(PC) Steven Santiago v. Caldwell

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: December 11, 2019
• Docket: 1:19-cv-00566
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 STEVEN SANTIAGO, Case No. 1:19-cv-00566-SKO (PC)

12 Plaintiff, ORDER REQUIRING PLAINTIFF TO FILE A FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT 13 v. OR NOTIFY THE COURT OF HIS DESIRE TO PROCEED ONLY ON CLAIM FOUND 14 J. CALDWELL, et al., COGNIZABLE

15 Defendants. (Doc. 1)

16 21-DAY DEADLINE 17 18 Plaintiff Steven Santiago alleges that the defendants violated the Cruel and Unusual 19 Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment. (Doc. 1 at 5, 7.) In Claim I, Plaintiff alleges that 20 Defendants Caldwell, Hurlbut, Medina, Perez, and Taylor subjected him to excessive force. (Id. at 21 5.) In Claim II, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Hurlbut and Martinez failed to stop the excessive 22 force, and that Defendant Tamayo failed to document all of Plaintiff’s injuries.1 (Id. at 7.) 23 Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to Claim II. (See id.) Thus, 24 the Court ORDERS Plaintiff to either file a first amended complaint curing the deficiencies in his 25 pleading OR, in the alternative, notify the Court that he wishes to proceed only on Claim I 26 regarding excessive force and to dismiss Claim II and Defendants Martinez and Tamayo. 27 1 It is unclear whether Plaintiff intends to name Hurlbut as a defendant in both Claim I and Claim II or, alternatively, 28 in only Claim II. (See Doc. 1 at 5, 7.) In an abundance of caution, the Court assumes the former. 1 I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT 2 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 3 governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 4 The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are 5 legally frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek 6 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). The 7 Court should dismiss a complaint if it lacks a cognizable legal theory or fails to allege sufficient 8 facts to support a cognizable legal theory. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 9 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 10 II. PLEADING REQUIREMENTS 11 A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) 12 “Rule 8(a)’s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited 13 exceptions.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 513 (2002). A complaint must contain 14 “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. 15 Civ. Pro. 8(a)(2). “Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the 16 plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512 (internal 17 quotation marks and citation omitted). 18 Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a 19 cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 20 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must 21 set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its face.’” 22 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Factual allegations are accepted as 23 true, but legal conclusions are not. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 24 The Court construes pleadings of pro se prisoners liberally and affords them the benefit of 25 any doubt. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). However, “the 26 liberal pleading standard … applies only to a plaintiff’s factual allegations,” not his legal theories. 27 Neitze v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). Furthermore, “a liberal interpretation of a civil 28 rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled,” 1 Bruns v. Nat'l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation 2 marks and citation omitted), and courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe 3 I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and 4 citation omitted). The “sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully” is not sufficient to 5 state a cognizable claim, and “facts that are merely consistent with a defendant’s liability” fall 6 short. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 7 B. Linkage and Causation 8 Section 1983 provides a cause of action for the violation of constitutional or other federal 9 rights by persons acting under color of state law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under 10 Section 1983, a plaintiff must show a causal connection or link between the actions of the 11 defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by the plaintiff. See Rizzo v. Goode, 12 423 U.S. 362, 373-75 (1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects’ another to the 13 deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative 14 act, participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legally 15 required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 16 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978) (citation omitted). 17 III. EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES 18 The Prison Litigation Reform Act provides that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect 19 to prison conditions under … any other Federal law … by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, 20 or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 21 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Exhaustion of administrative remedies is mandatory and “unexhausted 22 claims cannot be brought in court.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211. Inmates are required to 23 “complete the administrative review process in accordance with the applicable procedural rules, 24 including deadlines, as a precondition to bringing suit in federal court.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 25 U.S. 81, 88, 93 (2006). The exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits relating to prison 26 life, Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002), regardless of the relief sought by the prisoner or 27 offered by the administrative process, Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001). Generally, 28 failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense that the defendant must plead and prove. Jones, 549 1 U.S. at 204, 216. However, courts may dismiss a claim if failure to exhaust is clear on the face of 2 the complaint. See Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 2014). 3 IV. DISCUSSION 4 A. Plaintiff’s Claims for Relief 5 1. Excessive Force under the Eighth Amendment 6 “[T]he unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain on prisoners constitutes cruel and 7 unusual punishment” in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 328 8 (1986) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). As courts have succinctly observed, 9 “[p]ersons are sent to prison as punishment, not for punishment.” Gordon v. Faber, 800 F. Supp. 10 797, 800 (N.D. Iowa) (quoting Battle v. Anderson, 564 F.2d 388, 395 (10th Cir. 1977)) (citation 11 omitted). “Being violently assaulted in prison is simply not part of the penalty that criminal 12 offenders pay for their offenses against society.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) 13 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 14 A correctional officer engages in excessive force in violation of the Cruel and Unusual 15 Punishments Clause if he (1) uses excessive and unnecessary force under all the circumstances, 16 and (2) “harms an inmate for the very purpose of causing harm,” and not “as part of a good-faith 17 effort to maintain security.” Hoard v. Hartman, 904 F.3d 780, 788 (9th Cir. 2018). In other 18 words, “whenever prison officials stand accused of using excessive physical force …, the core 19 judicial inquiry is … whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore 20 discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6–7 21 (1992). In making this determination, courts may consider “the need for application of force, the 22 relationship between that need and the amount of force used, the threat reasonably perceived by 23 the responsible officials, and any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response.” Id. 24 at 7. Courts may also consider the extent of the injury suffered by the prisoner. Id. However, the 25 absence of serious injury is not determinative. Id. 26 In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Correctional Lieutenant P. Hurlbut ordered 27 Correctional Officer J. Caldwell to remove him from Hurlbut’s office. (Doc. 1 at 5.) Plaintiff 28 states that Caldwell then slammed Plaintiff’s head into a door window, and that Correctional 1 Officer B. Taylor then threw him to the ground, handcuffed him, and punched him. (Id.) Plaintiff 2 alleges that Correctional Sergeant A.R. Perez, Correctional Sergeant M.R. Medina, Officer 3 Caldwell, and other officers then kicked and punched him, and that Perez repeatedly struck him 4 with a baton while he “was handcuffed and in a hogtied position face down,” causing him to go 5 unconscious. (Id.) Plaintiff states that he suffered abrasions and bruises to his head and neck, a 6 burn to his lower abdomen, seizures, and respiratory failure, and that he fell into a coma. (Id.) 7 Although Plaintiff provides no details regarding the context or the reason for the 8 defendants’ use of force, the Court finds that Plaintiff states a cognizable excessive force claim 9 under the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants punched, kicked, and struck him 10 with a baton while he was handcuffed and hogtied. (Id. at 5.) If true, regardless of the need for 11 force, the amount of force appears unnecessary, and Plaintiff suffered serious injuries as a result. 12 Claim I of Plaintiff’s complaint is thus cognizable. 13 In Claim II, Plaintiff alleges that Hurlbut and Correctional Officer M.J. Martinez failed to 14 stop the other defendants from using excessive force. (Id. at 7.) Plaintiff also alleges that 15 Psychiatric Technician M. Tamayo failed to document all his injuries. (Id.) The Court need not 16 address whether these allegations, if true, state a cognizable claim, since the Court finds that 17 Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to this claim. In his complaint, 18 Plaintiff admits that he did not submit a request for administrative relief because he “was focusing 19 on the issue of excessive force … and failed to address Claim 2.” (Id.) Exhaustion of 20 administrative remedies is mandatory, and Plaintiff’s admission that he did not even attempt to 21 exhaust makes clear on the face of his complaint that Claim II is barred. See Jones, 549 U.S. at 22 211 23 2. Retaliation 24 A claim for retaliation has five elements. Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1114 (9th Cir. 25 2012). First, a plaintiff must allege that he engaged in protected activity. Id. For example, filing 26 an inmate grievance is protected, Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 568 (9th Cir. 2005), as is the 27 right to access the courts. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977); see also Rizzo v. Dawson, 28 778 F.2d 527, 531-32 (9th Cir. 1985). Second, the plaintiff must show that the defendant took 1 adverse action against him. Watison, 668 F.3d at 1114 (citation omitted). “Third, the plaintiff 2 must allege a causal connection between the adverse action and the protected conduct.” Id. In 3 other words, the plaintiff must claim the defendant subjected him to an adverse action because of 4 his engagement in protected activity. Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 567. “Fourth, the plaintiff must allege 5 that the official’s acts would chill or silence a person of ordinary firmness from future [protected] 6 activities.” Watison, 668 F.3d at 1114 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Fifth, the 7 plaintiff must allege ‘that the prison authorities’ retaliatory action did not advance legitimate 8 goals of the correctional institution….’” Id. (quoting Rizzo, 778 F.2d at 532). 9 Although Plaintiff checks the box for “Retaliation” on his complaint, (Doc. 1 at 7), 10 Plaintiff does not state a cognizable retaliation claim. Plaintiff does not allege that he engaged in 11 protected activity, let alone that Defendants took adverse action against him because of that 12 activity. See Watison, 668 F.3d at 1114. 13 V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 14 For the reasons provided above, within 21 days, Plaintiff may file a first amended 15 complaint OR, in the alternative, notify the Court that he wishes to proceed only on Claim I and 16 to dismiss Claim II and Defendants Martinez and Tamayo. If Plaintiff no longer wishes to pursue 17 this action, he may file a notice of voluntary dismissal of this case. If Plaintiff needs an extension 18 of time to comply with this order, he shall file a motion seeking an extension no later than 21 19 days from the date of service of this order. 20 Plaintiff is informed that an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint, Lacey 21 v. Maricopa Cty., 693 F.3d 896, 927 (9th Cir. 2012), and must be “complete in itself without 22 reference to the prior or superseded pleading.” Local Rule 220. The Court provides Plaintiff with 23 the opportunity to amend his complaint to cure the deficiencies identified in this order. However, 24 Plaintiff may not change the nature of this suit by adding unrelated claims in an amended 25 complaint. 26 Accordingly, the Court ORDERS: 27 1. Plaintiff is GRANTED leave to file a first amended complaint; 28 2. The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff a civil rights complaint form; and, 1 3. Within 21 days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff must file one of 2 the following three items: 3 a. a first amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified in this order, OR 4 b. a notice that he does not wish to file a first amended complaint and instead 5 wishes to (1) proceed only on Claim I under the Eighth Amendment, (2) 6 dismiss Claim II, and (3) dismiss M.J. Martinez and M. Tamayo as defendants, 7 OR 8 c. a notice of voluntary dismissal of this entire case. 9 If Plaintiff fails to comply with this order, the Court will recommend that this action 10 proceed only on the claims found cognizable herein and that all other claims and defendants 11 be dismissed with prejudice. 12 IT IS SO ORDERED. 13

Sheila K. Oberto 14 Dated: December 10, 2019 /s/ . UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 15

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