(PC) Taylor v. Teragawa

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 KIRELL TAYLOR, No. 2:21-cv-01330-TLN-KJN 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 S. TERAGAWA, 15 Defendant. 16 17 This matter is before the Court on Defendant S. Teragawa’s (“Defendant”) Motion for 18 Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 38.) Plaintiff Kirell Taylor (“Plaintiff”), a state prisoner 19 proceeding pro se, filed an opposition. (ECF No. 40.) Defendant filed a reply. (ECF No. 41.) 20 The matter was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 21 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302. On July 05, 2023, the magistrate judge filed findings and 22 recommendations herein which were served on all parties, and which contained notice to all 23 parties that any objections to the findings and recommendations were to be filed within fourteen 24 days. Neither party filed objections to the findings and recommendations. The Court presumes 25 that any findings of fact are correct. See Orand v. United States, 602 F.2d 207, 208 (9th Cir. 26 1979). The magistrate judge’s conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. See Britt v. Simi Valley 27 Unified School Dist., 708 F.2d 452, 454 (9th Cir. 1983). Having carefully reviewed the record, 28 the Court declines to adopt the findings and recommendations. (ECF No. 44.) 1 For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part 2 Defendant’s motion. 3 I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1 4 This case arises from Plaintiff’s attempted suicide on February 16, 2018. At the time, 5 Plaintiff was an inmate in the custody of California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation 6 (“CDCR”), and Defendant was a correctional officer assigned to California State Prison – 7 Sacramento (“CSP-SAC”) where Plaintiff was housed in a mental health crisis bed (“MHCB”) for 8 mental health care treatment.2 (ECF Nos 38-1 at 1–2; 38-3 at 22.) 9 The night before the incident, Plaintiff braided a bedsheet to create a noose. (ECF No. 38- 10 3 at 19.) The following morning, Plaintiff tied one end of the noose to the smoke detector affixed 11 to the ceiling in the dayroom in CSP-SAC’s B-Facility, A Section. (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff then put 12 the other end of the noose around his neck and climbed over the guardrail and stood on the ledge 13 on the second tier of A Section. (ECF No. 38-4 at 2.) 14 Defendant and other correctional staff responded to a radio announcement and alarm 15 regarding Plaintiff’s suicide attempt. (Id.) Non-Defendant Lieutenant Hobert observed Plaintiff 16 and believed the noose was tightly constructed and seemingly strong enough to support Plaintiff’s 17 weight if he jumped. (ECF No. 38-5 at 3.) The officers approached Plaintiff on the second tier 18 cautiously, fearing Plaintiff may jump and activate the noose. (ECF No. 38-4 at 2.) 19 Defendant stood about three feet away from Plaintiff and ordered him to come back over 20 the guardrail several times. (ECF No. 38-4 at 2.) Lieutenant Hobert gave similar orders. (Id.) 21 Lieutenant Hobert directed other staff to get cut down tools and called for the A-Facility 22 Treatment and Triage nurse to report to the scene to provide medical treatment to Plaintiff in the 23 event he hung himself or fell to the lower tier. (ECF No. 38-5 at 2.) 24 1 The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted. 25

26 2 The Mental Health Services Delivery System Program Guide for the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation provides four levels of mental health care services: 27 (1) Correction Clinical Case Management System (“CCCMS”); (2) enhanced outpatient; (3) mental health crisis bed; and (4) hospital care. Coleman v. Brown, No. CIV. S-90-520 LKK, 28 2013 WL 6491529, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2013). 1 For at least the next ten minutes, multiple officers tried to verbally dissuade Plaintiff from 2 going through with his suicide attempt and ordered him to climb back over to the second tier 3 away from the ledge. (ECF No. 38-3 at 7–8.) Plaintiff repeatedly refused to obey the officers’ 4 orders by not coming back over the guardrail to the second tier. (Id. at 7.) 5 Defendant contends Plaintiff then became visibly aggressive towards staff and Plaintiff 6 threatened to strike Defendant and other officers on scene, eventually attempting to punch Officer 7 D. Garret.3 (ECF No. 38-4 at 2.) This caused Plaintiff to lurch away from the guardrail several 8 times and lose his grip on the guardrail before reaching out for the guardrail again to regain his 9 balance. (Id.) 10 Lieutenant Hobert feared if the situation continued, Plaintiff would intentionally or 11 inadvertently fall from the ledge. (ECF No. 38-5 at 3–4.) He ordered Plaintiff to again step over 12 the guardrail and submit to handcuffing. (Id.) Plaintiff again refused to comply with Lieutenant 13 Hobert’s order. (Id.) Lieutenant Hobert then directed Defendant to prepare and utilize his 14 oleoresin capsicum (“OC”) pepper spray. (Id.) Defendant applied one burst of his pepper spray 15 to Plaintiff’s facial area from about six feet away. (ECF No. 38-4 at 3.) The pepper spray struck 16 Plaintiff’s face, which caused Plaintiff to let go of the guardrail to shield his face. (ECF No. 38-3 17 at 9.) Plaintiff lost his balance, and he slipped off the second tier’s ledge. (ECF No. 1 at 4.) The 18 noose snaped, and Plaintiff fell from the second tier onto mattresses laid out by officers on the 19 lower tier. (Id.) Responding staff then placed Plaintiff in restraints, escorted him to medical for 20 triage, and allowed Plaintiff to decontaminate with water. (ECF No. 38-4 at 3.) As a result of the 21 fall, Plaintiff claims he suffers from back pain and periodic seizures. (ECF No. 1 at 3.) 22 In a Mental Health Assessment prepared after the incident, M. Schneider, a Senior 23 Psychiatric Supervisor stated, “At the time of the event, [Plaintiff] was psychiatrically 24 decompensated and was trying to kill himself, and was actively engaged in a suicide attempt with 25 intent to die. He was unable to control his behavior towards custody staff.” (ECF No. 38-3 at 2.) 26 /// 27 3 Plaintiff disagrees and contends he did not make any physical gestures towards officers 28 because it would have caused him to let go of the railing. (ECF No. 38-3 at 9.) 1 Plaintiff filed the instant action on July 28, 2021, alleging Defendant violated his Eighth 2 Amendment rights and his rights under Article 1, Section 17 of California’s Constitution. (ECF 3 No. 1.) Defendant filed the instant motion for summary judgment on December 5, 2022. (ECF 4 No. 38.) 5 II. STANDARD OF LAW 6 Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party demonstrates no genuine issue 7 of any material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. 8 R. Civ. P. 56(a); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). Under summary 9 judgment practice, the moving party always bears the initial responsibility of informing the 10 district court of the basis of its motion, and identifying those portions of “the pleadings, 11 depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file together with affidavits, if any,” 12 which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. 13 Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). “[W]here the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof 14 at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be made in reliance 15 solely on the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file.” Id. at 16 324 (internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, summary judgment should be entered against a 17 party who does not make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to 18 that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. 19 If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing 20 party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact does exist. Matsushita Elec. Indus. 21 Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585–87 (1986); First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. 22 Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288–89 (1968). The opposing party may not rely upon the denials of its 23 pleadings but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or 24 admissible discovery material, in support of its contention that the dispute exists. Fed. R. Civ. P. 25 56(c). The opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that 26 might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, Anderson v. Defendant Lobby, Inc., 27 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986), and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a 28 reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. at 251–52. 1 In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not 2 establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the claimed factual 3 dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at 4 trial.” First Nat’l Bank of Ariz., 391 U.S. at 288–89. Thus, the “purpose of summary judgment is 5 to ‘pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for 6 trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Rule 56(e) advisory committee’s 7 note on 1963 amendments). 8 In resolving the motion, the court examines the pleadings, depositions, answers to 9 interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with any applicable affidavits. Fed. R. Civ. P. 10 56(c); SEC v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301, 1305–06 (9th Cir. 1982). The opposing party’s 11 evidence is to be believed and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of the opposing 12 party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is 13 the opposing party’s obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be 14 drawn. Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244–45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 15 810 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1987). Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue that necessitates a jury trial, 16 the opposing party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to 17 the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 586. “Where the record taken as a 18 whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine 19 issue for trial.’” Id. at 587. 20 III. ANALYSIS 21 Defendant moves for summary judgment as to all of Plaintiff’s claims and argues 22 qualified immunity otherwise shields Defendant from liability. (ECF No. 38-1 at 1.) The Court 23 will address each of Defendant’s arguments in turn. 24 A. Eighth Amendment Violation 25 Defendant argues he did not violate Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights because he did 26 not pepper spray Plaintiff to cause him undue harm. (ECF No. 38-1 at 6.) Rather, Defendant 27 argues he pepper sprayed Plaintiff to “protect Plaintiff and prevent further disruption to 28 institutional order.” (Id. at 7.) This argument is unpersuasive. 1 A prison official’s use of force constitutes cruel and unusual punishment when it inflicts 2 “unnecessary and wanton pain and suffering.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320 (1986). This 3 inquiry will turn on “whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore 4 discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Id. A Court must be hesitant “to 5 critique in hindsight decisions necessarily made in haste, under pressure, and frequently without 6 the luxury of second chance.” Marquez v. Gutierrez, 322 F.3d 689, 692 (9th Cir. 2003). 7 Therefore, to determine whether a particular use of force evinces wantonness, a court must 8 consider five factors: (1) the objective need for force; (2) the relationship between any such need 9 and the amount of force actually used; (3) the threat reasonably perceived by the correctional 10 officer; (4) whether the officer took efforts to temper the severity of his response; and (5) the 11 extent of the inmate’s injury. Id. 12 First, there is a triable issue of material fact as to whether Defendant needed to pepper 13 spray Plaintiff, given it appears from the record Defendant or other responding officers could 14 have cut down the noose to deescalate the situation per the CDCR Suicide Prevention and 15 Response protocol. (See ECF No. 1 at 12.) The record makes clear Lieutenant Hobert ordered 16 staff to get cut down tools to cut down Plaintiff’s noose when he first saw Plaintiff standing on 17 the ledge of the second tier with a noose around his neck. (ECF No. 38-5 at 2–3.) However, the 18 record is silent as to why these tools were not used during the ten to twenty minutes Defendant 19 and other officers negotiated with Plaintiff before Defendant pepper sprayed Plaintiff.4 If 20 Defendant’s goal was to protect Plaintiff from hanging himself, a jury could find cutting down the 21 noose could have accomplished this goal without using force. 22 Second, reasonable minds could differ as to whether using pepper spray to subdue an 23 inmate who is standing on a ledge with a noose around his neck was a proportionate or 24 appropriate response. While the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit a prison official from using 25 a nonlethal quantity of a chemical agent to prevent a perceived future harm, it does not follow 26

27 4 It is unclear from the record how close officers would have to get to Plaintiff to cut down the noose or whether such action would have jeopardized officer safety. These issues, however, 28 can be resolved at trial. 1 that a prison official may use a chemical agent on an inmate where there is an obvious risk such 2 use could cause significant harm to an inmate, including death. See Clement v. Gomez, 298 F.3d 3 898, 903–904 (9th Cir. 2002) (upholding two bursts of pepper spray to stop a fight between two 4 inmates inside a cell did not violate Eighth Amendment). Moreover, “the Eighth Amendment 5 requires clear and adequate constraints on the amount, if any, of pepper spray that may be used on 6 mentally ill inmates.” Coleman v. Brown, 28 F. Supp. 3d 1068, 1079 (E.D. Cal. 2014). It is 7 undisputed, “[a]t the time of the event, [Plaintiff] was psychiatrically decompensated and was 8 trying to kill himself, and was actively engaged in a suicide attempt with intent to die.” (ECF No. 9 38-3 at 2.) Thus, a jury could find the use of pepper spray under these circumstances runs afoul 10 of these constraints, especially given the risk Plaintiff could hang himself or fall to the first tier if 11 pepper sprayed. 12 Third, there is a triable issue of material fact as to whether Plaintiff posed a threat to 13 Defendant and others, such that Defendant was justified in pepper spraying Plaintiff. Defendant 14 states his other goal in pepper spraying Plaintiff was to stop “Plaintiff’s attempts to attack 15 responding staff on scene.” (ECF No. 38-1 at 7.) While Plaintiff admits to being verbally hostile 16 towards responding officers, Plaintiff states he never made any physical gestures towards officers. 17 (ECF No. 38-3 at 25–26.) Additionally, it is not clear based upon the record whether officers 18 were ever in danger of being struck by Plaintiff. At all times, responding officers were between 19 three and six feet away from Plaintiff. (ECF No. 38-4 at 2–3.) Moreover, there was guardrail 20 between Plaintiff and responding officers. Based on this evidence, it is unclear whether Plaintiff 21 posed a threat to Defendant or other responding officers. 22 Fourth, it is, however, undisputed Defendant and others tried to temper the severity of 23 their forceful response by allowing Plaintiff to eventually decontaminate and receive medical 24 treatment. (ECF No. 38-4 at 3.) 25 Fifth and finally, the Court finds Plaintiff’s injuries caused by the pepper spray and 26 subsequent fall were significant. In addition to enduring the temporary pain and irritation caused 27 by being pepper sprayed in the face, Plaintiff alleges he now suffers from chronic back pain and 28 1 panic attacks after falling from the second tier to the lower tier.5 (ECF No. 1 at 3.) 2 After weighing these factors, the Court finds a jury could conclude Defendant did not 3 pepper spray Plaintiff out of a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline. 4 Accordingly, the Court DENIES summary judgement as to Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment 5 claim. 6 B. Supplemental State Law Claim 7 Plaintiff seeks damages for Defendant’s alleged violation of Article 1, Section 17 of the 8 California Constitution which states, “Cruel or unusual punishment may not be inflicted or 9 excessive fines imposed.” See ECF No. 1; Cal. Const. Art.1 § 17.6 However, there is no private 10 cause of action for damages under the California cruel and unusual punishment clause set out in 11 Article 1, Section 17. Davis v. Kissinger, No. CIV S–04–0878 GEB DAD P, 2009 WL 256574, 12 at *12 n. 4 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2009) (citing Giraldo v. Cal. Dep’t Corrs. & Rehab., 168 Cal. App. 13 4th 231, 253–56 (2008)). 14 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s supplemental state 15 law claim. 16 C. Qualified Immunity 17 Defendant contends he is entitled to qualified immunity against Plaintiff’s claims. (ECF 18 No. 38-1 at 10.) “Qualified immunity balances two important interests—the need to hold public 19 officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from 20 harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” Pearson v. 21 Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). In determining whether a state official is entitled to

22 5 The record indicates responding officers placed mattresses on the lower tier below 23 Plaintiff. (See ECF No. 38-5 at 3.) These mattresses appear to have mitigated Plaintiff’s injuries.

24 6 Defendant agrees and the Court finds it has supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367 grants federal courts supplemental jurisdiction over claims where 25 no original jurisdiction exists. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Section 1367(a) provides “district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to 26 claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or 27 controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.” Id. In the instant case, the underlying facts of Plaintiff’s state law claim are directly related to Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment 28 claim. 1 qualified immunity in the context of summary judgment, we consider (1) whether the evidence 2 viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff is sufficient to show a violation of a 3 constitutional right and (2) whether that right was “clearly established at the time of the 4 violation.” Horton by Horton v. City of Santa Maria, 915 F.3d 592, 599 (9th Cir. 2019) (citing 5 Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232, 129 S.Ct. 808). 6 The Court already determined there is a triable issue of material fact as to whether 7 Defendant violated Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights, and thus Defendant is not entitled to 8 qualified immunity at this stage of proceedings. Id. However, the Court also finds there is a 9 triable issue of material fact as to whether Plaintiff’s right to safety was clearly established at the 10 time of the violation. Id. 11 Officials are charged with knowing the laws governing their conduct. Harlow v. 12 Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818–19 (1982). The Supreme Court rejects the proposition an Eighth 13 Amendment right is only clearly established when prior cases have addressed facts “materially 14 similar” to those in the case at issue. Hope v. Peltzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002); D.C. v. Wesby, 15 583 U.S. 48, 64 (2018) (“[T]here can be the rare obvious case, where the unlawfulness of the 16 officer’s conduct is sufficiently clear even though existing precedent does not address similar 17 circumstances.”). That the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain constitutes cruel and 18 unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment is well established. Whitley v. Albers, 19 475 U.S. 312, 319, (1986). It is similarly well-established prison officials may not ignore known 20 or obvious risks of substantial harm to health or safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834–37. 21 Defendant contends he is entitled to qualified immunity because neither he “nor any other 22 reasonable prison official would have known that complying with orders and pepper spraying 23 Plaintiff during a suicide attempt would violate the Eighth Amendment.” (ECF No.38-1 at 11– 24 12.) However, the Court finds reasonable minds could differ as to whether Defendant ignored a 25 known or obvious risk of substantial harm to Plaintiff’s health and safety. When Defendant 26 pepper sprayed Plaintiff in the face, Plaintiff was standing on the ledge of the second tier with a 27 noose around his neck and his hands on the guardrail to keep his balance. (ECF No. 38-3 at 9.) 28 When someone is pepper sprayed in the face, it is almost certain they will use their hands to either 1 shield their face from being pepper sprayed again or to wipe the residue off their face. Further, 2 the record clearly establishes when Plaintiff previously removed his hands from the guardrail, he 3 would lose his balance. (ECF No. 38-4 at 2.) Thus, a jury could conclude Defendant ignored a 4 known or obvious risk Plaintiff would lose his balance and either hang himself or fall to lower tier 5 when he pepper-sprayed Plaintiff in the face. 6 Confronted with these circumstances, the Court finds there is a triable issue of material 7 fact as to whether Plaintiff’s right to safety was clearly established at the time of the violation. 8 Accordingly, Defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity at this stage of proceedings. 9 IV. CONCLUSION 10 For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Defendant’s Motion for Summary 11 Judgment as to Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim but GRANTS Defendant’s Motion for 12 Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff’s supplemental state law claim. (ECF No. 38.) The matter is 13 referred back to the magistrate judge. 14 IT IS SO ORDERED. 15 Date: September 15, 2023 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28