DEAN MICHAEL STEVENS, Case No. 2:25-cv-0785-DAD-JDP (P) Plaintiff, v. ORDER; FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Defendant. Plaintiff Dean Michael Stevens is a state prisoner proceeding pro se, who has filed this civil rights action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, together with an application to proceed in forma pauperis. Plaintiff has also filed a motion for temporary restraining order. Because the complaint fails to state a claim, I will dismiss it with leave to amend, and I will recommend that his motion for injunctive relief be denied. I will also grant plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis, which makes the required showing. I. Screening Order A. Screening and Pleading Requirements A federal court must screen a prisoner’s complaint that seeks relief against a governmental entity, officer, or employee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any portion of the complaint that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1), (2). A complaint must contain a short and plain statement that plaintiff is entitled to relief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and provide “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The plausibility standard does not require detailed allegations, but legal conclusions do not suffice. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). If the allegations “do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct,” the complaint states no claim. Id. at 679. The complaint need not identify “a precise legal theory.” Kobold v. Good Samaritan Reg’l Med. Ctr., 832 F.3d 1024, 1038 (9th Cir. 2016). Instead, what plaintiff must state is a “claim”—a set of “allegations that give rise to an enforceable right to relief.” Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1264 n.2 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (citations omitted). The court must construe a pro se litigant’s complaint liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam). The court may dismiss a pro se litigant’s complaint “if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Hayes v. Idaho Corr. Ctr., 849 F.3d 1204, 1208 (9th Cir. 2017). However, “‘a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.’” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)). B. Complaint’s Allegations Plaintiff alleges that while he was at Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility in San Diego, defendant Shuge Nite, another inmate, was asked by “an outside person” to put a “hit out on” plaintiff.1 ECF No. 1 at 3. Plaintiff claims that his life is in danger and that he can be killed in any prison. Id. Plaintiff is now housed at California Health Care Facility in Stockton, California. Id. at 1. 1 It appears that plaintiff may be referring to Marion Hugh “Suge” Knight, who is another inmate at Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility and a public figure. C. Analysis Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has not alleged that defendant was acting under the color of state law, which is a requirement to state a § 1983 claim. See Price v. Hawaii, 939 F.2d 702, 707-08 (9th Cir. 1991) (“[P]rivate parties are not generally acting under color of state law.”). Plaintiff may file an amended complaint. He is advised that the amended complaint will supersede the current complaint. See Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 907 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). This means that the amended complaint will need to be complete on its face without reference to the prior pleading. See E.D. Cal. Local Rule 220. Once an amended complaint is filed, the current complaint no longer serves any function. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original complaint, plaintiff will need to assert each claim and allege each defendant’s involvement in sufficient detail. The amended complaint should be titled “First Amended Complaint” and refer to the appropriate case number. II. Motion for Injunctive Relief In order to obtain injunctive relief, plaintiff must show (1) likelihood of success on the merits; (2) likelihood of irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) that the balance of equities tips in his favor; and (4) that an injunction is in the public interest. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). “The first factor under Winter is the most important— likely success on the merits.” Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 740 (9th Cir. 2015). Here, plaintiff fails to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits, since, as explained above, the complaint fails to state a claim. Moreover, even if plaintiff had met the pleading requirements, he must have done more than plausibly allege imminent harm; he must demonstrate it. See Caribbean Marine Servs. Co., Inc. v. Baldridge, 844 F.2d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1988). This requires plaintiff to demonstrate by specific facts that there is a credible threat of immediate and irreparable harm. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b). “Speculative injury does not constitute irreparable injury sufficient to warrant granting a preliminary injunction.” Id. at 674-75. Here, plaintiff’s claim that defendant put a hit out on him fails to establish that he faces an immediate and credible threat of irreparable harm necessary to justify injunctive relief at this stage of the case. See Goldie’s Bookstore, Inc. v. Superior Crt. of State of Cal., 739 F.2d 466, 472 (9th Cir. 1984) (“Speculative injury does not constitute irreparable injury.”); Rigsby v. State, No. CV 11-1696-PHX-DGC, 2013 WL 1283778, at *5 (D. Ariz. Mar. 28, 2013) (denying the prisoner’s request for a temporary restraining order based on fear of potential future injury based on past assaults). A presently existing actual threat must be shown, even though injury need not be certain to occur. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.,
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DEAN MICHAEL STEVENS, Case No. 2:25-cv-0785-DAD-JDP (P) Plaintiff, v. ORDER; FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Defendant. Plaintiff Dean Michael Stevens is a state prisoner proceeding pro se, who has filed this civil rights action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, together with an application to proceed in forma pauperis. Plaintiff has also filed a motion for temporary restraining order. Because the complaint fails to state a claim, I will dismiss it with leave to amend, and I will recommend that his motion for injunctive relief be denied. I will also grant plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis, which makes the required showing. I. Screening Order A. Screening and Pleading Requirements A federal court must screen a prisoner’s complaint that seeks relief against a governmental entity, officer, or employee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any portion of the complaint that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1), (2). A complaint must contain a short and plain statement that plaintiff is entitled to relief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and provide “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The plausibility standard does not require detailed allegations, but legal conclusions do not suffice. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). If the allegations “do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct,” the complaint states no claim. Id. at 679. The complaint need not identify “a precise legal theory.” Kobold v. Good Samaritan Reg’l Med. Ctr., 832 F.3d 1024, 1038 (9th Cir. 2016). Instead, what plaintiff must state is a “claim”—a set of “allegations that give rise to an enforceable right to relief.” Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1264 n.2 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (citations omitted). The court must construe a pro se litigant’s complaint liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam). The court may dismiss a pro se litigant’s complaint “if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Hayes v. Idaho Corr. Ctr., 849 F.3d 1204, 1208 (9th Cir. 2017). However, “‘a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.’” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)). B. Complaint’s Allegations Plaintiff alleges that while he was at Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility in San Diego, defendant Shuge Nite, another inmate, was asked by “an outside person” to put a “hit out on” plaintiff.1 ECF No. 1 at 3. Plaintiff claims that his life is in danger and that he can be killed in any prison. Id. Plaintiff is now housed at California Health Care Facility in Stockton, California. Id. at 1. 1 It appears that plaintiff may be referring to Marion Hugh “Suge” Knight, who is another inmate at Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility and a public figure. C. Analysis Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has not alleged that defendant was acting under the color of state law, which is a requirement to state a § 1983 claim. See Price v. Hawaii, 939 F.2d 702, 707-08 (9th Cir. 1991) (“[P]rivate parties are not generally acting under color of state law.”). Plaintiff may file an amended complaint. He is advised that the amended complaint will supersede the current complaint. See Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 907 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). This means that the amended complaint will need to be complete on its face without reference to the prior pleading. See E.D. Cal. Local Rule 220. Once an amended complaint is filed, the current complaint no longer serves any function. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original complaint, plaintiff will need to assert each claim and allege each defendant’s involvement in sufficient detail. The amended complaint should be titled “First Amended Complaint” and refer to the appropriate case number. II. Motion for Injunctive Relief In order to obtain injunctive relief, plaintiff must show (1) likelihood of success on the merits; (2) likelihood of irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) that the balance of equities tips in his favor; and (4) that an injunction is in the public interest. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). “The first factor under Winter is the most important— likely success on the merits.” Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 740 (9th Cir. 2015). Here, plaintiff fails to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits, since, as explained above, the complaint fails to state a claim. Moreover, even if plaintiff had met the pleading requirements, he must have done more than plausibly allege imminent harm; he must demonstrate it. See Caribbean Marine Servs. Co., Inc. v. Baldridge, 844 F.2d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1988). This requires plaintiff to demonstrate by specific facts that there is a credible threat of immediate and irreparable harm. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b). “Speculative injury does not constitute irreparable injury sufficient to warrant granting a preliminary injunction.” Id. at 674-75. Here, plaintiff’s claim that defendant put a hit out on him fails to establish that he faces an immediate and credible threat of irreparable harm necessary to justify injunctive relief at this stage of the case. See Goldie’s Bookstore, Inc. v. Superior Crt. of State of Cal., 739 F.2d 466, 472 (9th Cir. 1984) (“Speculative injury does not constitute irreparable injury.”); Rigsby v. State, No. CV 11-1696-PHX-DGC, 2013 WL 1283778, at *5 (D. Ariz. Mar. 28, 2013) (denying the prisoner’s request for a temporary restraining order based on fear of potential future injury based on past assaults). A presently existing actual threat must be shown, even though injury need not be certain to occur. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 130-31 (1969); FDIC v. Garner, 125 F.3d 1272, 1279-80 (9th Cir. 1997); Caribbean Marine, 844 F.2d at 674. Accordingly, it is ORDERED that: 1. Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis, ECF No. 3, is GRANTED. 2. Plaintiff’s complaint, ECF No. 1, is DISMISSED with leave to amend. 3. Within thirty days from service of this order, plaintiff shall file either (1) an amended complaint or (2) notice of voluntary dismissal of this action without prejudice. 4. Failure to timely file either an amended complaint or notice of voluntary dismissal may result in the imposition of sanctions, including a recommendation that this action be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). 5. The Clerk of Court shall send plaintiff a complaint form with this order. Further, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that plaintiff’s motion for injunctive relief, ECF No. 1, be DENIED. These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days of service of these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Any such document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations,” and any response shall be served and filed within fourteen days of service of the objections. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 1718 SO ORDERED. ( — Dated: _ March 12. 2025 ssn (aioe JEREMY D. PETERSON UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE g il