(PC) Snowden v. Falco

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. California
DecidedMarch 3, 2020
Docket2:19-cv-01299
StatusUnknown

This text of (PC) Snowden v. Falco ((PC) Snowden v. Falco) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
(PC) Snowden v. Falco, (E.D. Cal. 2020).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 KIOKI RAY SNOWDEN, No. 2:19-cv-01299-CKD-P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 OFFICER FALCO, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this federal civil 18 rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This proceeding was referred to this court by 19 Local Rule 302 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 20 Plaintiff requests leave to proceed in forma pauperis. As plaintiff has submitted a 21 declaration that makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), his request will be granted. 22 Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 28 U.S.C. §§ 23 1914(a), 1915(b)(1). By separate order, the court will direct the appropriate agency to collect the 24 initial partial filing fee from plaintiff’s trust account and forward it to the Clerk of the Court. 25 Thereafter, plaintiff will be obligated for monthly payments of twenty percent of the preceding 26 month’s income credited to plaintiff’s prison trust account. These payments will be forwarded by 27 the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in plaintiff’s account 28 1 exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). 2 I. Screening Standards 3 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 4 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 5 court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 6 “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek 7 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 8 A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 9 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th 10 Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an 11 indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 12 490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully 13 pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th 14 Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227. 15 In order to avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain more than 16 “naked assertions,” “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause 17 of action.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-557 (2007). In other words, 18 “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 19 statements do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Furthermore, a claim 20 upon which the court can grant relief has facial plausibility. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A 21 claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw 22 the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. 23 at 678. When considering whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted, 24 the court must accept the allegations as true, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007), and 25 construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, see Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 26 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). 27 II. Allegations in the Complaint 28 Plaintiff alleges that while an inmate at California State Prison-Sacramento (“CSP-Sac”) 1 he was denied adequate mental health services when he reported feeling suicidal on two different 2 occasions to two different prison guards. ECF No. 1 at 3, 5. Plaintiff contends that as a result he 3 gnawed his right middle finger to the bone causing him additional pain and nerve damage. ECF 4 No. 1 at 3-5. In a separate claim for relief, plaintiff alleges that defendant Dr. Uddin verbally 5 ridiculed him and did not care about helping him. ECF No. 1 at 4. Lastly, plaintiff asserts that he 6 was pepper sprayed and had his left hand repeatedly kicked on January 1, 2019 when he reported 7 feeling suicidal. ECF No. 1 at 5. Plaintiff does not identify which defendants were responsible 8 for these actions. Id. By way of relief, plaintiff seeks compensatory damages. ECF No. 1 at 6. 9 III. Legal Standards 10 In order to state a claim cognizable in a civil rights action, a plaintiff must connect the 11 named defendants clearly with the claimed denial of his rights. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 12 837, 843 (1994) (official’s liability for deliberate indifference to assault requires that official 13 know of and disregard an “excessive risk”); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) 14 (“liability under section 1983 arises only upon a showing of personal participation by the 15 defendant (citation omitted) . . . [t]here is no respondeat superior liability under section 1983.”); 16 Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.3d 740, 743-44 (9th Cir. 1978) (discussing “requisite causal connection” 17 in section 1983 cases between named defendant and claimed injury). Additionally, “[a] plaintiff 18 must allege facts, not simply conclusions, that show that an individual was personally involved in 19 the deprivation of his civil rights.” Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194-95 (9th Cir. 1998). 20 When prison officials are accused of using excessive force in violation of the Eighth 21 Amendment, the relevant inquiry is whether the force was applied in a good faith effort to 22 maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing 23 harm. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320–21 (1986); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6–7 24 (1992). “Force does not amount to a constitutional violation ... if it is applied in a good faith 25 effort to restore discipline and order and not ‘maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of 26 causing harm.’” Clemente v. Gomez, 298 F.3d 898, 903 (9th Cir.2002) (quoting Whitley, 475 27 U.S. at 320–21.

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Bluebook (online)
(PC) Snowden v. Falco, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pc-snowden-v-falco-caed-2020.