(PC) Taylor v. Palagummi

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: July 16, 2025
• Docket: 2:19-cv-02375
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 BERNARD GLEN TAYLOR, No. 2:19-CV-2375-DJC-DMC-P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 14 JOHN SONZA et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42 18 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court is Defendant Palagummi’s unopposed motion for 19 summary judgment. See ECF No. 66. 20 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for summary judgment or summary 21 adjudication when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 22 together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that 23 the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The 24 standard for summary judgment and summary adjudication is the same. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25 56(a), 56(c); see also Mora v. ChemTronics, 16 F. Supp. 2d. 1192, 1200 (S.D. Cal. 1998). One of 26 the principal purposes of Rule 56 is to dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses. See 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). Under summary judgment practice, the 2 moving party

3 . . . always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of “the pleadings, 4 depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,” which it believes demonstrate the absence of a 5 genuine issue of material fact.

6 Id., at 323 (quoting former Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). 7 If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the 8 opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. See 9 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In attempting to 10 establish the existence of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the 11 allegations or denials of its pleadings but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the 12 form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in support of its contention that the 13 dispute exists. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1); see also Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11. The 14 opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might 15 affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 16 242, 248 (1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th 17 Cir. 1987), and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could 18 return a verdict for the nonmoving party, Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1436 19 (9th Cir. 1987). To demonstrate that an issue is genuine, the opposing party “must do more than 20 simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts . . . . Where the record 21 taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no 22 ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted). It is sufficient that “the 23 claimed factual dispute be shown to require a trier of fact to resolve the parties’ differing versions 24 of the truth at trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. 25 In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings, 26 depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any. 27 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed, see Anderson, 28 477 U.S. at 255, and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the 1 court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party, see Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. 2 Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party’s obligation to 3 produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. See Richards v. Nielsen 4 Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 5 1987). Ultimately, “[b]efore the evidence is left to the jury, there is a preliminary question for the 6 judge, not whether there is literally no evidence, but whether there is any upon which a jury could 7 properly proceed to find a verdict for the party producing it, upon whom the onus of proof is 8 imposed.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251. 9 10 I. BACKGOUND 11 A. Procedural History 12 Plaintiff Bernard Glen Taylor, a state prisoner at the time, initiated this action by 13 filing a pro se civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on November 21, 2019. See ECF 14 No. 1. On December 2, 2019, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint as of right pursuant to 15 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15. See ECF No. 5. The Court screened the first amended 16 complaint and directed Plaintiff to file a second amended complaint. See ECF No. 12. Plaintiff 17 complied and filed a second amended complaint on June 2, 2021. See ECF No. 16. On August 4, 18 2021, the Court screened the second amended complaint, found the second amended complaint 19 states cognizable claims against Defendants Palagummi and Sonza, and provided Plaintiff an 20 opportunity to file a third amended complaint within 30 days as to his claims against Defendant 21 Malakkla. See ECF No. 17. Plaintiff filed a notice of voluntary dismissal of Defendant 22 Malakkla, who was dismissed on August 30, 2021, on Plaintiff’s notice. See ECF No. 22. On the 23 same day, the Court directed service of the second amended complaint on Defendants Palagummi 24 and Sonza. See ECF No. 23. 25 / / / 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 On September 15, 2021, the Attorney General’s office filed a notice of its intent to 2 not waive service as to Defendant Sonza. See ECF No. 27. On October 19, 2021, summons was 3 returned unexecuted by the United States Marshal as to Defendant Sonza, who remains 4 unserved.1 See ECF No. 30. Defendant Palagummi waived service on October 22, 2021. See 5 ECF No. 31. Following proceedings on Defendant Palabummi’s motion to revoke Plaintiff’s in 6 forma pauperis status, which was granted, Plaintiff paid the filing fees for this case and Defendant 7 Palagummi filed an answer on April 17, 2023. See ECF No. 53. On May 26, 2023, The Court 8 issued a schedule for the case. See ECF No. 57. After the close of discovery, Defendant 9 Palagummi filed the currently pending motion for summary judgment. See ECF No. 66. Plaintiff 10 has not filed an opposition. 11 B. Plaintiff’s Allegations 12 This action currently proceeds on Plaintiff’s second amended complaint. See ECF 13 No. 16. Plaintiff alleges Defendant Palagummi was, at the times relevant to the complaint, a 14 doctor at the California Health Care Facility (CHCF). See ECF No. 16, pgs. 2-3. Plaintiff claims 15 Defendant Palagummi “ignored or disregarded” his diagnosis by a previous doctor. See id. 16 Plaintiff asserts Defendant Palgummi failed to provide adequate treatment for his kidney 17 problems. See id. As a result, Plaintiff claims he has suffered blood infections, lost kidney 18 function, and has requires dialysis. See id. 19 20 II. THE PARTIES’ EVIDENCE 21 Defendant's unopposed motion for summary judgment is supported by a statement 22 of Defendant’s Undisputed Facts (DUF), ECF No. 66-5, and the declarations of Defendant 23 Palagummi, ECF No. 66-2, B. Feinberg, M.D., ECF No. 66-3, and defense counsel Evan Medina, 24 Esq., ECF No. 66-4. Plaintiff has not filed an opposition to Defendant’s motion, nor does he 25 otherwise dispute any of Defendant’s evidence. The docket reflects no filings by Plaintiff after 26 Defendant’s motion for summary judgment was filed. 27 1 The Court will recommend dismissal of Defendant Sonza for failure to effect 28 timely service of process as required under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m). 1 Given that Defendant’s motion is unopposed, the facts asserted by Defendant are 2 necessarily undisputed and the Court accepts Defendant’s summary of the relevant facts as 3 follows:

4 * * *

5 5. Plaintiff was first notified of his kidney disease around 2005 by Dr. Ruggles. (Medina Decl. at Ex. A, Deposition of Plaintiff, at 6 pp. 17:22-18:6.)

7 6. Plaintiff was referred to Dr. Ruggles after experiencing flu- like symptoms and exhaustion. (Medina Decl. at Ex. A, Pl.’s Depo. Tr., p. 8 19:1-12.)

9 7. Plaintiff cannot remember what exactly Dr. Ruggles did to treat him, but he recalls receiving a steroid and another medication. 10 (Medina Decl. at Ex. A, Pl.’s Depo. Tr., p. 19:13-16.)

11 8. Plaintiff’s symptoms resolved after 90 days. (Medina Decl. at Ex. A, Pl.’s Depo. Tr., p. 19:17-21.) 12 9. After his symptoms resolved in 2005, Plaintiff did not 13 monitor his kidneys. (Medina Decl. at Ex. A, Pl.’s Depo. Tr., p. 20:8-14.)

14 10. Plaintiff arrived at Dual Vocational Institution (DVI) on September 7, 2016, at the beginning of his incarceration. (Medina Decl. at 15 Ex. A, Pl.’s Depo. Tr., p. 14:14-25.)

16 11. DVI was a reception facility. Inmates would come to DVI to get processed into CDCR custody. After they were processed, prisoners 17 were transferred to a different, long-term institution. (Palagummi Decl. ¶ 5; Medina Decl. at Ex. A, Pl.’s Depo. Tr., p. 56:6-19.) 18 12. Plaintiff remained at DVI for approximately three months 19 and then transferred to CHCF on December 5, 2016. (Medina Decl. at Ex. A, Pl.’s Depo. Tr., p. 15:3-7.) 20 13. Plaintiff remained at CHCF until he was released in 2021. 21 (Medina Decl. at Ex. A, Pl.’s Depo. Tr., p. 15:8-11.)

22 14. Dr. Palagummi never worked at CHCF. (Palagummi Decl. ¶ 4.) 23 15. Plaintiff mistook Dr. Palagummi for a doctor who treated 24 him at CHCF. Before Plaintiff’s deposition, Plaintiff thought Dr. Palagummi was an African male doctor who worked at CHCF. In fact, 25 Dr. Palagummi is an Indian woman who worked at DVI. (Medina Decl. at Ex. A, Pl.’s Depo. Tr., pp. 47:2-51:5; Palagummi Decl. ¶¶ 2, 3.) 26 16. Plaintiff was seen by many health care providers while in 27 prison. (Medina Decl. at Ex. A, Pl.’s Depo. Tr., p. 47:15-24; see Palagummi Decl. ¶ 6.) 28 1 17. At his initial health screening at DVI, Plaintiff was noted to be receiving medical care for high blood pressure (HTN or hypertension) 2 and for mental health conditions. (Feinberg Decl. ¶ 9.)

3 18. On September 14, 2016, Plaintiff saw non-defendant Physician Assistant Street for an intake history and physical. At this visit, 4 Plaintiff’s medical history was documented to be notable only for high blood pressure. Plaintiff stated that he was compliant with taking two 5 high blood pressure medications. Plaintiff’s blood pressure was noted to be well-controlled. (Feinberg Decl. ¶ 10; Medina Decl. at Ex. A, Pl.’s 6 Depo. Tr., p. 66:11-68:6.)

7 19. Plaintiff saw Dr. Palagummi on September 23, 2016, for the first time. The visit was scheduled to address Plaintiff’s history of a 8 latent tuberculosis infection. Dr. Palagummi noted that Plaintiff had no symptoms of an active tuberculosis infection but ordered a chest x-ray for 9 further evaluation. Plaintiff’s blood pressure was well-controlled. (Feinberg Decl. ¶ 11; Palagummi Decl. ¶ 8.) 10 * * * 11 22. On September 30, 2016, Plaintiff saw Dr. Palagummi for a 12 follow-up of his latent tuberculosis infection. Dr. Palagummi noted that Plaintiff’s x-ray showed no active tuberculosis, but that Plaintiff refused 13 treatment for his latent tuberculosis as recommended. Plaintiff’s blood pressure was well controlled. (Feinberg Decl. ¶ 14; Palagummi Decl. ¶ 9.) 14 23. On October 12, 2016, Plaintiff saw Dr. Palagummi for a 15 follow-up of the September 27, 2016, lab tests and for a follow-up of his high blood pressure. Dr. Palagummi noted that Plaintiff’s cholesterol was 16 elevated and ordered a cholesterol lowering medication. For Plaintiff’s mild anemia, Dr. Palagummi opined that these results may be due to mild 17 CKD (chronic kidney disease). Dr. Palagummi ordered blood work to determine Plaintiff’s iron levels to help clarify his type of anemia, though 18 Plaintiff refused studies to rule out possible causes of his anemia other than CKD, such as colon cancer. Plaintiff’s blood pressure was well 19 controlled. (Feinberg Decl. ¶ 15; Palagummi Decl. ¶ 10.)

20 24. On October 26, 2017, Plaintiff saw Dr. Palagummi for a follow-up of his iron studies. The studies were normal and Dr. Palagummi 21 opined that Plaintiff’s mild anemia may be due to his CKD and ordered further studies to reassess his CKD. Plaintiff’s blood pressure was well 22 controlled. (Feinberg Decl. ¶ 16; Palagummi Decl. ¶ 12.)

23 25. On November 1, 2016, Plaintiff had lab work with essentially unchanged results related to his mild CKD. (Feinberg Decl. ¶ 24 17; Palagummi Decl. ¶ 13.)

25 26. On November 3, 2016, Dr. Palagummi reviewed the lab results and submitted a request for Plaintiff to be scheduled for a follow- 26 up appointment to discuss these results. (Feinberg Decl. ¶ 18; Palagummi Decl. ¶ 13.) 27

28 / / / 1 27. On November 16, 2016, Plaintiff saw Dr. Palagummi for a follow-up of his lab results. Dr. Palagummi noted that the iron studies 2 were normal and therefore iron deficiency was not a cause of Plaintiff’s anemia. She ordered further studies to look for other causes of anemia, 3 such as folic acid or B12 deficiencies, or hemoglobinopathies such as a sickle cell trait. Plaintiff’s blood pressure was still well-controlled at this 4 visit. This was the last time Dr. Palagummi met with Plaintiff. (Feinberg Decl. ¶ 19; Palagummi Decl. ¶ 14.) 5 28. On December 2, 2016, Plaintiff had lab work with 6 unchanged results relating to his mild CKD. Plaintiff’s hemoglobin electrophoresis ordered by Dr. Palagummi was consistent with the 7 diagnosis of sickle cell trait. Thus, sickle cell trait appeared to be a potential cause of Plaintiff’s anemia. (Feinberg Decl. ¶ 21; Palagummi 8 Decl. ¶ 16.)

9 29. Plaintiff transferred to CHCF on December 5, 2016. (Medina Decl. at Ex. A, Pl.’s Depo. Tr., p. 15:3-7; Feinberg Decl. ¶ 22.) 10 30. On December 8, 2016, Dr. Palagummi reviewed the lab 11 results from December 2, 2016, and submitted a request for Plaintiff to be scheduled for a follow-up to discuss the results. Dr. Palagummi was 12 unaware that Plaintiff had transferred three days prior. This represents Dr. Palagummi’s last involvement in Plaintiff’s medical care and Dr. 13 Palagummi had no control over Plaintiff’s care after he transferred. (Feinberg Decl. ¶ 21; Palagummi Decl. ¶ 16.) 14 31. Plaintiff admits that he did not experience any symptoms 15 related to his kidneys while he was at DVI. (Medina Decl. at Ex. A, Pl.’s Depo. Tr., pp. 21:19-22:4.) 16 32. Plaintiff had lab work performed on April 28, 2017, at 17 CHCF and the results related to his mild CKD remained essentially unchanged. (Feinberg Decl. ¶ 24.) 18 33. Plaintiff did not begin to experience symptoms related to 19 his kidneys until a year to a year-and-a-half after his interactions with Dr. Palagummi. (Medina Decl. at Ex. A, Pl.’s Depo. Tr., pp. 21:19-22:11.) 20 * * * 21 38. Plaintiff admits that Dr. Palagummi never assisted with his 22 dialysis because he was not on dialysis when he was seeing Dr. Palagummi. (Medina Decl. at Ex. A, Pl.’s Depo. Tr., p. 92:13-21.) 23 39. Dr. Palagummi provided Plaintiff with timely, judicious, 24 and medically appropriate care responsive to his medical needs. Plaintiff’s claim that Dr. Palagummi was deliberately indifferent by failing 25 to provide adequate treatment for his kidney problems is not supported by the medical record. Dr. Palagummi’s treatment related to Plaintiff’s mild 26 CKD was appropriate because she ensured that his blood pressure was well-controlled, and she frequently reviewed Plaintiff’s lab results related 27 to his mild CKD to make sure that his levels did not worsen. Plaintiff’s lab results related to mild CKD remained essentially unchanged while he 28 was at DVI, indicating that his mild CKD was successfully being slowed 1 in its progression. Further, it was unnecessary to refer Plaintiff to a nephrologist while he was at DVI because his eGFR remained around 54 2 and did not go below 30. Dr. Palagummi’s care was medical acceptable under the circumstances, and no actions of inactions of Dr. Palagummi 3 caused or contributed to Plaintiff’s unfortunate subsequent kidney failure. (Feinberg Decl. ¶ 27; Palagummi Decl. ¶ 17.) 4 ECF No. 66-5, pgs. 2–9. 5 6 7 III. DISCUSSION 8 In her motion for summary judgment, Defendant Palagummi argues she is entitled 9 to judgment in her favor as a matter of law because the undisputed facts show: (1) while at DVI, 10 Defendant provided adequate medical care; and (2) while at CHCF, Defendant had no 11 involvement in Plaintiff’s health care. See ECF No. 66-1. According to Defendant:

12 While Plaintiff’s kidney failure is undeniably unfortunate, Dr. Palagummi provided him appropriate and timely care and did not 13 contribute to his kidney failure. At his deposition, Plaintiff realized that he had mistaken Dr. Palagummi for a different doctor that treated him at a 14 different prison. He mistook Dr. Palagummi, an Indian woman who worked at Deuel Vocational Institute (DVI), for an African male doctor 15 who worked at CHCF. Plaintiff was incarcerated at DVI for three months before he transferred to CHCF in 2016, and during that time, Dr. 16 Palagummi provided him with appropriate medical care. Because Dr. Palagummi was not deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s medical needs, 17 Dr. Palagummi is entitled to summary judgment. . . .

18 Id. at 2. 19 For the reasons discussed below, the Court agrees that Defendant is entitled to 20 judgment in her favor as a matter of law. 21 A. Plaintiff’s Received Medical Care from Defendant While at DVI 22 The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which the 23 prisoner is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel 24 and unusual punishment. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993); Farmer v. Brennan, 25 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). The Eighth Amendment “. . . embodies broad and idealistic concepts 26 of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 27 (1976). Conditions of confinement may, however, be harsh and restrictive. See Rhodes v. 28 Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Nonetheless, prison officials must provide prisoners with 1 “food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.” Toussaint v. McCarthy, 2 801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986). A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when 3 two requirements are met: (1) objectively, the official’s act or omission must be so serious such 4 that it results in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities; and (2) 5 subjectively, the prison official must have acted unnecessarily and wantonly for the purpose of 6 inflicting harm. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Thus, to violate the Eighth Amendment, a prison 7 official must have a “sufficiently culpable mind.” See id. 8 Deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or injury, or risks of serious 9 injury or illness, gives rise to a claim under the Eighth Amendment. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105; 10 see also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. This applies to physical as well as dental and mental health 11 needs. See Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1253 (9th Cir. 1982). An injury or illness is 12 sufficiently serious if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant 13 injury or the “. . . unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 14 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Doty v. County of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546 (9th Cir. 1994). 15 Factors indicating seriousness are: (1) whether a reasonable doctor would think that the condition 16 is worthy of comment; (2) whether the condition significantly impacts the prisoner’s daily 17 activities; and (3) whether the condition is chronic and accompanied by substantial pain. See 18 Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 19 The requirement of deliberate indifference is less stringent in medical needs cases 20 than in other Eighth Amendment contexts because the responsibility to provide inmates with 21 medical care does not generally conflict with competing penological concerns. See McGuckin, 22 974 F.2d at 1060. Thus, deference need not be given to the judgment of prison officials as to 23 decisions concerning medical needs. See Hunt v. Dental Dep’t, 865 F.2d 198, 200 (9th Cir. 24 1989). The complete denial of medical attention may constitute deliberate indifference. See 25 Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1111 (9th Cir. 1986). Delay in providing medical 26 treatment, or interference with medical treatment, may also constitute deliberate indifference. See 27 Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1131. Where delay is alleged, however, the prisoner must also demonstrate 28 that the delay led to further injury. See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060. 1 Negligence in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not, however, give 2 rise to a claim under the Eighth Amendment. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. Moreover, a 3 difference of opinion between the prisoner and medical providers concerning the appropriate 4 course of treatment does not give rise to an Eighth Amendment claim. See Jackson v. McIntosh, 5 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996). 6 The undisputed evidence in this case establishes that, while Plaintiff was housed at 7 DVI for three months for classification and transfer to another facility, he received medical care 8 from Defendant Palgummi. Specifically, Plaintiff was seen and treated by Defendant Palagummi 9 on multiple occasions. At no time during his time at DVI did Plaintiff complain of kidney 10 problems, though Defendant Palagummi nonetheless ordered various tests to rule out 11 complications related to Plaintiff’s mild chronic kidney disease. Based on the evidence 12 presented, the Court finds that Defendant has met her burden on summary judgment of 13 establishing that she was not deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s medical needs during the time 14 she treated him at DVI. Because Plaintiff has not filed an opposition to Defendant’s motion or 15 otherwise presented any evidence to the Court, Defendant’s evidence is necessarily undisputed 16 and Defendant is entitled to judgment in her favor as a matter of law with respect to Plaintiff’s 17 claim that, while at DVI, Defendant was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. 18 B. Defendant Had No Involvement in Plaintiff’s Medical Care at CHCF 19 To prevail on a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must establish an actual 20 connection or link between the actions of the named defendants and the alleged deprivations. See 21 Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). “A 22 person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of 23 § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts, or omits to perform 24 an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” 25 Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations 26 concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See 27 Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Rather, the plaintiff must set forth 28 specific facts as to each individual defendant’s causal role in the alleged constitutional 1 deprivation. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988). 2 In the instant case, the undisputed facts show that, put simply, Defendant 3 Palagummi was not involved with Plaintiff’s medical treatment while at CHCF after he left DVI. 4 Specifically, the evidence submitted, which Plaintiff does not dispute, establishes that Defendant 5 never worked as a health care provider at CHCF. Plaintiff has acknowledged this fact at his 6 deposition by admitting to mistaken identity. The doctor Plaintiff alleges treated him at CHCF is 7 an African male; Defendant Palagummi is an Indian female who never worked at CHCF. Thus, 8 Defendant has met her burden on summary judgment of establishing the non-existence of an 9 essential element of Plaintiff’s claim, specifically, the causal link between Defendant Palagummi 10 and a violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights while housed at CHCF. Plaintiff has not filed 11 an opposition to Defendant’s motion or otherwise submitted evidence which would establish a 12 genuine dispute as to Defendant’s involvement at CHCF. Defendant is also entitled to judgment 13 in her favor as a matter of law with respect to Plaintiff’s claims of deliberate indifference by 14 Defendant Palagummi while Plaintiff was housed at CHCF. 15 / / / 16 / / / 17 / / / 18 / / / 19 / / / 20 / / / 21 / / / 22 / / / 23 / / / 24 / / / 25 / / / 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 IV. CONCLUSION 2 Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends as follows: 3 1. Defendant Sonza be dismissed for failure to effect timely service of 4 | process. 5 2. Defendant Palagummi’s unopposed motion for summary judgment, ECF 6 || No. 66, be granted. 7 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District 8 | Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(I1). Within 14 days 9 || after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections 10 || with the court. Responses to objections shall be filed within 14 days after service of objections. 11 | Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal. See Martinez v. 12 | Yist, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 13 14 | Dated: July 15, 2025 Ss..c0_, 15 DENNIS M. COTA 16 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 12