(PC) Smithee v. California Correctional Institution

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: January 22, 2025
• Docket: 1:19-cv-00004
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 DANA SMITHEE, et al, Case No. 1:19-cv-0004 JLT CDB (PC)

12 Plaintiffs, ORDER ADOPTING FINDINGS AND 13 v. RECOMMENDATIONS AND DENYING DEFENDANT PRATAP NARAYAN’S 14 PRATAP NARAYAN, et al., MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

15 Defendants. (Docs. 163, 180)

16 17 Dana Smithee and E.M., a minor, by and through her guardian ad litem Jennifer Montes, 18 seek to recover damages following the death by suicide of Smithee’s son, Cyrus Ayers, while 19 Cyrus was incarcerated at California Correctional Institution (“CCI”). In the operative sixth 20 amended complaint (Doc. 142), Plaintiffs assert a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for 21 deliberate indifference against Defendant Pratap Narayan, M.D. who at the time of the 22 decedent’s passing was CCI’s chief psychiatrist during the months leading up to the suicide. 23 On November 22, 2024, the assigned magistrate judge issued findings and 24 recommendations to deny Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 180 at 24.) In his 25 findings and recommendations, the assigned magistrate judge also denied the parties’ respective 26 motions to exclude and/or disqualify each side’s expert witness. 27 Defendant timely filed objections to the findings and recommendations on December 6, 1 (Doc. 182.) In his objections, Defendant challenges the assigned magistrate judge’s denial of his 2 motion to exclude and disqualify Plaintiffs’ expert witness, Salma Khan, M.D. (“Dr. Khan”). 3 (Doc. 181 at 1.) Defendant reiterates arguments already presented in his motion, specifically that 4 Dr. Khan, as a psychiatrist employed by the California Department of Corrections and 5 Rehabilitation cannot offer expert testimony in this case because her employment presents a 6 conflict of interest. (Id. at 2.) 7 A magistrate judge is empowered by statute to “determine” non-dispositive matters, such 8 as discovery disputes, as opposed to merely making recommendations. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 9 Rule 72(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs the Court’s review of objections to a 10 magistrate judge’s non-dispositive pre-trial order, such as the magistrate judge’s ruling here on 11 Defendant’s motion to preclude an expert witness from testifying. Under Rule 72(a), a magistrate 12 judge’s ruling on such non-dispositive matters is subject to a “clearly erroneous or is contrary to 13 law” standard. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). 14 Here, the magistrate judge properly determined that Defendant failed to advance any 15 compelling basis for the Court to strike Dr. Khan’s expert declaration or preclude her or 16 otherwise disqualify her from testifying at trial. (Doc. 180 at 15-16 (citing inter alia Hewlett- 17 Packard Co. v. EMC Corp., 330 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1092 (N.D. Cal. 2004), and Campbell Indus. 18 V. M/V Gemini, 619 F.2d 24, 27 (9th Cir. 1980)).) According to Hewlett-Packard, a case relied 19 upon by Defendant, expert disqualification is a “drastic measure that courts should impose only 20 hesitantly, reluctantly, and rarely. 330 F. Supp. 2d at 1092. Among the many general principles 21 considered, disqualification of an expert may be warranted where “(1) the adversary had a 22 confidential relationship with the expert and (2) the adversary disclosed confidential information 23 to the expert that is relevant to the current litigation.” 330 F. Supp. 2d at 1092 (internal citations 24 and quotations omitted). However, “if only one of the two factors is present, disqualification 25 likely is inappropriate.” Id. at 1093. Assuming Dr. Khan had a confidential relationship with 26 CDCR by virtue of her employment, it remained Defendant’s burden to also “point to specific 27 and unambiguous disclosures that if revealed would prejudice the [Defendant].” Id. at 1094. ] decedent’s medical records, (see Doc. 175-2 at 20), Defendant provided no evidence that this 2 | occurred and therefore failed to meet the burden of proof on that issue. Moreover, while correctly 3 || pointing out that issues of fundamental fairness and prejudice, as well as other policy 4 | considerations, are relevant, Defendant presents no arguments or authorities that suggest the 5 | magistrate judge’s analysis or conclusion was clearly erroneous or contrary to law. 6 Defendant’s objection to the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendation that his 7 | motion for summary judgment be denied is based entirely on Defendant’s argument that the 8 || magistrate judge improperly relied on Dr. Khan’s expert report to find disputed issues of material 9 | fact going to the Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim. Because the undersigned 10 | concludes that the magistrate judge properly declined to disqualify Dr. Khan, it is appropriate to 11 consider Dr. Khan’s expert opinions. According to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), this Court has 12 | conducted a de novo review of this case. Having carefully reviewed the entire file, including 13 | Defendant’s objections, the Court finds the findings and recommendations to be supported by the 14 | record and proper analysis. 15 Thus, the Court ORDERS: 16 1. The findings and recommendations issued on November 22, 2024 (Doc. 180) are 17 ADOPTED IN FULL. 18 2. Defendant’s objection to the denial of his motion to disqualify Plaintiffs’ expert 19 witness (Doc. 175) are OVERRULED. 20 3. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 163) is DENIED. 21 IT IS SO ORDERED.

93 | Dated: _January 22, 2025 Charis [Tourn TED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 24 25 26 27 28