “[T]he party moving to compel bears the burden of demonstrating why [defendants’] 6 objections are not justified.” Anderson v. Hansen, No. 1:09-CV-01924-LJO-MJS (PC), 2013 WL 7 428737, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2013). Although pro se litigants in civil rights cases are not held 8 to the same standard as parties with counsel, see Blaisdell v. Frappiea, 729 F.3d 1237, 1241 (9th 9 Cir. 2013), a plaintiff must at a minimum “inform[] the court of which discovery requests are the 10 subject of his motion to compel,” Waterbury v. Scribner, No. 1:05-CV-0764-OWW-DLB (PC), 11 2008 WL 2018432 at *1 (E.D. Cal. May 8, 2008); see also Eastern District Local Rule 251(d) 12 (“Each specific interrogatory, deposition question or other item objected to . . . shall be 13 reproduced in full.”). 14 Discussion 15 As an initial matter, defendants argue that plaintiff’s motion should be denied because he 16 did not satisfy Rule 37’s requirement to meet and confer with defense counsel before filing a 17 motion to compel. See ECF No. 25 at 2. The court is vested with broad discretion to manage 18 discovery in the interests of justice, subject to the overriding limitation of good faith. See Hunt v. 19 Cnty. of Orange, 672 F.3d 606, 616 (9th Cir. 2012). Here, there is no indication of bad faith on 20 the part of plaintiff, and I am mindful that defendants had failed to serve responses to plaintiff’s 21 requests before the discovery deadline. See ECF No. 23. In such circumstances, the court may 22 relieve pro se prisoner litigants of the requirement to meet and confer prior to involving the court 23 in a discovery dispute. See, e.g., Anderson, 2013 WL 428737, at *1 (relieving pro se “state 24 prisoner challenging his conditions of confinement . . . [of] the need to meet and confer in good 25 faith prior to involving the Court in a discovery dispute”). Accordingly, I will proceed to the 26 merits. 27 A. Requests for Production Numbers 3, 4, 5, 9, 10, and 12 28 Requests 3, 4, 5, and 12 seek “[a]ny and all rules and regulations, and policies of the 1 California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation [(“CDCR”)] concerning[:] (3) the 2 treatment of prisoners with diabetes”; (4) the denial of plaintiff’s pain medication and treatment 3 by Petras; (5) Bick’s authorization of Petras’ decisions with respect to plaintiff’s pain medication 4 and treatment; and (12) drug testing of prisoners. ECF No. 24 at 13-14, 17. Request 9 seeks “any 5 and all documents relating to plaintiff being denied pain medication or medical treatment.” ECF 6 No. 24 at 16. Request 10 seeks “any and all information, documents, reports, rules, regulations, 7 and policies by Dr. Bick or the pain committee to allow Dr. Petras to deny plaintiff medical 8 treatment and pain medication.” Id. at 16. 9 Defendants object to these requests primarily on the grounds that “rules, regulations, and 10 policies have no bearing on a claim of deliberate indifference.” See id. at 13-17; ECF No. 25-1 at 11 3-4. They claim that plaintiff has access to the documents in his medical record and that only 12 those documents are relevant to a claim of deliberate indifference. Id. Plaintiff argues that 13 policies, rules, and regulations can help show that defendants “knew that plaintiff face[d] a 14 substantial risk of serious harm.” ECF No. 24 at 8. 15 Plaintiff is correct that policies, rules, regulations, and other facility- or department-wide 16 materials can help prove or defend a claim of deliberate indifference. The Federal Rules of Civil 17 Procedure permit discovery into “any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the claim or 18 defense of any party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b). Moreover, as defendants acknowledge, plaintiff’s 19 claims center on “a policy change instituted by CDCR regarding the prescription of opium-based 20 pain medications.” ECF No. 25 at 2. The knowing administration of harmful policies can form 21 the basis of a deliberate indifference claim. See Colwell v. Bannister, 743 F.3d 1060, 1063 (9th 22 Cir. 2014) (“[T]he blanket, categorical denial of medically indicated surgery solely on the basis of 23 an administrative policy . . . is the paradigm of deliberate indifference.”). Accordingly, this 24 request seeks documents that are within the proper scope of discovery. 25 Nevertheless, defendants argue that they are not custodial officers of CDCR and therefore 26 do not “have possession, custody, or control to (sic) the type of rules, regulations, and policies 27 sought here.” ECF No. 25 at 5. While defendants might lack legal custody of the documents 28 requested, I am not persuaded that they lack possession or control, “defined as the legal right to 1 obtain documents upon demand.” United States v. International Union of Petroleum and Indus. 2 Workers, AFL-CIO, 870 F.2d 1450, 1451 (9th Cir. 1989). It is this court’s experience that 3 individual defendants employed by CDCR can obtain documents—including rules, regulations, 4 and policies—by requesting them from CDCR. See Mitchell v. Adams, No. CIV S-06-2321 GEB 5 GGH (P), 2009 WL 674348, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2009); Nible v. Knowles, No. 1:06-CV- 6 01716-DLB PC, 2011 WL 2160907, at *5 (E.D. Cal. June 1, 2011); Dickey v. Churray, No. CIV 7 S-03-2215 MCE PA, 2006 WL 1153796, at *2 (E.D. Cal. May 2, 2006). During the relevant 8 period, defendant Petras was employed as a physician at California Medical Facility (“CMF”) and 9 defendant Bick was the Chief Medical Executive at CMF; neither Petras nor Bick claim that they 10 are no longer employed by CDCR. ECF No. 26.1 11 Accordingly, I will grant plaintiff’s motion to compel documents responsive to requests 3, 12 4, 5, 9, 10, and 12.2 13 B. Request for Production #8 14 Request 8 seeks “any and all documents relating to Dr. Petras’ prison medical training.” 15 ECF No. 24 at 15. 16 Defendant Petras argues that training materials are not relevant because “deliberate 17 indifference is not mere medical negligence, but encompasses a state of mind unconnected to 18 medical training.” ECF No. 25-1 at 6-7. Plaintiff contends that the material will help establish 19 1 Additionally, while I express no opinion on the merits of defendants’ pending motion for 20 summary judgment, I have reviewed the filings and find their contents helpful for the disposition of plaintiff’s motion to compel. In moving for summary judgment, defendants argue both that 21 their actions were taken pursuant to policies and guidelines and that those policies and guidelines are consistent with the recommendations of medical research and oversight bodies. ECF No. 26 22 at 9-10. This argument appears to contradict defendants’ representations in the present motion 23 that “documents, reports, rules, regulations, and policies” are outside the scope of discovery, and that defendants lack possession or control of such documents. 24 2 Defendants have not objected that plaintiff’s requests are vague. Nevertheless, I am mindful of the potential vagueness in the operative terms used by plaintiff: “information, 25 documents, reports, rules, regulations, and policies.” ECF No. 24 at 16. In keeping with the overriding mandate of good faith, defendants are advised to exercise due diligence to provide all 26 documents that they identify as responsive to plaintiff’s request and, if necessary, to meet and 27 confer with plaintiff as to whether their responses are sufficient. To the extent that a responsive document is already available to plaintiff in his medical record, defendants need not reproduce 28 such documents. 1 that defendant’s conduct manifested deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. ECF 2 No. 24 at 6. “[D]ue to the professional expertise of medical defendants,” records of their 3 education and training are “generally assumed to be relevant” in medical deliberate indifference 4 cases. Kilgore v. Mandeville, No. 2:07-CV-2485-GEB-KJN (P), 2010 WL 2557702, at *7 (E.D. 5 Cal. June 21, 2010) (citations omitted); see also Heilman v. Cook, No. 14-CV-1412-JLS-MDD, 6 2016 WL 6680099, at *1-2 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2016). Defendants have not provided contrary 7 authority, and I see no basis for distinguishing this general principle. 8 Petras argues that, even if training records are relevant, “the request is a violation of [his] 9 privacy rights” because “disclosure of [his] medical training and education is a security threat and 10 could expose [him], his family, his colleagues, and those who provided his education to threats of 11 violence and harassment.” Id. This argument is also unavailing. “[C]ourts have generally found 12 that a plaintiff’s need for the records outweighs individual privacy interests when employment, 13 training, and internal investigation records are sought in a civil rights case.” Jacobo v. Los 14 Angeles Cty., No. CV 11-07212 GW (SSX), 2012 WL 13009164, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2012). 15 The redaction of personal information has been found an adequate remedy for such concerns, e.g. 16 Heilman, 2016 WL 6680099, at *1-2, and defendants have not identified countervailing authority. 17 Accordingly, I will grant plaintiff’s motion to compel documents responsive to request 9 and 18 order defendant Petras to provide records of his prison medical training with redactions, as 19 necessary, for sensitive personal information. 20 I will order defendants to provide their responses to plaintiff’s requests within fourteen 21 days from the date of this order. Given that the documents may be relevant to defendants’ 22 pending motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 26, I will grant plaintiff thirty-five days from 23 the date of this order to review the documents and, if appropriate, to file a supplemental 24 opposition.3 Defendants will have forty-five days from the date of this order to file a reply to 25 26
27 3 Plaintiff is advised that if he would like the court to consider additional documents in adjudicating defendants’ motion for summary judgment, he must submit a copy of those 28 documents with his supplemental opposition. 1 | plaintiffs opposition and potential supplemental opposition.* 2 Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that: 3 1. Plaintiff's motion to compel, ECF No. 24, is granted as follows: 4 a. within fourteen days of the date of this order, defendants shall produce all 5 | documents responsive to the requests in plaintiff's motion to compel; 6 b. defendants will redact any confidential personal information from documents 7 | provided in response to plaintiff's request for production number eight. 8 2. Plaintiff is granted thirty-five days from the date of this order to review the discovery 9 | and, if appropriate, to file a supplemental opposition. 10 3. Defendants are granted forty-five days from the date of this order to file a reply to 11 | plaintiff's opposition and supplementary opposition, if any. 12 4. Defendants’ motion for an extension of time to file their reply, ECF No. 31, is denied. 13 4 IT IS SO ORDERED. 15 ( 1 Ow — Dated: _ March 8, 2022 16 JEREMY D. PETERSON 7 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 * Because I will modify the scheduling order to permit the parties additional time to complete briefing on their pending motion for summary judgment, I will deny defendants’ 28 | outstanding motion for an extension of time to file a reply as moot. ECF No. 31.